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ABSTRACT 
 
LISA HOPPENJANS: Watching the Watchdogs: Assessing a First Amendment 
Claim Against the Government’s Use of National Security Letters to Track  
Journalists’ Newsgathering Activities 
(Under the direction of Michael Hoefges) 
 
 The FBI’s use of National Security Letters (“NSLs”) to secretly demand 
customer records from communications providers in terrorism-related 
investigations has been criticized as an intrusion on privacy rights.  The potential 
use of NSLs to collect the records of journalists, however, raises an additional set 
of concerns by threatening to expose and deter confidential sources.  
 While the Fourth Amendment does not protect communications records in 
the hands of third-party service providers from searches or seizures by the 
government, when NSLs are issued for journalists’ communications records, the 
First Amendment may separately provide a right to certain procedural protections 
in order to guard against NSL abuses that threaten protected newsgathering 
activities.  Limits on this First Amendment right, however, are likely justified by 
the government’s countervailing interests in national security.  Those seeking to 
protect journalists’ records from disclosure via NSLs would therefore be best 
advised to pursue legislative reform rather than constitutional remedies. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, advances in technology 
have combined with the grant of sweeping counterterrorism powers to the federal 
government to create what some privacy advocates have described as a 
“surveillance society.”1  Although much of this surveillance is conducted in 
secret, and remains so, evidence has emerged that journalists, like many other 
Americans, have not been able to escape this new surveillance network.  In 
August 2008, for example, FBI Director Robert Mueller apologized to the editors 
of The Washington Post and The New York Times for collecting four reporters’ 
phone records during the course of a national-security investigation without 
following U.S. Department of Justice policies designed to limit subpoenas of 
journalists’ records.2  Later that same year, two former military intercept 
operators working at a National Security Agency monitoring center revealed that 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Adam L. Penenberg, The Surveillance Society, WIRED, Dec. 2001, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/9.12/surveillance.html; American Civil Liberties Union, 
Surveillance Clock – More, Sept. 4, 2007, http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-
liberty/surveillance-society-clock-more (last visited Dec. 18, 2009). 
2
 Carrie Johnson, FBI Apologizes to Post, Times, THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 9, 2008, at A4, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/08/AR2008080803603.html. 
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they had electronically eavesdropped on the calls of American journalists in 
Baghdad’s Green Zone.3   
While the intrusiveness of such monitoring may be unwelcome to anyone, 
it is particularly problematic for journalists.  Source confidentiality has long been 
considered an important professional responsibility of journalists, and journalists 
also depend on secrecy to avoid tipping off the subject of an investigative piece to 
the journalist’s activities, especially when the subject matter is controversial.  One 
reporter starkly warned that surveillance “compromises my ability to gather 
information and therefore compromises my ability to do my job.”4  Moreover, 
government monitoring of journalists’ activities threatens the press’ traditional 
role as a government watchdog;5 investigative reporting to expose government 
abuses may be significantly hampered if the government is monitoring the 
investigation.    
One of the counterterrorism tools that potentially exposes journalists to 
government monitoring of confidential newsgathering activities is the National 
Security Letter (“NSL”).  The NSL is a “unique form of administrative 
subpoena”6 used in national security investigations.  Authorized under five 
different statutes covering various types of information, NSLs allow certain 
                                                 
3
 Brian Ross, Vic Walter & Anna Schecter, Exclusive: Inside Account of U.S. Eavesdropping on 
Americans, ABC NEWS: THE BLOTTER, Oct. 9, 2008, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Story?id=5987804&page=1. 
4
 Samantha Fredrickson, Tapping Into the Reporter’s Notebook, THE NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, 
Fall 2008, at 10, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/mag/32-
4/tapping_into_the_reporters_notebook_10.html. 
5
 See infra Part II. 
6
 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (vacated by 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 
2006)) [hereinafter “Doe I”]. 
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government agencies—mainly the Federal Bureau of Investigation—to demand 
“customer and consumer transaction information in national security 
investigations from communications providers, financial institutions, and credit 
agencies” (hereinafter referred to collectively as “providers”).7  Although the 
information is collected from the provider, it is the customer who is the actual 
“target” of the investigation.    
The power to issue NSLs existed before the Sept. 11th terrorist attacks, but 
it was greatly expanded with the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act (“Patriot 
Act”),8 which contained provisions relaxing the standards for issuing an NSL.  
Prior to the Patriot Act, all NSLs had to come from FBI headquarters and be 
signed by a high-ranking FBI official.9  With the Act’s passage, letters can be 
signed by the Special Agent in Charge of one of the FBI’s field offices.10  The 
Patriot Act also relaxed the evidentiary requirement for securing an NSL.  Before 
the act, the FBI had to demonstrate specific facts that would allow the FBI official 
issuing the NSL to conclude that the target himself was a terrorist or spy;11 under 
the amended statutes, the agency need only show that the records sought are 
                                                 
7
 Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., National Security Letters in Foreign Intelligence 
Investigations: Legal Background and Recent Amendments 1 (2009), available at 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33320.pdf. 
8
 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Interrupt and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) 
[hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act]. 
9
 Valerie Caproni, Symposium, Crimes, War Crimes, and the War on Terror, 11 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 1087, 1095 (2007). 
10
 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505, 115 Stat. 272, 365 (2001). 
11
 Caproni, supra note 9, at 1095. 
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relevant to a national security investigation.12  These new provisions expanded the 
class of targets to whom an NSL could apply, and the use of NSLs soared as a 
result.  Between 2003 and 2005, the FBI issued more than 143,000 NSL requests, 
and by 2005 it was using NSLs in 29 percent of its counterterrorism 
investigations.13 
This expansion of NSL authority was particularly worrisome to some 
because, prior to amendments in 2006, the statutes authorizing NSLs barred 
providers from telling anyone that they had received such requests.  The amended 
statutes allow the government to issue nondisclosure orders to providers only if 
executive officials certify that dissemination of information about the request 
could harm national security; interfere with diplomatic relations or with a 
criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation; or endanger the 
physical safety of an individual.14  However, it should be noted that even when 
providers are not bound by secrecy, nothing requires them to alert a customer who 
is the target of an NSL that his or her records have been requested.  The target, 
therefore, often has no notice that his or her records have been turned over to the 
government. 
The NSL statutes themselves do not address the potential use of NSLs 
against journalists.  However, while expanding the NSL provisions in 2001, 
Congress amended most of the NSL statutes to require that records requests not 
                                                 
12
 USA PATRIOT Act § 505. 
13
 See Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, A Review of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation's Use of National Security Letters 120 (2007) [hereinafter OIG 2007 Report], 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf. 
14
 Doyle, supra note 7, at 9-10. 
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be made in investigations conducted “solely upon the basis of activities protected 
by the first amendment.”15  These amendments mirror a similar provision in the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.16  The extent of protection that these 
amendments offer journalists, however, is likely quite limited.  In discussing 
NSLs’ potential to chill political speech, privacy law scholar Daniel Solove noted: 
“Hardly any investigations are conducted ‘solely’ on the basis of First 
Amendment activities.  Law enforcement officials will invariably argue that their 
investigation is based at least in some part on criminal activity.”17  This would 
likely be the case in the journalism context as well.  For example, a law 
enforcement official investigating an illegal leak of classified information could 
seemingly issue an NSL for the phone records of the journalist who published this 
information without running afoul of the First Amendment limitation; the crime 
of the illegal leak would provide a basis for the investigation of activities beyond 
those protected by the First Amendment.   
A second possible limitation on the use of NSLs to collect the records of 
journalists is a voluntarily adopted U.S. Department of Justice policy that lays out 
special requirements for subpoenas to members of the media or for telephone 
records of journalists.18  This policy, among other things, directs DOJ employees 
(including members of the FBI) to take “all reasonable investigative steps . . . 
                                                 
15
 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505, 115 Stat. 272, 365 (2001). 
16
 50 U.S.C. § 1801, et. seq. 
17
 Daniel Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 168 
(2007).  
18
 See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(a) (2009). 
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before considering issuing a subpoena for telephone toll records of any member of 
the news media”19 and requires authorization of the Attorney General prior to 
issuing such a subpoena.20  As with the First Amendment statutory limitations, 
however, the extent of protection offered by this policy is likely limited.  As an 
initial matter, the policy applies only to telephone records and would thus provide 
no limitations on NSLs requesting other records, such as those from Internet 
service providers (“ISPs”).  Second, the policy does not have the force of law: 
violations are punishable only by internal disciplinary action and the policy 
specifically states that it “is not intended to create or recognize any legally 
enforceable right in any person.”21  Third, even when the policy is appropriately 
followed, the ultimate decision to request the records rests with the Attorney 
General rather than a neutral decision maker such as a judge.22  Finally, evidence 
suggests that this policy is not being stringently followed.  A January 2010 report 
by the Department of Justice Inspector General, for example, reveals that in three 
leak investigations since 2003, the FBI failed to follow these procedures when 
requesting media telephone records using exigent letters,23 a since-abandoned 
form of records request that is similar to the NSL, but easier to obtain.24  The 
limited protection offered to journalists by either the statutory First Amendment 
                                                 
19
 Id. § 50.10(b). 
20
 Id. § 50.10(e). 
21
 Id. § 50.10(n). 
22
 See id. § 50.10(e). 
23
 See Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, A Review of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation's Use of Exigent Letters and Other Informal Requests for Telephone Records 89 
(2010) [hereinafter OIG 2010 Report], available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s1001r.pdf. 
24
 OIG 2007 Report, supra note 13, at xxxiv.  
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exemption or the DOJ guidelines thus suggests that journalists remain susceptible 
to having their records collected through NSLs in the absence of a recognized 
First Amendment right against such records requests or statutory protection. 
The constitutionality of NSLs in general has been debated by scholars, but 
has not been heavily litigated.25  The dearth of litigation can be attributed to the 
nature of the NSL statutes themselves:26 because of the secrecy surrounding the 
issuance of NSLs, targets do not know that their records have been requested and, 
until recently, the custodians of the records were not permitted to notify anyone of 
the records request.27  According to one commentator, this has left “few people 
who have both the necessary knowledge and the will to litigate.”28  While the 
government has issued tens of thousands of NSLs,29 only two custodians are 
known to have gone to court to challenge the requests.30  These cases are 
discussed briefly in the paragraphs that follow in order to provide context and 
background and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
In the 2004 case of Doe v. Ashcroft (“Doe I”), an unnamed ISP and the 
ACLU brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
                                                 
25
 See Susan N. Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth Amendment, 41 
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 67, 71 (2006). 
26
 See id.  
27
 See 18 U.S.C. §3511(b) (2006). 
28
 See Herman, supra note 25, at 71. 
29
 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
30
 See Herman, supra note 25, at 87-88.  The first case, brought in the Southern District of New 
York, will be discussed below.  The second, brought in the District of Connecticut was 
consolidated with the first case on appeal to the Second Circuit, but was dismissed as moot 
because the government accidentally released the identity of the target. Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 
415, 419-21 (2d Cir. 2006) [hereinafter “Doe III”].  The Doe litigation will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 2. 
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York, claiming that the document production provisions of one of the NSL 
statutes violated the First and Fourth Amendments and that the nondisclosure 
provisions violated the First Amendment.31  First, the plaintiffs claimed that the 
statute’s failure to provide a mechanism for judicial review of NSL requests 
violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable searches and 
seizures,”32 which depends on the availability of a neutral tribunal to determine 
reasonableness.33  Second, they claimed that the document production provisions 
could be used to infringe the First Amendment rights to anonymous speech and 
association of ISP subscribers who were targets of an investigation.34  Finally, the 
plaintiffs claimed that the nondisclosure provisions—which essentially imposed 
gag orders barring recipients from disclosing receipt of the NSL request—
operated as unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.35  A prior restraint is an 
administrative or judicial order prohibiting in advance future speech or other 
communication36 and may only be upheld “if it is ‘narrowly tailored to promote a 
compelling Government interest.’”37 
The federal district court largely agreed with the plaintiffs’ claims.  As to 
the Fourth Amendment claim, the court held that the document production 
                                                 
31
 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) [hereinafter “Doe I”]. 
32
 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
33
 Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 495-96. 
34
 Id. at 506. 
35
 Id. at 511. 
36
 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993). 
37
 Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 511 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 
803, 813 (2000)). 
9 
 
provisions “authorize[ed] coercive searches effectively immune from any judicial 
process, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”38  The court also found this lack 
of judicial review relevant to the plaintiffs’ claim that the statute violated the First 
Amendment rights of subscribers, concluding that the statute’s document 
production provisions “may, in a given case, violate a subscriber’s First 
Amendment privacy rights . . . if judicial review is not readily available.”39  
Finally, the court agreed that the nondisclosure provisions “operate[d] as an 
unconstitutional prior restraint on speech in violation of the First Amendment.”40 
In 2005, in Doe v. Gonzales (“Doe II”), a member of the American 
Library Association filed a separate challenge to an NSL in a federal district court 
in Connecticut.  The Doe II court similarly concluded that the nondisclosure 
provisions violated the First Amendment.41  The two cases—Doe I and Doe II—
were consolidated on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, in Doe I v. Gonzales (“Doe III”).42  In the meantime, however, Congress 
amended the statutes to provide for judicial review of the nondisclosure orders 
and to provide limited judicial review of NSL requests themselves.43  The Second 
Circuit vacated and remanded Doe I to the federal district court for the Southern 
District of New York to reconsider the plaintiffs’ claims in light of the new 
                                                 
38
 Id. at 506. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. at 475. 
41
 Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 82 (D. Conn. 2005) [hereinafter “Doe II”]. 
42
 Doe III, 449 F.3d 415, 417 (2d Cir. 2006). 
43
 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 
192 (Mar. 9, 2006). 
10 
 
amendments and dismissed Doe II as moot based on a concession by the 
government.44  On remand, however, the government dropped its demand for the 
underlying records at issue in Doe I; the district court accordingly considered only 
the First Amendment challenge to the nondisclosure provision.45 
Because the Doe plaintiffs did not raise their First Amendment challenge 
to the statute’s document production provisions upon remand of the case to the 
district court, the viability of a First Amendment claim by the target of an NSL 
remains an open legal question.  The goal of this thesis is to examine the viability 
of a First Amendment claim against the use of NSLs by a specific class of 
potential targets—journalists.  A close examination of the constitutionality of 
NSLs as an investigative tool to collect journalists’ records is worthy of attention 
because the threat of NSLs to identify journalists’ sources or expose their 
investigative work has the potential to chill important newsgathering activities, 
particularly on issues relating to national security.     
Part II of this chapter provides the background for this discussion by 
briefly describing traditional views of a free press as a crucial component of an 
informed democracy and as a watchdog against government abuse.  Part III 
describes the debate over whether the First Amendment provides the press with 
protection against government intrusion into the newsgathering process in order to 
                                                 
44
 Doe III, 449 F.3d at 419-21. 
45
 Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 385 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) [hereinafter “Doe IV”].  As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the district court held the nondisclosure provisions unconstitutional.  Id. at 
385-86.  On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with much of the district court’s reasoning, but 
upheld most of the nondisclosure provisions based on an alternate reading of the statute that 
remedied many of the constitutional problems.  Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008) 
[hereinafter “Doe V”]. 
11 
 
carry out this role.  Part IV of this chapter reviews the scholarly debate on the 
conflict between First Amendment press rights and government interests in the 
context of national security.  Part V will then examine scholarly literature that has 
specifically addressed the constitutional implications of National Security Letters 
in general.  This review will demonstrate that the First Amendment implications 
of using NSLs to collect journalists’ records is a topic that has not been addressed 
in the scholarly literature.  Finally, Parts VI of this chapter explains the research 
questions and methodology for this study and provides a brief summary of the 
chapters that follow.   
 
Part II: The Role of the Free Press  
Because of the secrecy provisions of the NSL statutes, it is impossible to 
know the extent to which they are being used against reporters.  News accounts, 
however, suggest that NSLs are at least being used to seek reporters’ phone 
records in leak investigations,46 and the FBI admitted to using a similar 
investigative tool, known as an exigent letter, to obtain the phone records of 
reporters in the Indonesia bureaus of The Washington Post and The New York 
Times.47  While First Amendment legal scholarship has yet to directly address the 
constitutionality of the document production provisions of the NSLs, the potential 
use of NSLs to collect journalists’ records implicates longstanding views about 
                                                 
46
 Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, FBI Acknowledges: Journalists’ Phone Records are Fair 
Game, ABC NEWS: THE BLOTTER, May 16, 2006, 
http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/2006/05/fbi_acknowledge.html (citing officials who explain 
that reporters’ phone records “will be sought if government records are not sufficient”). 
47
 Johnson, supra note 2, at A4. 
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the role of the press under democratic theories of the First Amendment by 
limiting the press’ ability to inform the public and to serve as a government 
watchdog.   
The importance of the press in fostering the continued vitality of 
American democracy has been recognized by the judiciary48 and by First 
Amendment scholars.  Under the informed democracy view of the First 
Amendment, free speech is valued for its role in facilitating democratic 
decisionmaking.  Thus, Professor Alexander Meiklejohn writes that the “primary 
purpose of the First Amendment is . . . that all citizens shall, so far as possible, 
understand the issues which bear upon our common life.”49  In the same vein, 
Professor Lillian BeVier explains: “[A] viable democracy requires a politically 
well-informed citizenry. . . . Information in the hands of citizens is indispensable 
to their being able to hold their government into account, which is in turn 
indispensable almost by definition to democracy.”50 
Beyond merely disseminating information necessary for informed 
democratic governance, Professor C. Edwin Baker explains, the press plays its 
most important role when it exposes information about “government corruption or 
                                                 
48
 See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (“The press plays a unique role as a 
check on government abuse . . . .”); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (“The 
First Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information 
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a 
condition of a free society.”). 
49
 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 
75 (1960), quoted in Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and 
Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: The Central Role of the Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free 
Expression, 103 NW. U. L. Rev. 1303, 1311 (2009). 
50
 Lillian R. BeVier, The Invisible Hand of the Marketplace of Ideas, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: 
FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 233, 238 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002). 
13 
 
incompetence.”51  The watchdog theory of the press views journalists as playing a 
vital role in a democracy by scrutinizing government activities.52  Professor 
Vincent Blasi similarly conceives the role of the press in his “checking value” 
theory of the First Amendment, which posits that the exercise of First 
Amendment rights—both by the press and by the people—functions as a check on 
government power.53  To the extent that NSL statutes limit journalists’ ability to 
effectively carry out their watchdog or checking functions, the question becomes 
whether NSLs constrain activity that is at the core of First Amendment protection. 
 
Part III: The First Amendment and Government Intrusion into  
the Newsgathering Process 
 The debate over whether the press has constitutional protection against 
government intrusion into the newsgathering process often begins with a debate 
about the meaning of the Press Clause itself.  In one camp are those, like Justice 
Potter Stewart, who argue that the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment is a 
                                                 
51
 C. Edwin Baker, The Media that Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 324-25 (1998) 
(“Exposure of government corruption or incompetence . . . is probably the most important 
contribution the press can make to either democracy or to the public sphere.”); see also S. Reid & 
Laurence B. Alexander, A Test Case for Newsgathering: The Effects of September 11, 2001 on the 
Changing Watchdog Role of the Press, 25 LOY. L.A. ENT. L REV. 357, 360 (2005) (“The press, by 
informing the public about the government, keeps the government accountable for its actions or 
inactions . . . .”); HERBERT J. GANS, DEMOCRACY AND THE NEWS 79 (2003) (explaining that the 
watchdog role represents “journalists’ finest opportunity to show that they are working to advance 
democracy”), quoted in Clay Calvert, The First Amendment, Journalism & Credibility: A Trio of 
Reforms for a Meaningful Free Press More Than Three Decades After Tornillo, 4 FIRST AMEND. 
L. REV. 9, 12 (2005). 
52
 Calvert, supra note 51, at 9. 
53
 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. 
J. 521. 
14 
 
“structural provision” extending protection to the press as an institution.54  While 
such protection, Stewart notes, does not provide a constitutional right of access to 
particular government information, the press “may publish what it knows, and 
may seek to learn what it can.”55  On the other hand, scholars like Professor David 
Lange argue that the framers did not contemplate a separate constitutional status 
for the mass media and, rather, understood the freedom of the press as an 
individual right against prior restraints.56  Under such a view, constitutional 
recognition of an independent right to newsgathering for the press would not be 
warranted. 
Scholars note that the Supreme Court has not made clear its own view of 
the Press Clause.  Professor Erik Ugland describes the “law of newsgathering” as 
a “patchwork of conflicting case law, appended by an assortment of statutes that, 
in some cases, provide journalists with special dispensations.”57  Such confusion 
stems from the Court’s ambiguous rulings in free press cases and the “lower 
courts’ willingness to supply their own doctrine” in the absence of clear guidance 
from the Supreme Court.58  Professor Timothy Dyk notes that while the Supreme 
Court seems to have afforded the press greater protection than other speakers in 
the context of prior restraints and defamation, the Court “has not been as generous 
                                                 
54
 Potter Stewart, “Of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975); see also Melville Nimmer, 
Introduction—Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 
26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975). 
55
 Stewart, supra note 54, at 636. 
56
 David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77, 97-99 (1975) 
57
 Erik Ugland, Newsgathering, Autonomy, and the Special-Rights Apocrypha: Supreme Court and 
Media Litigant Conceptions of Press Freedom, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 375, 381 (2009). 
58
 Id. 
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in the area of newsgathering” and “has yet to explicitly afford special protections 
to the newsgathering process.”59  Dyk explains that while the Court’s 1980 
decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia recognized a constitutional 
right of access for the press and public to criminal trials, it did not provide a 
special right of access for the press alone.60  Similarly, Dyk notes that while the 
majority in the 1972 decision in Branzburg v. Hayes recognized that “news 
gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,” the Court held that the 
First Amendment did not give reporters subpoenaed by a grand jury the right to 
protect confidential sources.61  Constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinksy 
concludes that the Court’s language regarding newsgathering in Branzburg and 
similar pronouncements suggesting the need for newsgathering protection were 
merely “empty rhetoric from the Court.”62 
Professor Ugland’s comprehensive review of the briefs and opinions filed 
in eighty First Amendment media or press cases heard by the Supreme Court 
between the 1971-72 term and the 2006-07 term similarly found a lack of clarity 
in the Court’s treatment of the First Amendment rights of the press.  Ugland 
concludes that while the Supreme Court has “routinely acknowledged the 
importance of the press and has distinguished it from freedom of speech . . . it has 
not directly addressed [Justice] Stewart’s thesis, nor has it declared that the Press 
                                                 
59
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Clause has any meaning apart from the Speech Clause.”63  In assessing whether 
the Court’s jurisprudence has conferred special newsgathering rights upon 
members of the press, Ugland finds that the while the Court has rejected 
newsgathering claims for an affirmative right of access—such as, for example, a 
right to interview inmates in state prisons64—it has not foreclosed the possibility 
that the First Amendment provides the press with a “shield” against government 
interference in the newsgathering process.65 
Separate from the question of whether the Court has recognized 
constitutional protection for newsgathering, a number of scholars have focused on 
whether the Court should recognize such protection.  Professor Randall Bezanson, 
on one hand, argues that the freedom of the press protected by the First 
Amendment means only that the press enjoys “independence from government 
decisions about whether and what to publish.”66  Since newsgathering has “little 
to do with independent judgment,” it is “only incidentally related to press 
freedom.”67  In Bezanson’s view, generally applicable restrictions on 
newsgathering therefore do not threaten press independence and should be 
presumed constitutional.68  Chemerinsky, on the other hand, argues that 
newsgathering does not exist in a vacuum, but rather “exists to provide the 
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information that the press . . . publishes.”69  As such, it “directly serves core 
purposes of the First Amendment” by obtaining information about government 
and the political process that can then be shared with the public.70 
As the literature demonstrates, whether the Press Clause provides special 
protection to journalists beyond that afforded to other citizens, or whether the 
First Amendment’s Speech Clause provides general protection to the type of 
activities involved in newsgathering remains a subject of debate.  However, to the 
extent that protection for newsgathering rights does exist, the literature suggests 
that it is far more likely to be recognized in those cases in which the government 
actively interferes with the newsgathering process—for example, by compelling a 
reporter to testify—rather than in cases in which the government merely refuses to 
provide the media with an affirmative right of access to government property or 
information.  The recognition of a First Amendment right, however, does not end 
the inquiry in cases in which a newsgathering interest may be involved.  The 
courts next have to assess the competing government interest that supports a 
restriction on newsgathering.  In the case of NSLs, the claimed competing interest 
is national security.  The next part of this chapter therefore examines the literature 
on balancing national security interests against the rights of a free press.  
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Part IV: The Conflict between the Rights of a Free Press 
 and National Security Interests 
 Scholars have noted that First Amendment rights are often most at risk 
when the nation is attempting to respond to a perceived threat to its security.71  As 
Blasi concludes, however, it is also during such times that adequate protection of 
First Amendment rights is most crucial.72  Law professor Paul Haridakis notes 
this tension, explaining that “it is exceedingly important to assess any attenuation 
of First Amendment rights during wartime, because finding the proper balance 
between homeland security and civil liberties is dependent on a robust exchange 
of ideas and debate fostered by the First Amendment, while at the same time it is 
hampered by restraints on such rights.”73  During times of war, Haridakis 
explains, the focus is often on the need to unify behind the troops and the war 
effort, overshadowing the important question of whether there exists a free 
marketplace of ideas that can provide “the information necessary to reach prudent, 
informed decisions in support of or in opposition to a particular wartime action or 
policy.”74 
 Journalism historian Jeffery A. Smith explains that the press plays a key 
role in providing this information.75  While the executive branch has often 
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attempted to limit press access to information about military operations, Smith 
notes that, historically, extraordinary efforts to maintain secrecy have ended up 
jeopardizing the efficiency of missions.76  Moreover, Smith argues, “[e]arly and 
careful media analysis of troubles not being addressed can help the military avoid 
costly mistakes.”77  Smith noted that unrestricted news coverage helps ensure that 
armed conflict “conforms to international law” and also contributes to the 
“political and psychological dimensions of national defense.”78 
 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have brought a renewed focus 
on the conflict between national security interests and First Amendment rights or 
other civil liberties.  In a 2006 book, the influential jurist Richard Posner argues 
that “constitutional decision making in the era of modern terrorism” requires 
“restrik[ing] the balance between the interest in liberty from government restraint 
or interference and the interest in public safety, in recognition of the grave threat 
that terrorism poses to the nation’s security.”79  The question, according to 
Posner, is not “whether liberty is more or less important than safety,” but 
“whether a particular safety measure harms liberty more or less than it promotes 
safety.”80  In the context of free press rights, Posner argues that this evaluation 
should yield greater restrictions on the press than the Supreme Court has 
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traditionally permitted.81  Posner is particularly critical of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in 1971’s New York Times Co. v. United States,82 also known as the 
“Pentagon Papers” case, in which the Court held that the Times could not be 
enjoined from publishing a classified history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.  In 
that case, Posner argues, the Court distorted the appropriate balancing analysis by 
placing too much emphasis on the taboo of “prior restraints” and further, that in 
doing so, the Court “placed a thumb on the balance, arbitrarily increasing the 
weight of free speech.”83  According to Posner, judges must be deferential to the 
government’s claims regarding the nature of a terrorist threat, even when judges 
may have their own doubts.  He argues, “The Bill of Rights should not be 
interpreted so broadly that any measure that does not strike the judiciary as a 
sound response to terrorism is deemed unconstitutional.”84 
 Constitutional law professor Keith Werhan argues that while freedom of 
speech has fared relatively well since the September 11, 2001, attacks, as 
compared to previous periods of heightened concern over national security, free 
press rights have been more vulnerable to attack.85  Werhan attributes this 
difference to the relative strength of contemporary free speech doctrine, as 
compared to free press doctrine, and in particular, the Court’s failure to recognize 
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a meaningful First Amendment right to newsgathering.86  Werhan notes that “the 
lack of doctrinal clarity surrounding the press’s First Amendment right to receive, 
possess, and publish classified information,”87 and federal prosecutors’ increased 
willingness to compel reporters to disclose their sources have exposed “weak 
points in the Press Clause doctrine” since the terrorist attacks.88  Werhan argues 
that the Court must “shore up First Amendment doctrine to protect freedom of the 
press, and the democratic principles that a free press serves,”89 among other ways, 
by recognizing a qualified reporter’s privilege against compelled testimony.90 
Other scholars have focused more narrowly on the war on terror’s 
implications for freedom of the press.  Professor Kendra Stewart and attorney 
Christian Marlin noted that the relationship between the government and the 
media has changed in three important areas since the September 11th attacks: 1) 
“access to government information and the interpretation of the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA)”; 2) “the openness of administrative and judicial 
proceedings involving immigrants and suspected terrorists”; and 3) “the media’s 
access to American troops overseas and to military battles.”91  Of these, the 
government’s denial of press access to military tribunals and certain deportation 
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proceedings—and this denial’s potential threat to the limited newsgathering right 
established in the Richmond Newspapers case—has received particularly strong 
attention in the academic literature.92 
The legal scholarship reveals the deep tension between free press rights 
and national security interests—at those points when the need to protect national 
security by suppressing media activities is at its greatest, the need for a robust 
media that can inform citizens about government actions is at its greatest as well.  
The debate in the legal scholarship since the September 11th attacks demonstrates 
this tension, with scholars on one side of the debate calling for broad deference to 
national security interests and those on the other side calling for a renewed 
commitment to free press rights and other civil liberties.  The conflict between 
civil liberties and national security has been highlighted specifically in the legal 
scholarship on NSLs as well.  Part V addresses this body of literature.  
 
Part V: The Debate over the Constitutionality of National Security Letters 
Most legal scholarship on NSLs has focused on their constitutionality 
under the Fourth Amendment’s search-and-seizure requirements93 or has 
evaluated First Amendment concerns raised by the nondisclosure provisions that 
                                                 
92
 See, e.g., Howard W. Chu, Is Richmond Newspapers in Peril After 9/11?, 64 OHIO. ST. L.J. 
1655 (2003); Paul Haridakis, The War on Terrorism: Military Tribunals and the First Amendment, 
9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 317 (2004); Kathleen K. Miller, Note, Do Democracies Die Behind Closed 
Doors?: Finding a First Amendment Right of Access to Deportation Hearings by Reevaluating the 
Richmond Newspapers Test, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646 (2004). 
93
 See, e.g., Nickolas J. Bohl, Note, Unsheathing a Sharp Sword: Why National Security Letters 
are Permissible Under the Fourth Amendment, 86 B.U.L. REV. 443 (2006); Susan N. Herman, The 
USA PATRIOT Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67 
(2006); Lauren M. Weiner, Comment, “Special” Delivery: Where Do National Security Letters 
Fit into the Fourth Amendment?, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1453 (2006) (highlighting potential 
Fourth Amendment issues and suggesting reforms). 
23 
 
apply to NSL recipients.94  Less attention has been paid to whether the targets of 
the investigation have any separate First Amendment claim against the use of 
NSLs to gather information,95 and even those articles that have addressed the 
question have failed to consider whether targeted journalists may have a special 
claim to First Amendment protection from NSLs. 
The legal literature addressing Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
concerns relating to NSLs examines whether NSLs may infringe the Fourth 
Amendment rights of two different groups—the rights of the targets of the 
investigation and the rights of the providers that maintain the records in question 
and actually receive the NSL.  The rights of the latter were at issue in the Doe 
litigation,96 while the rights of the former have received greater attention in the 
scholarly literature.  The Fourth Amendment protects “against unreasonable 
searches and seizures” and provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause.”97  Under the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Katz v. 
United States in 1967, the amendment’s protections apply only when an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information or activity at 
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issue.98  Meeting this threshold requires “first that a person have [sic] exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”99  These requirements are 
referred to as the subjective and objective prongs, respectively, of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test.  Because the test is an individualized assessment, the 
Fourth Amendment interests of the target and provider must be considered 
separately; it is possible that there may be a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the information sought by the NSL for one of these parties, but not the other.  If 
an individual can demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy, the court next 
considers whether the search or seizure was “reasonable.”   
 Most scholars conclude that NSLs do not violate targets’ Fourth 
Amendment rights because targets cannot have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the records at issue.100  These analyses rest on a line of Supreme Court 
cases holding that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information that has been exposed to a third party,101 a rule that is known as the 
third-party doctrine.  In its 1976 decision in United States v. Miller, for example, 
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the Court held that a defendant had no protectable Fourth Amendment interest in 
his bank records because they had already been exposed to a third party—the 
bank.102  The rationale behind these decisions is that an individual who 
voluntarily discloses information to a third party assumes the risk that that party 
could reveal the information to the government.103  In the NSL context, 
commentators explain, the target of the investigation cannot have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in phone or Internet records, for example, because such 
records have already been disclosed to the third-party provider.104  As Nickolas 
Bohl explains in a student note in the Boston University Law Review, “One does 
not need an intimate knowledge of network circuitry to know that an ISP can 
track information about its customer’s habits.”105 
 Bohl suggests, however, that the third-party doctrine might not bar all 
Fourth Amendment claims by individuals who have voluntarily disclosed 
information to a third party.106  He points out that the Miller Court may have 
qualified its holding; the Court explained that it had not been confronted “with a 
situation in which the Government, through unreviewed executive discretion, has 
made a wide-ranging inquiry that unnecessarily touches upon intimate areas of an 
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individual’s personal affairs.”107  Based on this language, Bohl proposes that if a 
target could show that the NSL “touched upon intimate areas of his or her life, 
then it might give rise to Fourth Amendment protection.”108  As Bohl notes, 
however, it’s unclear what type of “intimate” information would be required to 
distinguish a particular situation from those in which the Court has previously 
held that disclosure to third-party providers voided privacy expectations.109  
The question of the Fourth Amendment rights of the provider similarly 
begins with an assessment of the provider’s expectation of privacy.  Bohl suggests 
that a provider that took steps to protect the confidentiality of the records could 
demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy, but that surviving the objective 
prong of the privacy expectation analysis would be a closer call that comes down 
to how society balances a provider’s sense of security in its records against the 
government’s need for the information sought in the NSL.110  While there are 
“societal concerns about the government having the power to rummage through a 
company’s records unchecked,” Bohl notes, society may be “less concerned about 
the government’s rummaging when it involves a suspected terrorist.”111  A 
provider would also need to overcome the third-party disclosure exception; while 
the provider has not willingly exposed the records, the target has exposed them to 
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the provider.112  Bohl concludes, however, that because law enforcement could 
only have access to the records with the provider’s permission, the provider likely 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy if it has not exposed the records itself.113  
This would lead to the counterintuitive result that the provider has greater Fourth 
Amendment rights than the target of the NSL, whose personal information is at 
stake.114 
 Another line of legal scholarship on NSLs has examined the impact of 
NSL statutes on First Amendment rights.  Two First Amendment issues 
seemingly are implicated by the NSL statutes: 1) whether the nondisclosure 
provisions of the NSL statutes unconstitutionally violate the First Amendment 
rights of NSL recipients and 2) whether the records production provisions of the 
statutes violate the First Amendment rights of the targets.   
The decision in Doe I prompted several authors to examine the 
constitutionality of the nondisclosure provisions and other aspects of the court’s 
decision.115  Brett Shumate’s 2005 student comment in the Gonzaga Law Review 
criticizes the district court’s original holding in Doe I that the nondisclosure 
provisions violated the First Amendment and argues that the court should have 
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applied intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny to the NSL nondisclosure 
provisions.116  To survive strict scrutiny, a law must be “narrowly tailored to 
promote a compelling Government interest”;117 in other words, it must be the least 
restrictive means of achieving the interest that it was enacted to serve.118  
Intermediate scrutiny is a less demanding standard that requires that a law 
restricting speech “advance[] important governmental interests unrelated to the 
suppression of free speech” and that it “does not burden substantially more speech 
than necessary to further those interests.”119  Under the intermediate scrutiny 
standard, Shumate argues, the provisions would surely survive, especially in light 
of the substantial deference given to the political branches on issues of national 
security.120 
A 2008 student note by Brian Eyink published in the Duke Law Journal, 
on the other hand, concludes that even after Congress amended the nondisclosure 
provisions to try to remedy First Amendment deficiencies, the provisions 
remained “unconstitutional prior restraints and content-based restrictions on 
speech.”121  Eyink argues that the NSL nondisclosure provisions fail the minimum 
constitutional safeguards required by the Supreme Court for a system of prior 
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restraints,122 provide the issuing authority with too much discretion in restraining 
speech, and are not narrowly tailored to the government’s national security 
interests.123   
Finally, several authors have discussed whether the NSL records 
production provisions implicate the First Amendment free speech and 
association124 rights of the targets, a question ultimately left open by the Doe 
cases.  A recent student note by Chris Montgomery in the Ohio State Law Journal 
claimed that NSLs—along with other government information-gathering 
methods—are used by the government to circumvent First Amendment protection 
for inflammatory but constitutionally protected speech related to terrorism by 
pressuring ISPs to censor material that the government could not directly censor 
on its own.125  Because private actors like ISPs may censor inflammatory rhetoric 
without running afoul of constitutional protections, Montgomery argues, the 
government has pressured ISPs to become “de facto Internet police,” “operating 
as proxy censors for the government.”126  Montgomery identifies the “overuse of 
National Security Letters,” “‘good corporate citizen’ programs and provisions that 
request ISPs to voluntarily remove questionable content,” and “vague provisions 
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in the laws prohibiting material support of terrorists that create doubt about the 
scope of illegal speech” as the primary means of applying this pressure.127  NSLs, 
Montgomery explains, not only allow the government to monitor Internet users, 
but they put “an ISP on notice that one of its subscribers is the subject of a federal 
investigation, increasing the probability that the ISP will drop the subscriber to 
avoid liability.”128  He suggests this is particularly worrisome when, as reports 
demonstrate, the NSL process has been abused.129 
Other authors have focused in particular on whether NSLs may violate the 
right to speak or associate anonymously.130  If NSLs are used “to obtain personal 
information about previously-anonymous users,” they may produce a chilling 
effect.131  Privacy scholar Daniel Solove argues that targets of NSLs and other 
information-gathering tools may in some instances have First Amendment speech 
and association rights against collection of their information from third-party 
providers.132  Solove explains that while the Supreme Court has suggested that a 
stricter application of Fourth Amendment requirements may be in order when a 
warrant implicates First Amendment interests, the Court has left open the question 
of what protections should be required when information gathering implicates 
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First Amendment activities, but the Fourth Amendment does not apply.133  In such 
cases, Solove claims, the First Amendment should require the application of its 
own set of procedural safeguards, serving as an independent source of criminal 
procedure.134  To determine whether First Amendment safeguards apply under 
this analysis, courts should determine “whether the activity at issue is within the 
scope of the First Amendment” and “whether the government information 
gathering has a cognizable chilling effect on First Amendment activity.”135  If so, 
the First Amendment requires that the government demonstrate “a significant 
interest in gathering the information” and “that the manner of collection is 
narrowly tailored to achieving that interest.”136  According to Solove, a warrant 
supported by probable cause will typically satisfy the narrow tailoring 
requirement.137 
Such safeguards could be invoked, according to Solove, when the 
disclosure of information to the government pursuant to an NSL implicates the 
target’s First Amendment speech and association rights.138  This may be the case, 
for example, when an NSL is used to obtain the identity of an anonymous blogger 
who has espoused controversial views relating to a terrorist organization.139  
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According to Solove, in such cases, even if the government does not bring 
criminal charges against the blogger, the “mere exposure of the blogger’s identity 
could have significant chilling effects.”140  Although most NSL provisions 
provide that a records request may not be made in an investigation of a U.S. 
person “conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First 
Amendment,”141 Solove asserts that such protection is too narrow because few 
investigations are conducted “solely” on the basis of protected activities.142  
Instead of focusing on whether the investigation is based on First Amendment 
activities, Solove proposes, the focus should be on whether the investigation has a 
chilling effect on such activities.143  If it does, he argues, then the warrant 
requirement should apply.144 
Patrick Garlinger assesses targets’ First Amendment rights against NSLs 
in a 2009 student note published in the New York University Law Review and 
concludes that a First Amendment challenge to NSLs issued to 
telecommunications providers would likely be unsuccessful.145  According to 
Garlinger, the “critical question . . . is the extent to which an NSL actually 
implicates free speech and association.”146  As Garlinger explains, First 
Amendment protection is limited when the government is not attempting to 
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directly regulate speech or association but “is instead engaged in law enforcement 
activity.”147  Furthermore, the First Amendment chilling effect doctrine can 
protect privacy only when necessary to safeguard speech; it thus “requires proof 
that the government’s action actually deters speech.”148  Garlinger suggests that 
the type of Internet activity recorded by ISPs (or other activity recorded by 
telecommunications providers), however, might not sufficiently implicate First 
Amendment interests to trigger constitutional concerns about expression and 
association.  Related records sought through NSLs would therefore lack a link to 
protected activity such that the NSL would “create a cognizable chilling 
effect.”149  Moreover, a litigant must not only prove that protected First 
Amendment activities have been “concretely chilled,” she must also demonstrate 
that the interest in the privacy of her data outweighs a compelling government 
interest in national security.150  Because NSLs likely fall within the content-
neutral category of regulations and their impact on speech is incidental, Garlinger 
argues, they would likely be subject to a deferential standard of review.151  
Garlinger’s analysis, however, fails to account for instances—as is the case with 
journalists—where an activity for which records may be collected through an 
NSL is conducted as a crucial part of an arguably protected First Amendment 
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activity, such as newsgathering.  In such instances, it at least seems more likely 
that a litigant could concretely demonstrate the required chilling effect of NSLs. 
 
Part VI: Research Questions and Methodology 
The literature on NSLs demonstrates that while providers may have a 
Fourth Amendment claim against turning over records, the target of the 
investigation would likely have no such claim under the third-party doctrine.  The 
First Amendment, however, may provide the target with grounds to challenge an 
NSL, depending on how a court views the extent to which the collection of the 
target’s records implicates First Amendment interests and the degree of protection 
the court is willing to afford such interests in light of national security concerns.  
Overall, the scholarly literature demonstrates the need for concern about 
the use of NSLs against journalists in light of journalists’ watchdog function to 
draw attention to government abuses.  Furthermore, legal scholarship 
demonstrates that while the Supreme Court has acknowledged the need to protect 
at least some newsgathering rights, it has not defined the scope of these rights or 
specifically recognized newsgathering rights for members of the press that extend 
beyond free speech rights held by other citizens.  To the extent that newsgathering 
rights do exist, however, the scholarship demonstrates that they do not appear to 
provide affirmative access to information held by the government, but rather act 
as a shield against government interference in newsgathering activities that 
journalists could otherwise conduct.  The literature on the conflict between free 
press and national security interests demonstrates that a First Amendment 
35 
 
newsgathering right would be balanced against a competing claim of national 
security interests by the government and that the courts have traditionally been 
deferential to such government claims.  Finally, the literature on NSLs shows that 
while many legal scholars have considered the effect of NSLs on Fourth 
Amendment rights of providers and targets and on First Amendment rights of 
providers, little attention has been paid to the effect of NSLs on the First 
Amendment rights of the targets.  Those scholars who have addressed the issue—
Solove and Garlinger—have come to opposite conclusions about whether the 
collection of documents like phone records and Internet search records through 
the use of NSLs would actually implicate First Amendment speech and 
association rights.  However, neither Garlinger nor Solove has addressed the 
special case in which an NSL is used to collect such information about a 
journalist’s newsgathering activities, a situation in which there may be a stronger 
First Amendment claim at stake.  This thesis attempts to fill that void in the 
literature by considering whether the First Amendment protects journalists against 
the use of NSLs to collect their information.   
The analysis will focus on whether journalists have a cognizable First 
Amendment free speech or free press right against government collection of their 
records pursuant to NSLs and, if such a right exists, whether it outweighs 
countervailing national security interests.  This analysis will build on and extend 
beyond the work of scholars like Ugland by assessing the recognition of 
newsgathering rights not just at the Supreme Court, but also in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals.  Further, this thesis will build on research on the conflict between free 
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press rights and national security interests by providing a comprehensive analysis 
of both Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions involving such 
conflicts.  In addition this thesis will examine cases in which the First 
Amendment speech or association claims of nonmedia litigants are balanced 
against national security interests and analyze what parallels may be drawn to 
cases involving press rights.  In analyzing these issues, four specific sets of 
research questions will be addressed: 
1) How do the National Security Letter statutes enable the government to 
collect records related to a journalist’s newsgathering activities?  To what 
extent do the statutes, their legislative history, and the Department of 
Justice policy regarding media subpoenas inform the First Amendment 
issues involved when the press is the target of NSLs?   
2) To what extent have the federal courts recognized that journalists have 
protections, based on the First Amendment rights to free speech and free 
press, against government intrusion into the newsgathering process?  How 
do these cases inform the question of whether journalists have free speech 
or free press rights against government intrusion through the use of NSLs? 
3) How have the federal courts balanced First Amendment rights—including 
the right to free press, free speech, and the closely related right to freedom 
of association—against countervailing national security interests?  How do 
these cases inform whether journalists’ rights against government 
intrusion into the newsgathering process would be upheld against the 
government’s national security interest in the information sought? 
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4) Does the First Amendment bar the government from collecting the records 
of journalists under the NSL statutes?  If not, what statutory reforms might 
best limit the impact of NSLs on the newsgathering process? 
This thesis is organized such that each subsequent chapter addresses one set of 
these research questions, in the order in which they appear.  The research method, 
described in further detail below, is a critical analysis of the relevant statutes, 
legislative histories, and case law.   
 Chapter 2 describes the evolution of National Security Letters from a limited 
exception to privacy protection statutes to a wide ranging, warrantless 
investigative tool, and the resulting judicial and Congressional backlash.  In 
explaining this evolution, this chapter describes the adoption of the first NSL 
statute and outlines amendments of NSL statutes to the present day.  This chapter 
also describes certain developments—such as the Doe v. Ashcroft152 litigation and 
the release of U.S. Department of Justice Inspector General reports revealing NSL 
abuses—that spawned legislative changes or calls for reform.  This chapter will 
also consider the extent to which existing Department of Justice policies 
governing media subpoenas may provide reporters with protection against the 
collection of their records through NSLs.   
Chapter 3 describes U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals 
decisions that address the extent to which journalists have (or lack) First 
Amendment protection against government intrusion into the newsgathering 
process, in which journalists research and collect information for the purpose of 
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reporting it as news.  Among other areas, this chapter covers cases in which the 
government sought to subpoena a reporter or materials created in the 
newsgathering process, cases involving warrants for newsroom searches and 
surveillance of reporters, and cases in which judges have issued orders 
specifically barring the media from engaging in particular newsgathering 
activities.   
Chapter Four describes U.S. Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 
decisions that address a conflict between First Amendment press, speech, or 
associational rights and national security interests and assesses how the courts 
have balanced these opposing interests.    
Chapter Five will analyze, in light of the case law discussed in Chapters 
Three and Four: 1) whether the press could claim a cognizable First Amendment 
right to protection against the collection of records of newsgathering activity 
through the use of NSLs and 2) whether the First Amendment interest in such 
protection would outweigh countervailing interests in national security.  This 
chapter will also suggest—in the case that no such First Amendment protection 
seems available or is outweighed by countervailing security concerns—legislative 
reforms that might provide the media with protection against NSLs while also 
respecting the grave national security interest at stake.   
The legislative materials discussed in Chapter Two, including statutes, 
bills, committee reports, and hearing transcripts, were compiled from the 
LexisNexis and WestLaw online legal research databases and databases available 
through the Library of Congress (Thomas.gov), and Government Printing Office 
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Access web sites.  The materials examined include all statutes authorizing NSLs, 
as well as all amendments to those statutes.  The research also involved an 
examination of all committee reports accompanying these statutes and 
amendments in search of any indication that Congress considered the First 
Amendment implications of the NSL provisions and, more specifically, 
considered implications for the press.  In addition, research for this chapter 
included an examination of all House and Senate committee hearings since 2001 
(when the Patriot Act greatly expanded the use of NSLs) that addressed renewal 
of the NSL provisions of the Patriot Act or NSL amendments.  The hearings 
examined were limited to those for which full transcripts have been published in 
the Government Printing Office Access database.  The decisions making up the 
Doe v. Ashcroft litigation153 were accessed via the LexisNexis database.  The 
Inspector General’s reports were accessed through the U.S. Department of Justice 
web site.   
The cases for Chapters Three and Four were compiled using various 
searches, described in detail below, of the LexisNexis and WestLaw legal 
databases.  Several limitations apply to the cases examined in both these chapters.  
First, given the large number of cases that have assessed the types of claims at 
issue in these chapters and the existence of state statutory protections that may go 
beyond what the First Amendment requires, the case searches were limited to 
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals.  Once these 
searches were performed, certain cases were eliminated from discussion based on 
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the fact that: 1) the court failed to actually reach the merits of the First 
Amendment claim at issue—for example, by resolving the claim on procedural 
grounds; 2) the court’s decision lacked precedential value because it was vacated 
in its entirety, reversed by subsequent proceedings in the same case, or overturned 
by a later decision in a different case; or 3) the search terms were included as 
merely incidental mentions in cases focused on other issues.154 
The research for Chapter Three focused on cases that reveal the extent to 
which the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals have recognized First 
Amendment free speech or free press rights against government intrusion into the 
newsgathering process.  A preliminary list of cases was compiled by running 
three separate searches.  First, a search of the Lexis Nexis Supreme Court and 
Court of Appeals combined database was run using the following search string: 
("newsgathering" or "news gathering" or “gather news”) and (journalist! or 
reporter! or media or news!) and HEADNOTES("First Amendment" or “U.S. 
Const. amend. I”).  In this list, there were two Supreme Court cases that satisfied 
all the limitations for this chapter – Branzburg v. Hayes and Zurcher v. Stanford 
Daily.  A Westlaw155 “Citing References” search, which provides a list of 
subsequent cases that have cited these decisions, was run on each of these two 
cases.  For both cases, the search was limited to subsequent decisions by the 
Supreme Court or federal courts of appeals.  The search on Branzburg was also 
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 The Westlaw database, rather than the Lexis Nexis database, was used for this purpose because 
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41 
 
limited, using WestLaw’s “headnotes” function, to cases with headnotes relating 
to “enforcement of generally applicable laws,” “disclosure of sources,” “In 
general, obligation to testify,” “privilege,” and “journalists.”  Finally, the search 
was further narrowed using Westlaw’s “locate” function to cases containing the 
term “subpoena” and any word that had “reporter,” “journalist,” or “news” as its 
root (such that the search would yield hits for plural versions of “reporter” or 
“journalist” and variations on “news,” like “newsman”).  The citing references 
search on Zurcher was limited to decisions containing the term “First 
Amendment” and the term “journalist, reporter, media, or news” (or any word 
with those terms as its root).   
A final list of Chapter Three cases was compiled as follows.  First, all 
duplicate results were eliminated from the lists.  Second, in order to focus on 
those cases that most closely parallel the type of intrusion posed by NSLs and the 
interests supporting such intrusion, any case in which the intrusion on news 
gathering did not originate with the government itself was eliminated.  This 
means that cases in which the intrusion merely resulted from a court enforcing the 
rights of private parties—for example, by enforcing a subpoena for the testimony 
of a reporter by a private party in a civil suit—are not included in the analysis in 
Chapter Three.  Third, the cases included in the final list were limited to those in 
which the government action at issue could be understood to constitute active 
inference with the newsgathering process, rather than a simple refusal to provide 
affirmative access to government controlled information or spaces, including 
records, courts, prisons, executions, crime and accident scenes, and military 
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operations, among others.  Finally, cases involving criminal laws of general 
applicability or court orders that barred individuals from sharing certain types of 
information with anyone—such as general gag orders banning litigants from 
speaking about a case, laws restricting the disclosure of classified information, or 
laws banning the sending or receiving of child pornography—were also 
eliminated from consideration.  In total, these three searches produced a list of 
twenty-two decisions that fit the chapter’s limitations.156   
The research for Chapter Four was focused on those cases in which the 
federal courts have evaluated a conflict between First Amendment press, speech, 
or association rights and national security interests.  Because only a handful of 
such cases involved media litigants, the analysis includes cases in which First 
Amendment claims were raised by media and non-media parties.  An initial list of 
cases was compiled by running two separate searches in the LexisNexis online 
legal database.  The first search used the database’s headnotes and core terms 
features to search the Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals databases.  The 
search string was: HEADNOTES ("First Amendment" or “U.S. Const. amend. I”) 
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and (HEADNOTES ("national security") or CORE-TERMS ("national 
security")).  Because a number of cases discussed national security-type concerns 
without actually invoking the term “national security,” it was necessary to include 
in this search cases in which either the headnotes or the core terms included 
“national security,” as the core terms function identifies key concepts at issue in a 
decision, even if the decision itself does not use the word or phrase at issue.  A 
second search of the same databases focused on cases in which “First 
Amendment” and “national security” appeared in close proximity.  This search 
string was: “First Amendment” /s “national security.”   
A final list of cases was compiled as follows.  First, duplicate cases were 
eliminated.  Second, cases were individually evaluated for compliance with the 
general limitations for Chapters Three and Four described above.  Third, in order 
to maintain a focus on how the courts have evaluated conflicts between First 
Amendment rights and national security interests, cases in which the court 
rejected the existence of a protectable First Amendment interest—for example, by 
determining that the activity at issue was not actually within the scope of First 
Amendment protection—were eliminated.  Fourth, cases were excluded if the 
court refused to consider a balance of national security interests and First 
Amendment rights because it determined that the activity at issue—for example, 
decisions on security clearances or visa applications—had been uniquely 
delegated to the executive branch.  Finally, the cases selected were limited to 
those in which the asserted First Amendment interest was based on the right to 
free speech, press, or association.  In total, these two searches produced a list of 
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eighteen decisions within the limitations, including four Supreme Court 
decisions.157   
Chapter 5 is largely an analysis of the case law discussed in Chapters 
Three and Four and its applicability to the First Amendment rights of journalists 
targeted by NSLs.  However, this chapter will also consider whether—in the 
absence of a viable constitutional claim—legislative reforms could provide 
journalists with protection against NSLs.  For this purpose, the Library of 
Congress’ online legislative database, Thomas, was used to compile a list of bills 
in the 111th Congress (2009-10) that would provide, or that with minor 
amendments could provide, potential avenues for reform—specifically, bills 
proposing amendments to the NSL statues and those that would create a federal 
media shield law.  The final list for discussion was limited to those bills in the 
House and Senate that have been voted out of committee.
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CHAPTER 2  
 
THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 
 
While National Security Letters (“NSLs”) have come under fire from 
privacy advocates in recent years, they initially developed as limited exceptions to 
federal statutes designed to protect privacy interests in areas where the Fourth 
Amendment was not available.1  NSLs are currently authorized by five specific 
provisions contained in four federal statutes.2  Under these statutes, the FBI can 
issue NSLs to obtain records from third parties, “including telephone companies, 
financial institutions, Internet service providers, and consumer credit agencies.”3  
The type of information that may be collected varies by statute, but typically 
includes customer account information and transactional records, such as 
telephone toll billing records.4 
This chapter first describes each NSL statute and outlines its history from 
the time of adoption through the Patriot Act amendments in 2001.  It will then 
explain how post-Patriot Act concerns over NSL abuse and a challenge to the 
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 See infra notes 11-19 and accompanying text. 
2
 Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, A Review of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation's Use of National Security Letters viii (2007) [hereinafter OIG 2007 Report], 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf. 
3
 Id. 
4
 Id. 
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NSL statutes in federal court, in the Doe litigation mentioned in the previous 
chapter, led to additional amendments to the NSL statutes in 2006.5   In 
explaining the NSL statutes’ history, this chapter will in particular consider 
whether Congress considered the unique First Amendment concerns involved 
when journalists are the targets of NSLs.  Finally, this chapter will examine the 
extent to which existing Department of Justice policies governing media 
subpoenas may limit the collection of reporters’ records through NSLs.   
 
Part I: The Development of the NSL Statutes 
 National Security Letters are authorized under five provisions in four 
different federal statutes:6 The Right to Financial Privacy Act,7 The Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act,8 The Fair Credit Reporting Act,9 and The National 
Security Act.10  This section describes each of these statutes and recounts their 
legislative history from the time of initial adoption through the 2001 Patriot Act 
amendments. 
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 See infra notes 101-107 and accompanying text. 
6
 The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 
118(d), 120 Stat. 192, 218 (2006), defines a “national security letter” to mean a request for 
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7
 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A). 
8
 18 U.S.C. § 2709.  
9
 15 U.S.C. § 1681u, 1681v. 
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 50 U.S.C. § 436. 
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The Right to Financial Privacy Act 
The first statute authorizing a process similar to the modern NSL request 
was the Right to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”) of 1978.11  NSLs issued under 
RFPA allow the FBI to collect information about “open and closed checking and 
savings accounts and safe deposit box records,” and “transactions with issuers of 
travelers checks, operators of credit card systems, pawnbrokers, loan or finance 
companies, travel agencies, real estate companies, casinos, and other entities.”12  
The RFPA was passed in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Miller, which held that individuals have no Fourth Amendment 
protection against government subpoenas of their bank records from banks where 
they have accounts.13  Congress responded by extending statutory protection “to 
protect the customers of financial institutions from unwarranted intrusion into 
their records while at the same time permitting legitimate law enforcement 
activity.”14  RFPA struck this balance by requiring federal agencies to provide 
individuals with advance notice when the government is seeking disclosure of 
personal financial information and to provide these individuals with a chance to 
contest the requested disclosure.15  The 1978 Act, however, contained an 
exception for requests from agencies “authorized to conduct foreign counter- or 
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 Andrew E. Nieland, Note, National Security Letters and the Amended Patriot Act, 92 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1201, 1207 (2007). 
12
 OIG 2007 Report, supra note 2, at xii. 
13
 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436-37 (1976); see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-1383, at 32, 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9306 (1978) (noting that the statute “is a Congressional response to the 
Supreme Court decision” in Miller). 
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 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 31 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9305. 
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 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000). 
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foreign positive-intelligence activities for purposes of conducting such activities,” 
requests from “the Secret Service for the purpose of conducting its protective 
functions,” and for certain emergency situations.16  In such cases, the agency 
could request that the institution voluntarily disclose the records by providing a 
certified request from a supervisor.17  When these requests were issued, the 
financial institution was barred from disclosing to “any person” that the 
government had “sought or obtained access to a customer’s financial records.”18  
Congress intended this exception to be a narrow one, explaining that it should be 
used “only for legitimate foreign intelligence investigations” and that 
“investigations proceeding only under the rubric of ‘national security’ do not 
qualify.”19 
In 1986, however, Congress amended RFPA to make disclosure by 
financial institutions under this exception mandatory rather than voluntary when 
the FBI director or his designee certified that the records were “sought for foreign 
counterintelligence purposes and that there are specific and articulable facts 
giving reason to believe that the customer or entity whose records are sought is a 
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 Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1114, 92 Stat. 3641, 3707-08 
(1978). 
17
 Id. § 1114(a)(2), 92 Stat. 3707.  
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 Id. § 1114(a)(3), 92 Stat. 3708. 
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 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 52 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9327. 
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foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”20  By this point, the FBI was 
referring to requests made under the RFPA exception as “national security 
letter[s].”21  The 1986 amendment was deemed necessary in order to preempt 
state privacy laws that prevented financial institutions in some states from 
voluntarily turning over records to the FBI.22  According to a 1986 U.S. Senate 
report, by making disclosure mandatory, the statute would provide the access “the 
FBI needs to perform its counterintelligence functions effectively.”23  A House 
committee noted that the change was “justified and reasonable” given that the 
number of requests under the exception was likely to be “relatively small.”24   
The Patriot Act amended RFPA in two important ways.  First, it amended 
the certification requirement to give more FBI officials the authority to certify 
NSL requests.  Prior to the passage of the Patriot Act, RFPA required that an NSL 
request be certified by “the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (or the 
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 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-569, § 404, 100 Stat. 3190, 
3197 (1986) (amending RFPA § 1114(a) to require that financial institutions “shall comply” with 
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security letter,’ signed by an appropriate supervisory official and certifying compliance with the 
applicable provisions of the RFPA, seeking financial records relevant to FBI counterterrorism 
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 Id.  
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 Id. at 14. 
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 H.R. REP. NO. 99-690, at 16 (1986). 
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Director’s designee),”25 and a congressional conference report made clear that 
such a designee must be “no further down the FBI chain-of-command than the 
level of Deputy Assistant Director.”26  The Patriot Act, however, amended the 
statute to also allow Special Agents in Charge in bureau field offices to provide 
the necessary certification.27 
Second, the Patriot Act substantially broadened the category of 
investigations in which the FBI could issue an NSL.  Rather than requiring 
“specific and articulable facts” to show that the target of the NSL was a foreign 
power or agent of a foreign power, the Patriot Act amendments allow the FBI to 
issue an NSL when the information is “sought for foreign counterintelligence 
purposes to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States person is not 
conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.”28  The new standard, importantly, does not 
require any showing that the target himself is actually involved in international 
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, and instead merely requires that 
the records be “sought for foreign counter intelligence purposes to protect against 
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”29 
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The version of the Patriot Act that became law moved swiftly through 
Congress in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks; it was introduced in 
the House on Oct. 23, 2001,30 and was signed into law just three days later on Oct. 
26, 2001.31  The bill was not accompanied by a committee report, although 
portions of the bill’s language were drawn from three other bills, two of which 
were accompanied by committee reports.32  The RFPA amendments, however, 
originated in a Senate bill that was not accompanied by a report, leaving little 
legislative history to examine.33  Nonetheless, it should be noted that the language 
providing that a RFPA NSL may not be issued pursuant to an investigation 
“conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment” is 
similar to a provision in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) of 
1978 requiring that a target could not be considered a foreign power or agent of a 
foreign power “solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”34  A Senate report on FISA 
explained that activities consisting “solely of the lawful exercise of First 
Amendment rights of speech, petition, assembly, and association” should not 
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provide a basis for electronic surveillance.35  The committee report makes clear 
that legislators were concerned that certain types of protected political speech—
for example, “pure advocacy of the commission of terrorist acts”—could alone 
provide a basis for approving electronic surveillance against a U.S. person under 
FISA.36 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”)37 of 1986 was 
modeled after the RFPA to protect privacy interests in electronic and wire 
communications maintained by third parties, such as telephone companies and 
ISPs, while also “protecting the Government’s legitimate law enforcement 
needs.”38  The information the FBI may collect through an ECPA NSL includes 
historical (as opposed to real time) information on telephone calls made and 
received; local and long distance billing records; “electronic communication 
transactional records (e-mails), including e-mail addresses associated with the 
account[,] screen names[,] and billing records”; and “subscriber information 
associated with particular telephone numbers.”39  The FBI cannot access the 
content of conversations or e-mails under ECPA NSL authority.40 
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Under the 1986 statute, communication service providers were required to 
comply with requests by the FBI Director (or his designee) for subscriber 
information, toll billing records information, or electronic communication 
transactional records when the FBI certified that the records were “relevant to an 
authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation” and “there are specific and 
articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person or entity” whose 
information is sought “is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”41  The 
statute also barred providers from disclosing to “any person” that the records had 
been requested by the FBI.42  The Senate Judiciary Committee explained that 
these provisions were designed to “remed[y] the defect in current law that the FBI 
cannot gain access” to telephone toll records in states where “public regulatory 
bodies have created obstacles to providing such access.”43  The committee 
described these records as “highly important to the successful investigation of 
counterintelligence cases.”44  
Congress amended ECPA in 1993 in response to an FBI request that the 
statute be expanded to “require phone companies to identify not only suspected 
agents of foreign powers but also persons who have been in contact with foreign 
powers or suspected agents of foreign powers.”45  The 1993 amendment added 
authority for the FBI to issue an NSL for subscriber information (but not long 
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distance or local toll records) when “the information sought is relevant to an 
authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation” and “there are specific and 
articulable facts giving reason to believe that the communication facilities 
registered in the name of the person or entity have been used . . . in 
communication with” an individual engaged in international terrorism or with a 
foreign power or agent of a foreign power “under circumstances giving reason to 
believe that the communication concerned international terrorism . . . or 
clandestine intelligence activities.”46  A House of Representatives report 
explained that while “the national security letter is an extraordinary device” and 
“[n]ew applications are disfavored,” the expansion was justified.47  The 1993 
amendment also made a second change, specifying that the certification of the 
NSL may be made only by the FBI director or his designee “in a position not 
lower than Deputy Assistant Director.”48   
 As was the case with RFPA, the Patriot Act broadened the class of 
officials authorized to issue NSLs under ECPA to include Special Agents in 
Charge of field offices.49  The Patriot Act also replaced ECPA’s 1993 certification 
requirement, requiring instead that the FBI certify that “the information sought is 
relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States 
                                                 
46
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person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”50  A committee report for 
H.R. 2975, a predecessor to the bill that became the final Patriot Act, contained 
similar language easing the requirements for EPCA NSLs.  The report explained 
that the change was necessary because the prior “specific and articulable facts” 
requirement caused “unacceptable” and “substantial delays in counterintelligence 
and counterterrorism.”51  
The Fair Credit Reporting Act 
 The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”)52 of 1970 was enacted “to 
protect personal information collected by credit reporting agencies.”53  In 1996, 
the statute was amended to authorize the FBI to issue NSLs to obtain certain 
information about an individual’s credit history.  Under the amended statute, the 
FBI could compel disclosure of the names and addresses of all financial 
institutions at which a consumer has had an account upon certification that such 
information is “necessary for the conduct of an authorized foreign 
counterintelligence investigation” and that “there are specific and articulable facts 
giving reason to believe that the consumer” is a foreign power or is “an agent of a 
foreign power and is engaging or has engaged in an act of international terrorism . 
. . . or clandestine intelligence activities.”54  The statute also authorized the use of 
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NSLs to obtain the consumer’s current and former addresses, and the consumer’s 
current and former places of employment upon certification that “such 
information is necessary to the conduct of an authorized counterintelligence 
investigation” and that “there is information giving reason to believe that the 
consumer has been, or is about to be, in contact with a foreign power or an agent 
of a foreign power.”55  The House Conference Report, noting that the FBI already 
had the authority to issue NSLs under RFPA and ECPA, explained that 
“[e]xpansion of this extraordinary authority is not taken lightly.”56  However, the 
report concluded that in “this instance the need is genuine, the threshold for use is 
sufficiently rigorous, and, given the safeguards built in to the legislation, the 
threat to privacy is minimized.”57 
The Patriot Act amended the FCRA NSL authority in two ways.  First, as 
with the other categories of NSLs it amended, the act expanded the class of 
officials who could certify issuance of a FCRA NSL and amended the 
certification standard to require that the information requested is “sought for the 
conduct of an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation is not 
conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment.”58  
Second, the act added a new class of NSLs authorized under the FRCA, allowing 
the FBI to obtain from a consumer reporting agency an individual’s full credit 
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report and “all other” consumer information in the agency’s files.59  This type of 
NSL may be issued if “a government agency authorized to conduct investigations 
of, or intelligence or counterintelligence activities or analysis related to, 
international terrorism” certifies that the information “is necessary for the 
agency’s conduct or such investigation, activity or analysis.”60  A committee 
report for a predecessor bill to the Patriot Act containing similar language 
explained that the amendment would provide authorities with “prompt access to 
credit histories that may reveal key information about the terrorist’s plan or source 
of funding.”61 
The National Security Act 
 In 1994, Congress amended the National Security Act of 1947 to provide 
the FBI with the authority to issue NSLs “in connection with investigations of 
improper disclosure of classified information by government employees.”62  
Under this rarely used provision,63 the FBI can request financial records, other 
financial information, and consumer reports from financial organizations and 
consumer reporting agencies “as may be necessary to conduct any authorized law 
enforcement investigation, counterintelligence inquiry, or security 
determination.”64  Requests may only be made when the records “pertain to a 
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person who is or was an employee in the executive branch of Government.”65  
This provision was not affected by the Patriot Act amendments.  
 
Part II: Post-Patriot Act Changes to the Statutes Governing NSLs 
Following the expansion of the NSL statutes under the Patriot Act, the 
number of NSL requests soared.66  In 2000, the year before the passage of the 
Patriot Act, the FBI issued roughly 8,500 NSL requests.  After the act’s passage, 
the annual number of NSL requests increased to approximately 39,000 in 2003, 
56,000 in 2004, and 47,000 in 2005, according to the FBI Office of General 
Counsel National Security Letter database.67  The vast majority of these requests 
sought telephone toll billing records, telephone or e-mail subscriber information, 
or electronic communication transactional records under ECPA.68  These figures, 
however, may not account for the true number of NSL requests.  A report by the 
DOJ Office of the Inspector General concluded that due to incomplete 
information in the FBI database, the FBI’s figures were “significantly 
understated.”69  The Inspector General’s report estimated that about six percent of 
NSL requests issued between 2003 and 2005 were missing from the FBI 
database.70   
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 Serious calls for reform of the Patriot Act’s NSL provisions began in 
Congress within two years of the act’s passage.  The push for NSL reform took on 
additional urgency when two federal district courts struck down various 
provisions of the NSL statutes as unconstitutional.71  In 2006, Congress responded 
to the courts’ rulings and other concerns about NSL use by providing for judicial 
review of NSL requests and nondisclosure orders (which barred NSL recipients 
from sharing information about the NSL), increasing congressional oversight of 
NSL requests, and directing the Office of the Inspector General of the Department 
of Justice to undertake a review of NSL use, including any abuses of NSL 
authority.   
Early Calls for NSL Reform 
Although the Patriot Act passed Congress overwhelmingly in 2001,72 by 
2003 calls to scale back some of its broad investigatory powers were gaining 
support in Congress.  That year, legislators introduced a number of unsuccessful 
proposals to limit NSLs73 and bring greater congressional oversight to their use.74  
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The use of national security letters also was addressed in congressional hearings, 
with both legislators and witnesses raising concerns about their use.75 
By 2005, the push for NSL reform was even stronger.  At a 2005 hearing, 
Rep. Bobby Scott (D-Va.) identified what he considered to be “numerous” 
problems with the NSL authority granted under Section 505 of the Patriot Act: 
First, records sought under this provision don’t have to pertain to a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, thus, the 
confidentiality of records of countless innocent Americans can 
routinely get caught up in such requests. Second, instead of 
requiring the approval of a senior official at FBI headquarters, 
section 505 authorizes the release of such letters at the whim of a 
special agent in charge who is located somewhere in a local FBI 
office.  Third, national security letters are subject to the gag rule, 
which prevents the recipient from disclosing its receipt, and, 
therefore, questioning whether it’s appropriate.  Finally, the 
issuance of such letters is accomplished without any judicial 
supervision or checks and balances whatsover.76  
 
At the same hearing, U.S. Department of Justice attorney Matthew Berry laid out 
the administration’s case for maintaining the broadened Patriot Act NSL 
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authority, explaining that the pre-Patriot Act certification requirement “put the 
cart before the horse.”77  On this point he stated: 
Suppose, for example, investigators were tracking a known al-
Qaeda operative and saw him having lunch with three individuals.  
A responsible agent would want to conduct a preliminary 
investigation of those individuals and find out, among other things, 
with whom they had recently communicated.  Before the passage 
of the PATRIOT Act, however, the FBI could not have issued an 
NSL to obtain such information.  While investigators could have 
demonstrated that this information was relevant to an ongoing 
terrorism investigation, they could not have demonstrated 
sufficient specific, and articulable facts that the individuals in 
question were agents of a foreign power.  Thankfully, however, 
section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Act corrected this problem.78 
 
The Doe Litigation and Congress’ Response 
In 2004, in Doe v. Ashcroft (“Doe I”), an anonymous ISP filed suit in 
federal district court in the Southern District of New York challenging an NSL 
request and an accompanying nondisclosure order that barred the recipient from 
disclosing to anyone that the FBI had sought information from it.79  Joined by the 
ACLU, which also acted as the ISP’s counsel, the ISP claimed, inter alia, that the 
government’s broad power to order production of records under ECPA violated 
ISP subscribers’ First Amendment rights of anonymous speech and association80 
and violated the ISP’s procedural rights of protection against unreasonable 
searches under the Fourth Amendment.81  It also claimed that the nondisclosure 
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provision was an unconstitutional prior restraint in violation of the First 
Amendment.82  According to the plaintiffs, the ECPA NSL statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
2709, “gives the FBI extraordinary and unchecked power to obtain private 
information without any form of judicial process” and the “non-disclosure 
provision burdens speech categorically and perpetually, without any case-by-case 
judicial consideration of whether that speech burden is justified.”83 
In Doe I, the district court struck down the statute as unconstitutional.  The 
court held that § 2709 violated the Fourth Amendment because “at least as 
currently applied, it effectively bars or substantially deters any challenge to the 
propriety of an NSL request.”84  The court also concluded that the statute’s 
permanent ban on disclosure of an NSL request “operate[d] as an unconstitutional 
prior restraint on speech in violation of the First Amendment.”85    
In response to the ISP’s claim that § 2709 could be used to violate the 
First Amendment rights of anonymous speech and association of ISP customers 
(the targets, rather than the recipients, of the NSLs), the Doe I court concluded 
that the law “may, in a given case, violate a subscriber’s First Amendment 
privacy rights . . .  if judicial review is not readily available to an ISP that receives 
an NSL.”86  The government, drawing comparisons to the third-party doctrine in 
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Fourth Amendment law,87 claimed that “an internet speaker relinquishes any 
interest in anonymity, and any protected claim to that information as soon as he 
releases his identity and other information to the ISP.”88  The court, however, 
rejected this reasoning, noting that the right to engage in anonymous internet 
speech was well established and that “[n]o court had adopted the Government’s 
argument that . . . anonymous internet speech or associational activity ceases to be 
protected [just] because a third-party ISP is in possession of the [speaker’s] 
identifying information.”89  Such a holding, the court concluded, would allow 
anonymous speakers to be “unmasked” by a mere civil or trial subpoena without 
requiring the government “to provide any heightened justification for revealing 
the speaker.”90   
The Doe I court focused in particular on the nature of Internet 
communication, noting that while a customer may have no First Amendment 
interest in the compelled disclosure of transactional information by his or her 
phone company or bank, Internet records “differ substantially” for First 
Amendment purposes.91  The court explained that the “electronic communication 
transactional records” that ISPs must provide in response to NSL requests would 
include logs of e-mail addresses with which the target had corresponded and web 
                                                 
87
 As discussed in Chapter 1, under the third-party doctrine, individuals are considered to have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus no Fourth Amendment claim, in information that they 
have exposed to a third party.  See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
88
 Doe I, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 508. 
89
 Id.  
90
 Id. at 509. 
91
 Id.  
64 
 
pages the target had visited.92  The court stated further that transactional records 
could also reveal “the anonymous message boards to which a person logs on or 
posts, the electronic newsletters to which he subscribes, and the advocacy 
websites he visits.”93   
The Doe I court recognized that there could be situations in which an ISP 
customer’s First Amendment rights would be outweighed by the government’s 
compelling interests in obtaining records from ISPs, and the opinion emphasized 
that it was not attempting to define the scope of these rights in the NSL context.  
On this point, the opinion explained: 
The Court holds only that such fundamental rights are certainly 
implicated in some cases in which the Government may employ § 
2709 broadly to gather information, thus requiring that the process 
incorporate the safeguards of some judicial review to ensure that if 
an infringement of those rights is asserted, they are adequately 
protected through fair process in an independent neutral tribunal.94 
 
In striking down the statute, the Doe I court emphasized the weighty 
interests on both sides of the case.  The court explained that “[n]ational security is 
a paramount value” and that the government, in order to properly perform its 
national security functions, “must be empowered to respond promptly and 
effectively to public exigencies as they arise.”95  However, the Doe I opinion also 
cautioned that “cases engendering intense passions and urgencies to unencumber 
the Government . . . often pose the gravest perils to personal liberties” and that 
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times of crisis require “heightened vigilance, especially by the judiciary, to ensure 
that, as a people and as a nation, we steer a principled course faithful and true to 
our still-honored founding values.”96 
Nearly a year after the decision in Doe I, the federal district court for the 
District of Connecticut reached a similar conclusion on the constitutionality of § 
2709’s non-disclosure provision in Doe v. Gonzales (“Doe II”).97  In that case, an 
anonymous library received an NSL requesting “any and all subscriber 
information, billing information and access logs of any person or entity related to” 
a library computer.98  The court granted the library’s request for a preliminary 
injunction barring enforcement of the non-disclosure provision to prevent it from 
revealing its identity as the recipient of an NSL, concluding that, as applied, the 
provision could not survive the strict scrutiny review required for prior restraints 
on speech.99     
The two Doe cases were consolidated on appeal to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit as Doe I v. Gonzales (“Doe III”).100  In the 
meantime, however, Congress amended the NSL statutes to respond to the federal 
district courts’ rulings in Doe I and Doe II and other concerns about NSL use.  
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Two separate bills amending the NSL statutes were enacted on March 9, 2006.101  
The first, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 
created a judicial review procedure for NSL requests, allowing an NSL recipient 
to petition a federal district court “for an order modifying or setting aside the 
request” and providing that the court may provide such relief “if compliance [with 
the request] would be unreasonable, oppressive, or otherwise unlawful.”102  The 
act also created a judicial review procedure allowing an NSL recipient to contest 
NSL nondisclosure orders103 and made various additional amendments to the 
nondisclosure provisions.104  Finally, the act expanded congressional oversight of 
NSL use105 and directed the Inspector General of the Department of Justice to 
“perform an audit of the effectiveness and use, including any improper or illegal 
use, of national security letters” issued by the Department from 2003 to 2006.106  
The second bill, the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments 
Act of 2006, contained additional amendments to the NSL statutes, in particular, 
making clear that an NSL recipient could disclose receipt of an NSL request to an 
attorney to obtain legal advice or assistance.107 
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In light of these amendments, the Second Circuit vacated Doe I and 
remanded the case to the federal district court to reconsider the ISP’s First 
Amendment challenge to the nondisclosure provision under the new statute. 108  
The court noted that in light of the amendments allowing NSL recipients to 
challenge the issuance of NSLs in court, the ISP had dropped its Fourth 
Amendment claim to the document production provisions of the statute on 
appeal.109  The court did not mention the ISP’s claim that the document 
production provision violated the First Amendment, but because that claim also 
was predicated on the unavailability of judicial review, it may have been dropped 
on appeal.  In any case, following the circuit court’s decision, the government 
decided that it would not seek to enforce the underlying NSL, thus taking the First 
Amendment challenge to the document production provisions off the table on 
remand.110  The Second Circuit dismissed Doe II on procedural grounds, holding 
that the library’s claims were moot because the government conceded that the 
plaintiff could reveal its identity as the recipient of an NSL.111 
On remand, the Doe I federal district court considered the ISP’s First 
Amendment challenge to the non-disclosure provisions and held the modified 
provisions to be unconstitutional.112  On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed 
much of the district court’s reasoning, but interpreted the statute in a way that 
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significantly narrowed the circumstances in which a nondisclosure order could be 
upheld in order to remedy the district court’s concerns while avoiding striking 
down most of the statute.113  The circuit court did, however, agree that provisions 
requiring recipients, rather than the government, to initiate judicial review of 
nondisclosure orders and requiring that judges give extraordinary deference to 
certain determinations of executive officials in reviewing such orders were 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.114  
The Doe litigation is important because it resulted in significant 
amendments to the NSL statutes that alleviated some of the First Amendment 
concerns.  It also suggested that in addition to the obvious First Amendment 
concerns stemming from the nondisclosure orders, the use of NSLs in certain 
circumstances implicated the First Amendment rights of speech and association of 
the NSL targets.  Finally, the Doe litigation served to draw congressional attention 
to concerns about the use of NSLs.     
 
Part III: The Inspector General’s Reports 
One of the results of this congressional focus on NSLs was a series of 
investigations into the use of NSLs by the Inspector General of the U.S. 
Department of Justice (“IG”).  The 2006 amendments to the NSL statutes directed 
the IG to review the department’s use of NSLs and document any abuses.115  In 
response to this directive, the IG issued two reports that documented widespread 
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misuse of NSL authority and spawned a new round of calls for reform.  The 
findings of the reports also led to a request for a third IG report, focused on the 
FBI’s use of so-called “exigent letters” to circumvent certain requirements of the 
NSL statutes.  
The first IG report, which was released in March 2007, covered NSL use 
from 2003 to 2005.  The 2007 report outlined the dramatic increase in NSL use 
from 8,500 requests per year in 2000 to 47,000 in 2005.116  The IG’s report also 
documented a rise in the use of NSLs to investigate Americans; the percentage of 
NSL requests generated from investigations of Americans rose from 39 percent in 
2003 to 53 percent in 2005.117  The report found abuses of NSL authority in both 
the FBI field offices and at FBI Headquarters.  A sample of 293 NSLs issued by 
four FBI field offices turned up twenty-two NSL-related violations of statutes or 
directives that were not reported to the appropriate authorities.118  The IG 
attributed the violations to “confusion about the authorities available under the 
various NSL statutes,” rather than intentional misconduct.119  The IG also found 
widespread abuse of NSL authority by units of the FBI Headquarters 
Counterterrorism Division. Perhaps the most troubling discovery was that 
Counterterrorism Division personnel who were not authorized to sign NSLs under 
ECPA had been issuing so-called “exigent letters” to request toll billing records or 
subscriber information for approximately 3,000 phone numbers from three 
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companies.120  These letters stated that the records were being requested due to 
“exigent circumstances” and claimed that subpoenas from the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office would follow as quickly as possible.121  In most cases, however, the IG’s 
report found that “there was no documentation associating the requests with 
pending national security investigations.”122 
The second IG report, released in March 2008, reviewed the FBI’s use of 
NSLs in 2006 and the corrective measures that the FBI had taken following the 
issuance of the first IG report.123  The second IG report found that the annual 
number of NSL requests continued to increase, hitting 49,425 in 2006,124 and that 
the percentage of requests generated from investigations of Americans also 
continued to rise, reaching 57 percent in 2006.125  The report also concluded that 
the FBI had made “significant progress” in addressing the problems identified in 
the 2007 report, although it was “too early to definitively state whether the new 
systems and controls developed by the FBI and the Department [of Justice] will 
eliminate fully the problems” the IG identified.126 
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The IG’s discovery in its first report that the FBI had circumvented the 
ECPA NSL statute to request information for approximately 3,000 phone 
numbers using so-called “exigent letters” led to a third report, released in January 
2010, that reviewed these requests and other informal requests for telephone 
records.127  The IG had previously concluded that these exigent letters contained 
factual misstatements and were sometimes used in non-exigent circumstances.128  
The heavily redacted unclassified version of the third report detailed numerous 
violations of the law and department policy.  Notably, the report found that in the 
course of a leak investigation involving a potential violation of the Espionage Act, 
the FBI had used an exigent letter to collect telephone records of seven numbers 
assigned to reporters without complying with department policy governing 
subpoenas for the production of reporters’ telephone toll billing records.129         
The section of the third IG report that discusses this exigent letter is 
heavily redacted, but the report describes a letter requesting telephone toll records 
for seven phone numbers belonging to New York Times and Washington Post 
reporters.130  While all references to the dates of the requests, the names or 
locations of the reporters, or the subject matter of the investigation have been 
redacted, it appears, based on later media coverage, that the phone numbers were 
assigned to three reporters and a researcher covering Islamic terrorism in 
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Southeast Asia while working from Jakarta, Indonesia.131  Just days after the 
exigent letter was issued, the FBI received records of 1,627 phone calls, only 
three of which actually fell within the period of interest relevant to the 
investigation.132     
The department policy referenced in the third report is a set of self-
imposed guidelines created by the Department of Justice to govern subpoenas to 
members of the news media and subpoenas for telephone toll records of any 
member of the media.133  The guidelines direct attorneys to make “all reasonable 
attempts . . . to obtain information from alternative sources before considering 
issuing” such a subpoena.134  They also require that the department pursue 
negotiations with the affected member of the media prior to issuing a subpoena, 
except in those cases involving telephone toll records when an Assistant Attorney 
General determines that such negotiations would pose a “substantial threat to the 
integrity of the investigation.”135  Reporters must be notified ahead of time that 
the government intends to issue a subpoena for their toll records, or, when such 
notice cannot be made ahead of time, it must be provided as soon as “it is 
determined that such notification will no longer pose a clear and substantial threat 
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to the integrity of the investigation.”136  In criminal cases, the guidelines require 
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has occurred and that the information 
“sought is essential to the successful investigation of that crime.”137  Subpoenas 
for telephone records of members of the media also require approval by the 
Attorney General.138  The goal in each case is “to strike the proper balance 
between the public’s interest in the free dissemination of ideas and information 
and the public’s interest in effective law enforcement and the fair administration 
of justice.”139  
Although the guidelines predate the adoption of the NSL statutes and refer 
only to subpoenas, the IG’s third report makes clear that the department now 
interprets the guidelines to apply to NSLs.  While the guidelines may offer some 
protection against the use of certain types of NSLs to collect reporters’ records, it 
should be noted that this protection is fairly limited.  First, the guidelines apply 
only to subpoenas issued to reporters or subpoenas for reporters’ telephone toll 
records.  Therefore, at best, the guidelines apply only to NSLs issued pursuant to 
the ECPA NSL statute, and even then, only to the subset of NSLs that deal with 
telephone toll records, as opposed to telephone subscriber information or records 
from ISPs.  Second, even when the guidelines do apply, the decision to issue a 
subpoena for telephone toll records remains at the discretion of the Attorney 
General rather than a neutral magistrate, and the guidelines make clear that they 
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“are not intended to create or recognize any legally enforceable right in any 
person.”140  Finally, as the IG’s report demonstrates, these guidelines are not 
always followed.  In addition to the incident described above, the IG also 
identified two instances in which the department failed to follow the guidelines in 
issuing grand jury subpoenas for reporter’s telephone records.141     
 Despite ongoing concerns about the use and impact of NSLs, 
Congress has rejected the opportunity to further reform the NSL statutes.  
Although a number of bills proposed in 2009 would have further limited the use 
of NSLs while renewing certain expiring provisions of the Patriot Act,142 in 
February 2010 Congress passed a one-year extension of the expiring Patriot Act 
provisions without these or other reforms.143  The use of NSLs, however, 
continues to receive scrutiny.  In June 2010, the Inspector General notified Sen. 
Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, of his intention to 
conduct a fourth review of the use of NSLs.  According to the IG, this review will 
examine the FBI’s progress in responding to the IG’s recommendations in prior 
reports and will also examine the number of NSLs issued from 2007 to 2009.144 
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Conclusion 
NSLs have evolved from a limited exception to laws designed to provide 
privacy protections to a popular investigative tool subject to widespread abuse.  
While this development is troubling to privacy advocates, it should also be 
troubling to journalists.  The use of NSLs to secretly collect phone records and e-
mail transactional information provides the government with the opportunity to 
discover reporters’ confidential sources without notice to the reporter and, unless 
the provider chooses to contest the NSL, without any judicial oversight.  While 
the Department of Justice Guidelines may provide some measure of protection 
against collection of journalists’ records, this protection is limited to phone 
records only and occurs at the discretion of the executive branch.  Moreover, as 
the third IG report demonstrates, these guidelines are sometimes simply ignored. 
There is no evidence in the legislative history of the NSL statutes or their 
amendments that Congress considered the burden that NSLs may pose to First 
Amendment newsgathering rights.  While the Patriot Act amendments did provide 
protection against the use of NSLs for investigations conducted solely on the basis 
of protected First Amendment activities, this protection would probably only 
apply to a narrow class of cases and would certainly not apply if the government 
was investigating an illegal leak to a reporter.  Whether targets of an NSL may 
have a constitutional First Amendment right against the use of NSLs to collect 
their records remains an open question after the Doe litigation, although the 
district court’s ruling suggests that the existence of such a right would depend on 
whether the underlying activities are of a type that is at the core of First 
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Amendment protection.  In order to determine whether journalists may have a 
First Amendment right against being targeted by NSLs, the next chapter assesses 
the degree of First Amendment protection that has been extended to 
newsgathering activities.    
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3  
 
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST GOVERNMENT 
INTRUSION INTO THE NEWSGATHERING PROCESS 
  
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that newsgathering is 
entitled to at least some level of First Amendment protection,1 its decisions do not 
make clear the boundaries or robustness of this protection.  There are two broad 
categories of First Amendment newsgathering claims that have been considered 
by the court: those involving claims of an affirmative right of access to 
information or areas controlled by the government and those involving claims that 
the government was actively intruding into the newsgathering process.  As to the 
former category of cases, the Court has upheld a First Amendment right of access 
of the press and public to criminal trials and related proceedings,2 but has 
generally rejected other access claims.3  The Court addressed the latter category 
of newsgathering claims in two cases—Branzburg v. Hayes4 and Zurcher v. 
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 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972) (noting that “news gathering is not without its 
First Amendment protections”).   
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 See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
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Stanford Daily.5  In its 1972 decision in Branzburg, the Court held that the First 
Amendment did not protect journalists against having to reveal confidential 
sources pursuant to a grand jury subpoena.6  Six years later, the Court held in 
Zurcher that the First Amendment did not bar law enforcement searches of a 
newsroom pursuant to a warrant.7  However, while the Court ultimately ruled 
against the newsgathering claims at issue, language in both decisions supports the 
notion that interference with the newsgathering process implicates First 
Amendment interests.  In both cases, the Court also noted that to the extent that 
First Amendment concerns do arise, existing procedural protections can 
sufficiently guard First Amendment interests. 
The fact that the Branzburg and Zurcher majorities rejected the specific 
newsgathering claims at issue while still supporting at least some First 
Amendment protection for news gathering generally—along with an enigmatic 
concurrence by Justice Powell in Branzburg—left lower federal courts without 
clear guidance for assessing future newsgathering claims.  The appellate courts 
have generally provided the most robust protection to newsgathering interests 
when the government directly interferes with newsgathering activities—for 
example, by barring the media from contacting jurors following the conclusion of 
high-profile trials.8  The courts have provided only minimal protection for 
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newsgathering interests, however, when they view the link between the 
government action and the alleged harm to newsgathering as more attenuated—
for instance, in assessing claims that requiring reporters to testify about 
confidential sources will impede reporters’ ability to gather confidential 
information in the future.  Even in these cases, the circuits have varied in the 
protection afforded to newsgathering interests, with some circuits requiring the 
government to make a heightened showing of need before compelling a reporter’s 
testimony and others merely requiring that the subpoena have been issued in good 
faith.   
Part I of this chapter provides a detailed discussion of the Branzburg and 
Zurcher decisions, the two cases in which the Supreme Court has considered 
challenges to government intrusion into the newsgathering process.  Part II then 
describes federal courts of appeals decisions on claims involving government 
intrusion into the newsgathering process, focusing on five broad categories of 
cases involving:  subpoenas of reporters, searches and seizures of reporters, 
subpoenas for journalists’ phone records from third-party providers, restrictions 
on trial coverage, and restrictions on exit polling. 
 
Part I: Newsgathering Claims in the Supreme Court 
 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on First Amendment newsgathering 
claims has generally drawn a clear line between claims for an affirmative right of 
access to information or places in the control of the government for 
newsgathering purposes and claims for protection against government intrusion 
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into the newsgathering process.  As to the former class of claims, while the Court 
has recognized a First Amendment right of the press and the public to attend 
criminal trials9 and related court proceedings,10 it has generally rejected First 
Amendment-based access claims in other contexts.11  As to the latter class of 
claims, while the Court’s decisions in Branzburg and Zurcher ultimately rejected 
the journalists’ claims, the majority opinions in both cases contained language 
recognizing that intrusions on newsgathering invoke First Amendment concerns.  
The Court’s analysis in both cases also noted the availability of procedural 
protections—the ability to contest a subpoena by a motion to quash and the 
requirement of a neutral magistrate assessing a warrant—to adequately protect 
newsgathering rights on a case-by-case basis. 
 In Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court held that the First Amendment 
guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press did not provide 
journalists with a right to refuse to testify in front of a grand jury.12  At the same 
time, however, the Court recognized that newsgathering is entitled to at least 
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some degree of First Amendment protection,13 and language in the majority 
opinion and Justice Powell’s concurrence suggested that there may be 
circumstances in which First Amendment concerns would provide a basis for 
journalists to avoid compelled testimony.14  
 Branzburg involved the consolidated claims of three journalists, each of 
whom had been called to testify before a grand jury about potential criminal 
activity they had observed or learned about in the course of interactions with 
confidential sources.15  According to the Branzburg Court, the journalists objected 
to testifying on First Amendment grounds, explaining: 
that to gather news it is often necessary to agree either not to 
identify the source of information published or to publish only part 
of the facts revealed, or both; that if the reporter is nevertheless 
forced to reveal these confidences to a grand jury, the source so 
identified and other confidential sources of other reporters will be 
measurably deterred from furnishing publishable information, all 
to the detriment of the free flow of information protected by the 
First Amendment.16 
 
The journalists did not claim an absolute privilege against testifying.  Instead, 
their argument, as summarized by the Court, was that a reporter should not be 
forced to testify before a grand jury or at a trial unless there are sufficient grounds 
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 Id. at 681 (“[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be 
eviscerated.”). 
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to believe: 1) that the reporter has information relevant to the crime at issue; 2) 
that this information is not available from other sources; and 3) that “the need for 
the information is sufficiently compelling to override the claimed invasion of First 
Amendment interest occasioned by the disclosure.”17  As the Court explained, 
“The heart of the claim is that the burden on news gathering resulting from 
compelling reporters to disclose confidential information outweighs any public 
interest in obtaining the information.”18 
While the Branzburg Court disavowed the suggestion that news gathering 
was without First Amendment protection and recognized that “without some 
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated,”19 
it nonetheless held that a journalist did not have a First Amendment-based 
privilege to refuse to provide testimony to a lawfully-convened grand jury 
conducting a good faith investigation of an alleged crime about which the reporter 
has relevant information.20  The Court characterized the burden imposed by 
requiring a reporter to respond to grand jury subpoenas as relatively minimal, 
stating that the consolidated cases did not restrict speech, impose a prior restraint 
on publication, compel the press to publish information it wanted to withhold, or 
require the press to “indiscriminately” disclose the identity of sources on 
request.21  Instead, the Court explained, reporters were simply being asked to 
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fulfill a duty expected of all citizens—to respond to grand jury subpoenas and 
answer questions relevant to a criminal investigation.22  The First Amendment, 
the Court concluded, “does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press 
that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general 
applicability”23  Rather, prior cases demonstrated that “otherwise valid laws 
serving substantial public interests may be enforced against the press as against 
others, despite the possible burden that may be imposed.”24 
At the same time, the Branzburg Court highlighted the “ancient role” of 
the grand jury and its importance in the American criminal justice system.25  Not 
only are grand jury proceedings a constitutional mandate in many prosecutions, 
the Court explained, they also play a crucial role in protecting citizens against 
unfounded prosecutions.26  The public’s strong interest in law enforcement and 
effective grand jury proceedings, the Court concluded, outweighed the 
“consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result” 
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from compelling grand jury testimony by reporters.27  The majority dismissed 
concerns that this holding would broadly threaten confidential relationships 
between reporters and their sources.28  Using history as its guide, the Court 
explained that the common law did not recognize a reporter’s privilege and that 
the press had operated without a constitutional privilege since the nation’s 
founding, yet the lack of such protection had not been an obstacle to the press’s 
use of anonymous sources.29 
While the Court categorically rejected a reporter’s privilege to avoid 
testifying pursuant to a good faith grand jury subpoena, its opinion does not make 
clear whether this rejection extends to other contexts.  While the Court explained 
that the “sole issue before [it] is the obligation of reporters to respond to grand 
jury subpoenas,”30 its language elsewhere suggests a rejection of reporter’s 
privilege generally.31  However, the Court also suggested that there is an 
exception to this rule even in the grand jury context, noting that grand jury 
investigations “instituted or conducted other than in good faith, would pose 
wholly different issues for resolution under the First Amendment.”32  The Court 
explained that in such situations, procedural protections are available to guard 
First Amendment rights: “Grand juries are subject to judicial control and 
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subpoenas to motions to quash.  We do not expect courts will forget that grand 
juries must operate within the limits of the First Amendment as well as the 
Fifth.”33 
 Efforts to discern the scope of the Branzburg Court’s holding are further 
complicated by a two-page concurrence by Justice Powell.  Powell, who joined 
the five-justice majority opinion, wrote a separate concurrence noting the “limited 
nature” of the Court’s holding.34  The majority’s holding, Powell said, did not 
mean that reporters subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury “are without 
constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their 
sources.”35  Powell explained that if a reporter believed that an investigation was 
not being conducted in good faith, that the information sought had only a “remote 
and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation,” or that his or her 
testimony implicated relationships with confidential sources without a legitimate 
need by law enforcement, the reporter may move to quash the subpoena.  He 
further explained that the claim to privilege “should be judged on its facts by the 
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all 
citizens to give relevant testimony.”36  When Powell’s apparent support for a 
qualified privilege is added to the votes of the four dissenting justices, all of 
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whom supported at least a qualified reporter’s privilege,37 it appears that a five-
justice majority recognized at least some type of privilege for a reporter 
subpoenaed by the grand jury.  The significance of Powell’s concurrence has thus 
become a point of debate in lower courts considering privilege claims. 
 Six years after the Branzburg decision, the Supreme Court again took up a 
claim of First Amendment protection against government intrusion into the 
newsgathering process in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.38  In that case, police officers 
executed a warrant to search the newsroom of Stanford University’s student 
newspaper after the paper published articles and photographs relating to a protest 
in which two officers were injured.39  The warrant did not allege that members of 
the newspaper staff were involved in any crime, but instead was based on the 
probable cause to believe that the newspaper had unpublished photographs 
relevant to the identities of the attackers.40  The newspaper and several members 
of its staff sued in federal district court, alleging, inter alia, that the search 
violated the First and Fourth amendments.41  The newspaper claimed that searches 
of its premises would “seriously threaten the ability of the press to gather, 
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law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less 
destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in 
the information.” (footnotes omitted)).  
38
 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
39
 Id. at 550-51. 
40
 Id. at 551. 
41
 Id. at 552. 
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analyze, and disseminate news”42 because: 1) searches physically disrupt the 
newsroom; 2) confidential sources will “dry up” due to fears that confidential 
press files would be “readily available to the authorities’’; 3) reporters will be 
deterred from preserving their work product; 4) the dissemination of news will be 
“chilled by the prospects that searches will disclose internal editorial 
deliberations”; and 5) the press will engage in “self-censorship to conceal its 
possession of information of potential interest to the police.”43 
In a 5-3 opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the lower courts’ imposition 
of a special standard to govern newsroom searches under warrant and held instead 
that First Amendment interests can be adequately protected by a neutral 
magistrate applying with “particular exactitude” the Fourth Amendment 
requirements of probable cause, specificity with regard to the location to be 
searched and the items to be seized, and overall reasonableness.44  The Zurcher 
Court acknowledged historic concerns that the “unrestricted power of search and 
seizure” could be used to stifle free expression,45 but explained that the Framers 
had addressed these concerns by subjecting searches to a test of reasonableness, 
as determined by a neutral magistrate, rather than by subjecting searches 
involving the press to special rules.46  In other words, any First Amendment 
                                                 
42
 Id. at 563. 
43
 Id. at 563-64. 
44
 Id. at 565. 
45
 Id. at 564 (quoting Marcus v. Search Warrant, 37 U.S. 717, 729 (1961)). 
46
 Id. at 565. 
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concerns could be factored into the magistrate’s analysis of the reasonableness of 
the search:   
There is no reason to believe, for example, that magistrates cannot 
guard against searches of the type, scope, and intrusiveness that 
would actually interfere with the timely publication of a 
newspaper.  Nor, if the requirements of specificity and 
reasonableness are properly applied, policed, and observed, will 
there be any occasion or opportunity for officers to rummage at 
large in newspaper files or to intrude into or to deter normal 
editorial and publication decisions.47 
 
The Court cautioned, however, that “[w]here presumptively protected materials 
are sought to be seized, the warrant requirement should be administered to leave 
as little as possible to the discretion or whim of the officer in the field.”48    
Thus, even while recognizing that First Amendment rights are implicated 
when the government conducts searches of newsrooms, the Court concluded that 
existing procedural protections were sufficient to guard these rights against any 
abuses.  As it did in Branzburg, the Court rejected arguments that its holding 
would cause confidential sources to dry up, noting that whatever “incremental 
effect” search warrants had in this area “does not make a constitutional 
difference.”49   
 The Zurcher decision ultimately had only a limited impact on the searches 
of newsrooms.  Just two years later, Congress responded to Zurcher by passing 
the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, which barred searches for or seizures of 
journalists’ work product or other documentary materials by law enforcement 
                                                 
47
 Id. at 566. 
48
 Id. at 564.  
49
 Id. at 566. The Court noted that there had been very few instances of warrants for newsroom 
searches and that, moreover, the press “is not easily intimidated.”  Id. 
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officials at all levels of government, with only limited exceptions.50  The law was 
based on Congress’ conclusion that, contrary to the Court’s holding, “the search 
warrant procedure in itself does not sufficiently protect the press.”51  As the 
Senate Judiciary Committee explained, the new restrictions on searches would 
force law enforcement officials to first subpoena or otherwise request materials in 
the hands of the press, thereby reducing “the threat that [Zurcher] poses to the 
vigorous exercise of First Amendment rights.”52  This statute, rather than Zurcher, 
now governs newsroom searches, although Zurcher’s constitutional analysis of 
the First Amendment issues remains good law. 
 Branzburg and Zurcher establish that the First Amendment extends at 
least some degree of protection to newsgathering, although the precise boundaries 
of that protection are not made clear in either decision.  In both cases, the Court 
recognized that the government action at issue implicated news gathering but 
rejected arguments calling for a press-specific standard.  Instead, the Court 
                                                 
50
 Privacy Protection Act of 1980, § 101, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2006)).  The act does not refer to “journalists” specifically, but rather 
applies to persons “reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a 
newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication.”  See id.  There are 
two exceptions to the general bar on searches for or seizures of journalists’ work product 
materials: 1) if there is probable cause to believe that the person in possession of the protected 
materials “has committed or is committing the criminal offense to which the materials relate,” 
except if the offense “consists of the receipt, possession, communication, or withholding of such 
materials or the information contained therein,” and 2) if “there is reason to believe the immediate 
seizure of such materials is necessary to prevent the death of, or serious bodily injury to, a human 
being.”  Id. at § 101(a).  These exceptions also apply to the bar on searches for or seizures of 
documentary materials other than work product in the possession of journalists, along with 
additional exceptions when “there is reason to believe that the giving of notice pursuant a 
subpoena duces tecum would result in the destruction, alteration, or concealment of such 
materials” and when a subpoena has been unsuccessful and other remedies have been exhausted.  
Id. at § 101(b). 
51
 S. REP. NO. 96-874, at 4 (1980). 
52
 Id. at 4-5. 
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explained that the government’s law enforcement interests outweighed the 
“incidental” burdens on newsgathering and noted that generally applicable 
procedural protections—like judicial supervision of grand juries or magistrate 
approval of search warrants—were sufficient to guard against potential 
government abuses.    
 
Part II: Newsgathering Claims in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
The Supreme Court has not addressed a claim of First Amendment 
protection against government intrusion into the newsgathering process since its 
decision in Zurcher.  The federal courts of appeals have thus been left to resolve 
the scope of Branzburg in ruling on privilege claims and to determine the 
protection afforded to newsgathering activities in the face of other alleged 
government intrusions, such as court orders limiting post-verdict interviews with 
jurors or wiretaps of a reporter’s phone.  As outlined in Chapter 1, the cases 
discussed in this chapter were gathered through a series of legal database 
searches, including a search for cases that contained key relevant terms53 and 
separate searches for cases that had cited the Branzburg or Zurcher decisions and 
also contained certain key terms.54  The results of these searches were further 
                                                 
53
 The search string was: ("newsgathering" or "news gathering" or “gather news”) and (journalist! 
or reporter! or media or news!) and HEADNOTES ("First Amendment" or “U.S. Const. amend. 
I”). 
54
 These searches used the WestLaw citing references function.  The citing references search for 
Branzburg was limited using WestLaw’s “headnotes” function to cases with headnotes relating to 
“enforcement of generally applicable laws,” “disclosure of sources,” “In general, obligation to 
testify,” “privilege,” and “journalists.”  It was further narrowed using Westlaw’s “locate” function 
to cases that also contained term “subpoena” and any word that had “reporter,” “journalist,” or 
“news” as its root.  The citing references search for Zurcher was limited to decisions containing 
the term “First Amendment” and the term “journalist, reporter, media, or news” (or any word with 
those terms as its root).   
91 
 
limited by a case-by-case examination to focus on only those decisions involving 
an affirmative intrusion on newsgathering that originated with the government 
and that was not the result of a generally applicable criminal law or order banning 
individuals from sharing certain types of information in general (such as laws 
restricting the disclosure of classified information or general gag orders banning 
litigants from speaking about a case).  
This research found that the federal appeals courts have considered a First 
Amendment right against government intrusion on newsgathering in five broad 
classes of cases involving: subpoenas of reporters, searches and seizures of 
newsrooms or reporters’ materials, subpoenas for journalists’ phone records from 
third-party providers, restrictions on trial coverage that directly limited 
journalists’ newsgathering activities, and restrictions on exit polling.  In the 
remainder of this chapter, each of these classes is discussed in turn, with an 
extended discussion of the phone records cases due to the factual similarities 
those cases share with the collection of records via NSLs.  Study of these cases 
reveals that the courts have provided the most robust protection to newsgathering 
rights when the government directly restricts newsgathering activities, but that 
they have refused to extend First Amendment protection when the link between 
the government action and newsgathering interests is more attenuated. 
Subpoenas of Reporters 
The most common situation in which the courts of appeals have addressed 
claims of First Amendment newsgathering rights is when a reporter or media 
organization refuses to comply with a subpoena.  Branzburg dealt specifically 
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with grand jury subpoenas, and some language in that opinion could be 
interpreted to limit its holding to the grand jury context.55  At the same time, the 
majority’s decision spoke more broadly of the difficulty courts would face in 
trying to administer a judicially created reporter’s privilege, a concern that would 
arise for trial subpoenas as well as grand jury subpoenas.56  The federal courts of 
appeals have thus been left to sort out the scope of Branzburg’s holding and how 
it applies to subpoenas in other contexts, including civil and criminal trials and 
proceedings conducted by agencies.  The analysis below focuses on a subset of 
these cases57—those in which the government itself has requested the subpoena 
seeking to compel the reporter’s testimony—that provide the closest parallel to 
the NSL context, because it is in these cases that the government originates the 
intrusion on newsgathering rights rather than simply enforcing rights asserted by 
private parties.   
In assessing grand jury subpoenas of reporters or media organizations, the 
circuit courts have often debated the significance of Justice Powell’s Branzburg 
concurrence, which called for a balancing of First Amendment interests and the 
                                                 
55
 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972) (“[T]he investigation of crime by the grand jury 
implements a fundamental governmental role of securing the safety of the person and property of 
the citizen, and it appears to us that calling reporters to give testimony in the manner and for the 
reasons that other citizens are called ‘bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of the 
governmental purpose asserted as its justification.’” (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 
525 (1960)). 
56
 Id. at 703-04 (“We are unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult journey to such 
an uncertain destination. The administration of a constitutional newsman’s privilege would present 
practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order.”). 
57
 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 F. App’x 430 (9th Cir. 2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 
F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004); In re Shain, 978 
F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1992); Storer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 801 
F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987); SEC v. McGoff, 647 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976). 
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“obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal 
conduct” when there is evidence that the investigation is not being conducted in 
good faith, the reporter’s testimony “bear[s] only a remote and tenuous 
relationship to the subject of the investigation,” or if there is reason to believe the 
testimony is not related to a “legitimate need of law enforcement.”58  The Ninth 
Circuit tracked this language in its 2006 decision in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 
which assessed a blogger’s claim that a subpoena to testify in front of a grand jury 
and produce a video footage he recorded violated his First Amendment rights.59  
The Ninth Circuit explained that “a limited balancing of First Amendment 
interests may be conducted only ‘where a grand jury inquiry is not conducted in 
good faith, or where the inquiry does not involve a legitimate need of law 
enforcement, or has only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the 
investigation.’”60  Where no one of these conditions applied, according to the 
court, no balancing was necessary.61   
The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, held in a 2005 decision that no weight 
should be placed on Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Branzburg.62  In In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, the court considered journalists Judith Miller and Matthew 
                                                 
58
 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring). 
59
 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 F. App’x 430, 431 (9th Cir. 2006). 
60
 Id. at 432 (quoting Scarce v. United States, 5 F.3d 397, 401 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
61
 Id. 
62
 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d 964, 970 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Unquestionably, the Supreme 
Court decided in Branzburg that there is no First Amendment privilege protecting journalists from 
appearing before a grand jury or from testifying before a grand jury or otherwise providing 
evidence to a grand jury regardless of any confidence promoted by the reporter to any source. . . . 
Without doubt, that is the end of the matter.”). 
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Cooper’s appeals to contempt citations for their refusal to testify before a grand 
jury investigating a leak outing CIA agent Valerie Plame.  The court concluded 
that regardless of what Justice Powell intended to convey in his concurrence, he 
joined the majority’s opinion,63 and that opinion rejected the existence of a First 
Amendment reporter’s privilege “in no uncertain terms.”64   
Although the D.C. Circuit refused to recognize a First Amendment 
reporter’s privilege against testifying before a grand jury, this does not mean the 
court viewed the underlying newsgathering activities as unworthy of any 
protection at all.  In a concurring opinion, Judge David Tatel explained that while 
the D.C. Circuit had construed Branzburg broadly “with respect to criminal 
investigations,” it had recognized a reporter’s privilege in the face of a criminal 
defense subpoena and in the context of civil litigation.65  The recognition of a 
privilege in these contexts suggests that the court does not view the right to 
protect confidential sources as wholly unworthy of First Amendment protection, 
but rather that it simply considers this right to be outweighed by law enforcement 
needs in the context of a criminal investigation. 
A similar view of the meaning of Branzburg and the protection afforded to 
newsgathering activities is apparent in the Sixth Circuit’s 1987 decision in Storer 
                                                 
63
 Id. at 972. 
64
 Id. at 969. 
65
 Id. at 988 (Tatel, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Ahn, 231 F.3d 26, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2000); 
Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).  Judge Tatel would have recognized a 
common law privilege protecting against compelled disclosure of reporters’ confidential sources. 
Id. at 995. 
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Communications, Inc. v. Giovan.66  In that case, the court denied relief to a 
television news reporter challenging a state court order holding him in contempt 
for refusing to comply with a grand jury subpoena demanding he produce 
videotapes created during the course of reporting on youth gangs.67  The court 
explained that upholding a claim of privilege in this context based on Powell’s 
concurrence would require it to “restructure” the majority’s holding in 
Branzburg.68  The majority opinion in Branzburg, the Sixth Circuit stated, 
categorically rejected even a conditional or qualified privilege and “discussed at 
great length the difficulties of administering such a privilege and the policy 
reasons which argue against its recognition.”69  This does not mean, however, that 
there should not be a balancing of interests in some cases, according to the court.  
The court explained that judges must determine whether the subpoena is intended 
to harass the reporter, “whether the grand jury’s investigation is being conducted 
in good faith, whether the information sought bears more than a remote and 
tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, and whether a legitimate 
law enforcement need will be served by forced disclosure of the confidential 
source relationship.”70  While this language mirrors that of Powell’s concurrence, 
                                                 
66
 Storer Comm’ns, Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987). 
67
 Id. at 581-82. 
68
 Id. at 583. 
69
 Id. at 584. 
70
 Id. at 586. 
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the Sixth Circuit emphasized that “this balancing of interests should not then be 
elevated . . . to the status of a first amendment constitutional privilege.”71 
Outside of the grand jury context, federal appeals courts have been more 
willing to provide protection to newsgathering rights in the face of government 
subpoenas.  The First Circuit, in its 2004 decision in In re Special Proceedings, 
considered a reporter’s appeal of a civil contempt order for his refusal to comply 
with a special prosecutor’s subpoena demanding that he identify a confidential 
source who provided leaked materials.  Although the First Circuit affirmed the 
order, it explained that testimony “may not be compelled unless directly relevant 
to a nonfrivolous claim or inquiry undertaken in good faith; and disclosure may 
be denied where the same information is readily available from a less sensitive 
source.”72   
The Fourth Circuit, however, interpreted the newsgathering interest 
protected by Branzburg narrowly, at least when the reporter invokes the privilege 
to protect non-confidential information.  In its 1992 decision in In re Shain, the 
court affirmed a district court order holding reporters in contempt for refusing to 
comply with a prosecutor’s subpoena to testify about non-confidential 
statements.73  The court held that the reporters could not assert a privilege absent 
evidence that the government intended to harass them or otherwise sought the 
                                                 
71
 Id. 
72
 In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).  The 
court, however, noted that the extent to which these requirements were constitutional rather than 
prudential was “unsettled.”  Id.  
73
 In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 853 (4th Cir. 1992). 
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testimony in bad faith.74  As Judge Wilkinson pointed out in his concurrence, 
however, because a subpoena can only rarely be successfully challenged on the 
basis of state harassment, the “reportorial interest, as defined by the majority, is 
not much of an interest at all.”75  The majority’s reasoning in Shain runs counter 
to the Fourth Circuit’s 1976 decision in United States v. Steelhammer, in which 
the court held that reporters were not obligated to testify at a civil contempt trial 
about their observations at a union rally they had been invited to cover.76  That 
decision, which the court emphasized was limited to the facts of that case, held 
that where the “information could have been adduced for the Court through the 
testimony of any of many others,” the reporters should not be held in contempt for 
refusing to testify.77  The court explained that its holding did not recognize a 
reporter’s privilege, but was instead aimed at protecting a privilege of the public 
by balancing “protection of the public by exacting truth versus protection of the 
public through maintenance of a free press.”78 
Finally, the D.C. Circuit, in a 1981 decision considering a newspaper 
publisher’s challenge to subpoenas issued by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in a fraud investigation of the publisher and his companies, upheld a 
district court judge’s order excluding from the reach of the subpoenas documents 
related “solely to editorial policy or solely relate[d] to information obtained as 
                                                 
74
 Id. 
75
 Id. at 854 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). 
76
 United States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976). 
77
 Id. at 375. 
78
 Id. 
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part of the process of gathering news for publication.”79  Here, the newspaper 
companies were actually the target of the investigation rather than third parties 
who merely possessed relevant information.  While the D.C. Circuit held that the 
publisher and his companies had no “special privilege” to withhold information, it 
also explained that there was a need for “special sensitivity” when it comes to 
such subpoenas due to the “vital function the press serves in a self-governing 
society.”80  The court thus agreed with the district judge that the subpoenas must 
be limited in order to avoid “unnecessary encroachment” on activities related to 
newsgathering and editorial decisions.”81 
Searches and Seizures Involving Reporters 
The appellate courts have also considered the impact of First Amendment 
newsgathering rights in assessing Fourth Amendment-related claims.82  The 
courts have split on whether and in what circumstances the First Amendment 
imposes special requirements for searches involving journalists.  In 1979—after 
Zurcher, but before the passage of the Privacy Protection Act—the D.C. Circuit in 
Smith v. Nixon considered the claims of a New York Times reporter and his family 
for civil damages from federal officials for alleged violations of the First and 
Fourth Amendments in placing a wiretap on the family’s home phone line.83  The 
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 SEC v. McGoff, 647 F.2d 185, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
80
 Id. at 191. 
81
 Id. 
82
 See Arkansas Chronicle v. Murphy, 183 F. App’x 300 (4th Cir. 2006); Desyllas v. Bernstine, 
351 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2003); Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1979).  
83
 Smith, 606 F.2d at 1186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 
(1972)). 
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court relied in part on Branzburg’s statement that “newsgathering is not without 
its First Amendment protections”84 in concluding that a wiretap target’s 
employment as a journalist must be taken into account when determining whether 
surveillance satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” requirement.85  
The court found further support for this holding in Justice Powell’s concurrence in 
Zurcher, which stated that magistrates “‘can and should take cognizance of the 
independent values protected by the First Amendment’” when issuing a warrant.86  
The court cautioned, however, that its focus on the issues raised by surveillance of 
a journalist “does not suggest any lesser value of the First Amendment interest” of 
any target in “not having their private conversations overheard by the 
government, but simply highlights one feature of this case.”87 
Two other circuits, however, have rebuffed claims that searches or 
seizures involving journalists involved special constitutional considerations under 
the First Amendment.  In 2006, in Arkansas Chronicle v. Murphy, the Fourth 
Circuit rejected the claim of a part-time newspaper employee that a warrant for a 
search of his home and the seizure of computers and files belonging to the 
newspaper had to meet a “heightened standard of particularity.”88  While the court 
did not dispute that heightened specificity was required for some searches 
involving items protected by the First Amendment, it held that this requirement 
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 Id. at 1189 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707). 
85
 Id. 
86
 Id. (citing Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 570 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
87
 Id. at 1190. 
88
 Arkansas Chronicle v. Murphy, 183 F. App’x 300, 301-303 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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did not apply where the seizure “was an attempt to shed evidentiary light” on a 
crime, rather than to “suppress the ideas contained in the documents.”89  The 
Ninth Circuit, in its 2003 decision in Desyllas v. Bernstine, emphasized that 
“generally the First Amendment imposes no requirements beyond those in the 
Fourth Amendment” when officers engage in otherwise lawful investigative 
activities.90  The Court held that where officers complied with the Fourth 
Amendment in temporarily locking down the office of a campus newspaper office 
and did not otherwise attempt to interfere with publication, the student editor of 
the paper had no First Amendment claim.91   
Newsgathering Claims in Other Contexts 
Collection of Journalists’ Phone Records via Third-Party Providers.  
In two decisions that have particular relevance to discerning the potential First 
Amendment rights of journalists whose records were subject to NSLs, the Second 
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit addressed journalists’ claims of First Amendment 
protection for phone records maintained by third-party service providers.  In the 
first of these cases, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T Co., 
the D.C. Circuit in 1978 rejected journalists’ claims that the First Amendment 
requires prior notice of subpoenas issued for their telephone toll records in the 
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 Id. at 305. The court further explained, “The search warrant here was incidental to any alleged 
First Amendment activity and was not used as ‘an instrument for stifling liberty of expression, 
which is the evil that the heightened particularity standard is designed to combat.” Id. (quoting 
Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 564 (internal citation omitted). 
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 Desyllas v. Bernstine, 351 F.3d 934, 941-42 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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course of felony investigations.92  In 2006, the Second Circuit considered a 
similar claim, holding in New York Times Co. v. Gonzales that while the First 
Amendment protected phone records in the hands of third parties to the same 
extent they would be protected in the hands of the reporters themselves, this 
protection was not enough to avoid a good faith grand jury subpoena in the 
specific circumstances of that case.93  Due to the factual similarities between the 
actions at issue in these cases and the collection of phone records through NSLs, 
these two cases are discussed in greater detail than the other appeals court cases 
discussed in this chapter. 
 In Reporters Committee, journalists sued two phone companies for 
declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the First Amendment required that 
they be provided with prior notice before the companies provided their long 
distance billing records to the Government.94  The United States intervened as a 
defendant.95  The billing records at issue documented all long distance calls 
charged to a customer’s telephone number, including the number dialed and the 
“date, time, and duration of the call.”96  At least five times in a 38-month period, 
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 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(“[J]ournalists in this context have no ‘First Amendment interest’ in third-party records which 
disclose the identity of a secret source and, consequently, have no First Amendment right to notice 
of subpoenas directed at such records.”). 
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 New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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 Reporters Comm., 593 F.2d at 1036. 
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 Id.  The reporters also brought a Fourth Amendment claim.  This claim, however, was swiftly 
rejected under the third-party doctrine, with the Court noting “the well-settled rule that a person 
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protected by the Fourth Amendment in such records.” Id. at 1043-44. 
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 Id. at 1036. 
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phone companies had turned over such records in response to subpoenas issued in 
felony investigations.97    
In a 2-1 decision, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment to defendants on most of the plaintiff’s claims.98  The court 
agreed that “the First Amendment extends some protection to news-gathering,”99 
but held that this protection neither created a right to maintain the secrecy of 
confidential sources in the face of good faith felony investigations nor was it 
abridged by government access to third-party records.  The majority opinion 
characterized the reporters’ claims of a right to prior notice as relying on two 
separate theories, both based on a First Amendment right to gather information 
from anonymous sources.  Under the first theory, this right is threatened by any 
toll-record subpoena that could reveal anonymous sources, even one issued in 
good faith, and judicial balancing is necessary to determine whether the 
government’s intrusion is justified in a particular case.100  Under the second 
theory, journalists’ First Amendment rights are infringed by bad faith subpoenas 
issued “as part of politically-motivated efforts to interfere with their news-
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 Id. at 1037-39.  Four of the subpoenas were issued by grand juries.  Of these, three were issued 
in connection with possible violations of federal espionage laws—two involving the investigation 
of Daniel Ellsberg for the unauthorized disclosure of classified documents that came to be known 
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gathering activities.”101  In these cases, the journalists argued, prior notice is 
necessary to ensure that journalists can challenge the subpoena in court, where a 
judge would screen out subpoenas issued in bad faith.102 
 In addressing the first theory, the court held the right of journalists to 
gather information did not encompass the right to “maintain the secrecy of 
sources in the face of good faith felony investigations.”103  The majority 
considered Branzburg to be dispositive on this point: if journalists have no First 
Amendment right to resist subpoenas issued to the journalists themselves in good 
faith felony investigations, “then they certainly have no right to resist good faith 
subpoenas” for a third-party’s business records.104  Furthermore, the court noted, 
although government access to journalists’ telephone toll records may inhibit 
newsgathering activities, it does not follow that this limitation “abridges” First 
Amendment rights.105  Here, as in Branzburg, the government’s action did not 
subject reporters to “regulation, proscription or compulsion,” as such, the court 
explained, it did not constitute the type of “abridgement” contemplated by the 
First Amendment.106  Finally, the majority noted that even if the reporters could 
establish abridgment of a First Amendment right, they could not establish that this 
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created a serious burden to newsgathering that outweighed the government’s 
interest in carrying out good faith felony investigations.107 
 As to the plaintiffs’ second theory—that the First Amendment required 
judicial review to screen out subpoenas issued in bad faith—the majority held that 
the First Amendment does protect newsgathering activities from official 
harassment and that a bad faith toll-record subpoena could abridge journalists’ 
First Amendment rights.108  However, in assessing the plaintiffs’ demand for 
case-by-case judicial screening of toll-records subpoenas, the court concluded that 
ten of the fifteen plaintiffs had failed to make the requisite showing of an 
imminent threat that the government would in fact subpoena their toll records in 
bad faith.109  As to the five remaining plaintiffs, the court concluded that they had 
“adduced just enough evidence” that they faced a threat of bad faith subpoenas to 
withstand the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.110   
The majority seemed skeptical, however, that these plaintiffs would be 
able to demonstrate their entitlement to an injunction on remand.  In particular, 
the court explained, the plaintiffs would have difficulty making the required 
                                                 
107
 Id. at 1062-63 (“Journalists’ records have been subject to [toll-record] subpoenas for 50 years, 
and during this time, ‘the press has flourished’ and so has its use of confidential sources.” (quoting 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 698-99 (1972)). 
108
 Id. at 1064 (“Unlike good faith investigation to which all citizens are subject, official 
harassment places a special burden on information-gathering, for in such cases the ultimate, 
though tacit, design is to obstruct rather than to investigate, and the official action is proscriptive 
rather than observatory in character.”). 
109
 Id. at 1066.  Such a showing is necessary under the traditional test for injunctive relief, which 
requires that an injunction may issue only upon a showing that the plaintiff is threatened with 
imminent harm, that such harm will cause substantial and irreparable damage, and that other 
remedies are inadequate.  See id. at 1065. 
110
 Id. at 1066. The court made this determination viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiffs, as is required at the summary judgment stage.  Id.  
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showing that their remedy at law is inadequate.111  The plaintiffs’ phone company 
had adopted a new policy providing that customers would receive same-day 
notice of subpoenas for their records or, in cases in which the government 
certified that such notice would impede a felony investigation, that notice would 
be provided at the end of 90 days.112  The court explained that this “guarantees 
that plaintiffs will have the opportunity to bring . . . damage suits in any case in 
which they believe the Government was acting in bad faith” and that the 
“inevitability of damage suits would pose a significant deterrent to future 
Government misconduct.”113  Thus, in the court’s view, any First Amendment 
violations arising from a toll-records subpoena could be adequately addressed by 
existing legal remedies.    
 Judge J. Skelly Wright in dissent in Reporters Committee argued that toll-
record subpoenas placed a clear burden on journalists’ First Amendment 
newsgathering rights, explaining that to restrain journalists from “making use of 
their telephones for long distance calls is, in effect, to foreclose them from 
engaging in newsgathering activity.”114  Wright argued the majority had 
misinterpreted Branzburg and Zurcher.  Rather than “holding that the First 
Amendment rights involved were deserving of no procedural protections,” Wright 
explained, these decisions “turned explicitly on the determination that the prior 
                                                 
111
 Id. at 1069. 
112
 Id. at 1038, 1069.  The policy also allowed the government to extend the 90-day waiting period 
by providing a new certification that notice would impede a felony investigation.  In these cases, 
notification would take place after the expiration of the extension. 
113
 Id. at 1069. 
114
 Id. at 1090 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
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judicial scrutiny on a case-by-case basis which was afforded was sufficient to 
protect the First Amendment rights at stake.”115  Wright explained: 
Any lingering doubt as to the importance of judicial scrutiny to 
protection of First Amendment rights and, in particular, to 
newsgathering rights such as those at issue here must be laid to rest 
by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Branzburg v. Hayes and 
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.  The determinative vote in both those 
decisions was cast by Justice Powell on the basis of his view that 
the majority opinions did indeed provide for prior judicial scrutiny 
and thus afforded sufficient protection to the First Amendment 
rights at stake. . . .   
     In Branzburg, as Justice Powell pointed out, the reporter could 
seek judicial review of the grand jury subpoena through a motion 
to quash; at that point the court was charged with “(balancing) 
(the) vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case 
basis.” Similarly, the warrant procedure, as upheld in Stanford 
Daily, ensures that First Amendment rights of the press will not be 
jeopardized by searches unless and until a judicial officer has first 
concluded that the search is reasonable in light of the First 
Amendment values at stake.116 
 
An opportunity for such judicial scrutiny should similarly be available to the 
plaintiffs here, Wright argued, in order to adequately protect the journalists’ First 
Amendment rights.117   
 Twenty-eight years after the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the Second Circuit 
considered a similar claim of First Amendment protection for reporters’ phone 
records in New York Times Co. v. Gonzales.118  The claim arose out of a federal 
grand jury investigation of an unauthorized leak to two New York Times reporters 
revealing the government’s plans to search the offices of two foundations 
                                                 
115
 Id. at 1080. 
116
 Id. at 1088-89 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972)) (internal citation 
omitted) (alterations in original). 
117
 Id. at 1080. 
118
 New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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suspected of funding terrorist activities.119  The reporters called the foundations 
for comment, thus tipping them off to the planned searches and, according to the 
government, compromising the investigations.120  After the Times refused to 
cooperate with the federal prosecutor working on the case, the government, 
pursuant to Department of Justice guidelines, warned that it would subpoena the 
reporters’ phone records from the newspaper’s third-party telephone service 
provider.121  The Times sued, seeking a declaratory judgment that the records 
were protected from grand jury subpoena by a First Amendment privilege 
protecting against the compelled disclosure of confidential sources.122  The 
district court granted the Times’ motion for summary judgment. 
 In a 2-1 decision, the Second Circuit reversed.123  The court first rejected 
the government’s claim that any privilege held by the reporters could not extend 
to telephone records held by third parties.  Applying existing Second Circuit 
precedent governing privileges and third-party records, the court held that “so 
long as the third party plays an ‘integral role’ in reporters’ work, the records of 
                                                 
119
 Id. at 163. 
120
 Id.  
121
 Id. at 164-65. 
122
 Id. at 165. The Times also claimed that the records were protected by a common law privilege. 
The court said that it was unnecessary to decide whether a common law privilege applied, since 
any such privilege would be qualified and would be overcome by the government on the facts of 
this case. Id. at 169-71. 
123
 Judge Sack, dissenting, agreed with much of the majority’s analysis, but would have found the 
records to be protected by a qualified common law privilege requiring that the government 
demonstrate: 1) that the information sought is necessary; 2) that it is not available from other 
sources; and 3) that the public interest in compelling disclosure outweighs the public interest in 
newsgathering and maintaining a free flow of information.  See id. at 174, 186-87 (Sack, J., 
dissenting).  Because Sack did not dispute the majority’s holding on the First Amendment 
newsgathering claim—the primary subject of interest for purposes of this thesis—this chapter has 
omitted separate discussion of Sack’s dissent.   
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third parties detailing that work are . . . covered by the same privileges afforded to 
the reporters themselves and their personal records.”124  Because the telephone is 
an “essential tool of modern journalism and plays an integral role in the collection 
of information by reporters,” the court concluded, any First Amendment 
protection available to the reporters also extends to reporters’ telephone records 
sought from third parties.125 
 The court, however, rejected the Times’ claim that a First Amendment 
privilege applied to records sought by a grand jury subpoena.  The court explained 
that this claim was governed by Branzburg126 and that nothing in the majority 
opinion nor in Justice Powell’s concurrence “calls for preventing the present 
grand jury from accessing information concerning the identity of the reporters’ 
sources(s).”127  The court noted that the subject of the grand jury investigation—
disclosures that tipped off the targets of a criminal investigation to impending 
searches—was a serious law enforcement concern and that moreover there was 
“no suggestion of bad faith in the investigation or conduct of the investigation.”128  
The court stated that even the qualified privilege outlined by Justice Stewart’s 
dissenting opinion in Branzburg would be overcome in this case, as the “serious 
                                                 
124
 Id. at 168.  The case that the court considered governing precedent, Local 1814, Int’l 
Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Waterfront Comm’n, 667 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1981), had held 
that the First Amendment rights of union workers were implicated by subpoenas for third-party 
records of activities that played an “integral role” in the union’s membership and fundraising 
activities and that these records were therefore entitled to the same protection as records of the 
union itself. 
125
 New York Times Co., 459 F.3d at 168. 
126
 Id. at 172. 
127
 Id. at 174. 
128
 Id.   
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law enforcement concerns raised by targets learning of impending searches 
because of unauthorized disclosures” could easily satisfy Stewart’s demand for a 
showing of “relevance and need.”129  Importantly, the court’s opinion does not 
rule out the possibility that the First Amendment may protect reporters’ phone 
records from disclosure to grand juries in other contexts.   
Restrictions on Newsgathering Activities Related to Trial Coverage.  
The federal appeals courts have extended the greatest protection to First 
Amendment newsgathering rights when the government’s action directly intrudes 
on the newsgathering process.  The case law’s clearest examples of such direct 
restrictions are judicial orders that by their express terms directly limit reporters’ 
ability to gather news about a trial, for example, by barring reporters from 
conducting post-verdict interviews with jurors.130  These orders are often based on 
concern for protecting the jurors from harassment by the press or protecting the 
secrecy of jury deliberations.  The circuit courts that have addressed such 
restrictions have uniformly held them to be unconstitutional, although their 
precise reasoning has varied.131   
                                                 
129
 Id.  
130
 Trial judges may also indirectly limit reporters’ ability to gather news about a trial by placing 
gag orders barring attorneys and parties from making public comment to anyone.  Cases involving 
such gag orders, however, are not within the scope of this chapter.  See supra Chapter 1, Part IV. 
131
 See United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Cleveland, 128 F.3d 
267 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1355 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir. 
1982); United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1360 (9th Cir. 1978).  Although the Supreme 
Court has addressed claims of access to trials and of restrictions on publication of certain 
information related to trial proceedings, it has not addressed orders involving restrictions on 
underlying newsgathering activities that reporters could perform freely absent the restriction. 
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The Ninth Circuit, in its 1972 decision in United States v. Sherman, 
vacated a district court judge’s post-verdict order prohibiting news media from 
contacting jurors.  The court explained that Branzburg had “recognized that 
newsgathering is an activity protected by the First Amendment” and that the trial 
judge’s order “clearly restrained the media in their attempts to gather news.”132  
Rather than analyzing this violation of newsgathering rights on its own terms, 
however, the court analyzed the restriction under the broader First Amendment 
doctrine of prior restraint, in which there is a heavy presumption against 
constitutionality of laws that prevent a statement from being made or published.133  
Here, the court treated the order as a prior restraint “depriving the media of the 
opportunity to ask the jurors if they wished to be interviewed,” and found that it 
had failed to meet the stringent standards required for such laws.134 
The Fifth Circuit also invoked a prior restraint analysis in its 2001 
decision in United States v. Brown, which considered a trial judge’s orders barring 
the media from attempting to “interfere with” or “circumvent” a court order 
preserving the jury’s anonymity.135  While the non-circumvention orders could 
have been interpreted as merely barring journalists from attempting to obtain 
confidential court data, journalists challenging the orders argued that they also 
threatened “to proscribe independent newsgathering, e.g. any story not derived 
                                                 
132
 Sherman, 581 F.2d at 1361 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)). 
133
 Id. (citing Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). 
134
 Id. at 1361-62.  A prior restraint is a restriction prohibiting in advance future speech or 
communication.  The courts have applied a heavy presumption against the constitutionality of 
prior restraints, which must be “narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest.”  
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
135
 Brown, 250 F.3d at 917-18. 
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from confidential court records, that might deal with jurors.”136  To the extent the 
trial judge intended this latter interpretation, the circuit court held that the orders 
were unconstitutional prior restraints “insofar as they interdicted the press from 
independent investigation and reporting about the jury based on acts obtained 
from sources other than confidential court records, court personnel or trial 
participants.”137  
In the 1982 case of In re Express-News Corp., however, the Fifth Circuit 
relied solely on a standalone newsgathering right—rather than trying to place 
newsgathering activities within a prior restraint analysis—to strike down a district 
court rule that restricted post-verdict interviews with jurors.138  Noting 
Branzburg’s warning that “without some protection for seeking out the news, 
freedom of the press could be eviscerated,”139 the court explained that freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press would be limited if  “those who wish to 
disseminate information [were] denied access to it, for freedom to speak is of little 
value if there is nothing to say.”140  While journalists do not have the right to 
access information not available to the general public, the court explained that a 
court order cannot restrict the right to gather news unless the government can 
show that “it is narrowly tailored to prevent a substantial threat to the 
                                                 
136
 Id. at 914. 
137
 Id. at 917-18. 
138
 In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982). 
139
 Id. at 808 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).  The court also found that 
the order implicated a second First Amendment right—that of the public to receive information.  
Id. at 809.  
140
 Id. at 808. 
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administration of justice.”141  In two later cases, the Fifth Circuit deemed this 
standard to be satisfied: in a 1983 case the court upheld post-verdict restrictions 
barring repeated requests for interviews after a juror has refused to talk and 
forbidding questions about the specific votes of other jurors,142 and in a 1998 case 
it approved a judge’s instruction that jurors could not be interviewed about their 
“deliberations” without the judge’s permission.143   
In 1994 in United States v. Antar, the Third Circuit assessed post-verdict 
restrictions on how reporters could approach and interview jurors, defining the 
right at stake as the “right of the press and public to have access to court 
proceedings.”144  The court held that a judge could not limit the “press’s ability to 
have post-trial access to jurors” absent a “finding by the court that harassing or 
intrusive interviews are occurring or are intended” and that no less restrictive 
alternatives are available.145 
Restrictions on Exit Polling.  A final situation in which a federal court of 
appeals has addressed a First Amendment newsgathering claim is in assessing 
challenges to restrictions on exit polling.  While a number of states have passed 
laws restricting exit polling or interaction with voters near polling sites more 
generally, these claims have often been resolved in federal district courts or in a 
                                                 
141
 Id. at 810. 
142
 United States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114, 1115 (5th Cir. 1983). The order, on its face, did not 
apply specifically to journalists as such, but to any “person” or “interviewer” who attempted to 
engage in the forbidden activities.  Id. at 1116-17. 
143
 United States v. Cleveland, 128 F.3d 267, 269 (5th Cir. 1998). 
144
 United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1350 (3d Cir. 1994). 
145
 Id. at 1363-64. 
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state courts, and thus only one such challenge involving a First Amendment 
newsgathering claim has been considered by the federal appeals courts.146  In 
1986 in Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, the Ninth Circuit considered the claim that a 
Washington statute barring exit polling within 300 feet of a polling place violated 
the First Amendment newsgathering rights of a group of news organizations that 
challenged the law.147  The court concluded that the statute was a content-based 
restriction of speech148 in a public forum and thus could only be upheld if it was 
narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling government interest.149  The court 
held that while the state had an interest in maintaining peace and order at the 
polls, the statute was not narrowly tailored because it barred all exit polling, 
including exit polling that was non-disruptive.150  The Court, however, did not 
rely solely on the newspapers’ newsgathering rights.  It considered exit polling to 
involve speech that is protected “on several levels, by the First Amendment,” 
including the protection afforded to speech about governmental affairs.151 
                                                 
146
  The Ninth Circuit, however, considered whether media plaintiffs who had successful 
challenged exit polling restrictions in the district court should be awarded attorneys’ fees. See 
ABC v. Miller, 550 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2008).  As stated above, most other cases involving exit 
polling restrictions have been resolved by federal district courts or by state courts.  See, e.g., 
National Broad. Co. v. Cleland, 697 F. Supp. 1204 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Firestone v. News-Press 
Publ’g Co., 538 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1989).  In addition, a number of laws that restrict campaign 
activity or approaching voters within a certain distance from a polling site have been challenged 
by campaigns or activists as unconstitutional restrictions on political speech.  The Supreme Court 
considered such a claim in Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
147
 Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1986). 
148
 Content-based restrictions on speech are those based upon the subject matter or type of speech.  
Such a restraint is presumptively invalid, but may survive a First Amendment challenge if 
narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 141 (3d pocket 
ed. 2006).  
149
 Daily Herald Co., 838 F.2d at 385. 
150
 Id. 
151
 Id. at 384. 
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Conclusion 
 While the Supreme Court and federal appeals courts have been adverse to 
granting journalists “special rights,” they have often noted the special concerns 
involved when otherwise seemingly neutral laws threaten newsgathering interests 
and have recognized the need to adequately protect journalists’ First Amendment 
rights.  In the case of laws that specifically burden reporters or that directly 
restrict newsgathering rights—such as those barring reporters from conducting 
interviews with jurors—the courts have more readily upheld First Amendment 
claims.  The nature of the burden therefore appears to be a significant factor in 
how courts approach First Amendment newsgathering claims. 
 A second factor that appears to be influential in the courts’ case law on 
newsgathering claims is the availability of procedural protections.  Even when the 
courts have refused to provide blanket remedies—such as the recognition of a 
constitutional reporter’s privilege in Branzburg or a prohibition on newsroom 
searches in Zurcher—they have nonetheless noted the importance of protecting 
against abuses of First Amendment rights and have highlighted the availability of 
procedural remedies to guard against abuse.  The availability of procedural 
protections on a case-by-case basis to prevent First Amendment abuses thus 
seems to weigh in favor of a finding of constitutionality if the court has concerns 
about burdens to First Amendment rights but finds the government’s interest to be 
strong.   
A final theme that emerges from the case law analyzed in this study is that 
the courts weigh heavily the interests of law enforcement, even in those cases in 
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which First Amendment interests may be threatened.  In particular, in their 
decisions on government subpoenas for reporters’ testimony or work products, 
law enforcement searches of journalists’ work places, and subpoenas for 
reporters’ phone records demonstrate a strong deference to law enforcement 
needs. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4  
 
BALANCING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AGAINST  
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS 
 
 The judiciary has traditionally given “special deference” to the other 
branches of government on issues of national security, even when claims of 
constitutional rights are involved.1  At the same time, however, the federal courts 
have recognized that the government must not be allowed to invoke vague claims 
of national security to justify invasions of First Amendment rights.2  In several 
cases, in fact, the courts have cited the executive’s broad authority in the realm of 
national security as a reason to be particularly protective of First Amendment 
activities; the ability to monitor policies and actions related to national security 
and to bring information about them to the attention of the public, according to 
                                                 
1
 Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colo. Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007). 
2
 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) 
(“The word ‘security’ is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to 
abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment.”); United States v. Robel, 389 
U.S. 258, 263 (1967) (“[T]he phrase ‘war power’ cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to 
support any exercise of congressional power which can be brought within its ambit.”); Bl(a)ck Tea 
Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Security is not a talisman that the 
government may invoke to justify any burden on speech (no matter how oppressive.”). 
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these decisions, can serve as the most effective means of checking executive 
power in this realm.3    
  The federal courts have considered the conflict between First Amendment 
rights and national security interests in a number of contexts.  The Supreme Court 
has provided the most robust protection to First Amendment rights, and thus 
required the strongest showing of a national security interest to limit them, when 
the government attempts to impose a prior restraint upon speech.4  On the other 
end of the spectrum, the federal courts have considered national security to be a 
particularly compelling interest, and thus have more readily limited First 
Amendment rights, in the context of claims involving reasonable time, place, and 
manner restrictions on speech.   
 This chapter looks at cases in which the Supreme Court and federal courts 
of appeals have assessed conflicts between the First Amendment rights of free 
press, speech, or association and the government’s alleged national security 
interests.  As described in detail in Chapter 1, the cases for this chapter were 
compiled by running two searches in the Lexis Nexis database for cases 
containing relevant terms.5  From these lists, cases were screened individually to 
                                                 
3
 See, e.g., New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“In the absence of the 
governmental checks and balances in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint 
upon executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie 
in an enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here 
protect the values of democratic government.”); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 703-
04 (6th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “public access acts as a check on the actions of the Executive” 
in deportation proceedings in terrorism related cases). 
4
 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
5
 The first search string was: HEADNOTES ("First Amendment" or “U.S. Const. amend. I”) and 
(HEADNOTES ("national security") or CORE-TERMS ("national security")).  The second search 
was: “First Amendment” /s “national security.”   
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limit the cases discussed in this chapter to those in which the courts had actually 
considered on the merits a conflict between First Amendment rights and national 
security interests.  This means that cases in which the First Amendment or 
national security was mentioned only incidentally, cases in which the court held 
that the activity at issue was simply outside the scope of First Amendment 
protection, and cases in which the court refused to consider the balance of 
national security interests and First Amendment rights because it determined that 
the activity at issue—for example, approving security clearances—was uniquely 
within the power of the executive branch were excluded.  After applying these 
limitations, eighteen cases remained, each of which is discussed below.6 
 The first part of this chapter examines cases in which the courts 
considered a conflict between national security interests and journalists’ First 
Amendment rights.  The second part examines cases in which the court assessed a 
conflict between national security interests and the First Amendment speech or 
association rights of a non-media litigant. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 These decisions are: Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, No. 08-1498, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5252 
(June 21, 2010); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); New York Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Barenblatt v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 109 (1958); United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2008); Citizens for Peace 
in Space v. City of Colo. Springs, 477 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2007); Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of 
Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005); Detroit 
Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 
1000 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986); White House Vigil 
for ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1984); McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137 
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Marchetti, 
466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972); Wilkinson v. United States, 272 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1959); United 
States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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Part I: Balancing Journalists’ First Amendment Claims  
Against National Security Interests 
 While many cases balancing First Amendment rights and national security 
interests involve freedom of speech or association more generally, the courts have 
addressed claims that are specifically relevant to journalists’ First Amendment 
rights in two types of cases—those involving prior restraints and those concerned 
with public access to judicial proceedings.7  In the most famous case pitting 
journalists’ First Amendment rights against the government’s claims that speech 
would damage national security interests—New York Times Co. v. United States 
(also known as the “Pentagon Papers” case)—the Supreme Court held in 1971 
that the United States had not satisfied the “heavy burden” to uphold prior 
restraints enjoining The New York Times and The Washington Post from 
publishing the contents of a classified study of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.8  
According to the government, the disclosure of certain documents in the study 
would pose a “grave and immediate danger to national security.”9  At oral 
argument, the Solicitor General told the justices that release of the documents 
would impact ongoing “delicate negotiations” to end the war in Vietnam and to 
recover prisoners of war, thus impacting the security of the United States.10   The 
government claimed that the president’s constitutional power over foreign affairs 
                                                 
7
 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 
72, 76 (2d Cir. 2008); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002); In re 
Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986). 
8
 New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714. 
9
 Brief for the United States at 13, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) 
(No. 1885), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB48/usbrief.pdf.  
10
 Transcript of Oral Argument at 26-27, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (No. 1885), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB48/argument.pdf. 
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as well as his authority as Commander-in-Chief entitled him to protect the nation 
against publication of such materials.11  The district court that considered the 
government’s claims against the Times, however, had found that the government 
offered “no cogent reasons” as to why the documents would damage the nation’s 
security except for the general harm of “embarrassment.”12 
The Supreme Court held 6-3 that the government had not satisfied the 
burden necessary to justify a prior restraint.  To justify a prior restraint—a 
restriction that prohibits in advance future communication13—the government 
must demonstrate that the restraint is “narrowly tailored to promote a compelling 
Government interest.”14  The six justices’ brief per curiam opinion rejecting the 
injunctions demonstrates this strong presumption against prior restraints on 
speech, even in the face of claims of harm to national security.  However, these 
justices’ concurring opinions represent a range of views on how the government 
may otherwise restrict free speech to protect national security. 
                                                 
11
 Brief of United States, supra note 9, at 13-14. 
12
 United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).  The Second 
Circuit ordered that the case “be remanded to the District Court for further in camera proceedings 
to determine . . . whether disclosure of” certain items highlighted by the government would “pose 
such grave and immediate danger to the security of the United States as to warrant their 
publication being enjoined.”  United States v. New York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(en banc), rev’d 403 U.S. 713 (1971).  Due to the fast-moving nature of events in this litigation, 
the D.C. federal district court that considered the request for an injunction against the Post did not 
issue a published decision.  That court, however, also found that disclosure of the documents at 
issue “would not be harmful or that any harm resulting from disclosure would be insufficient to 
override First Amendment interests.”  See United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 
1328 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (explaining the district court’s ruling).  The D.C. Circuit affirmed.  Id. at 
1329. 
13
 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993). 
14
 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
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 The views of Justices Black and Douglas in New York Times, each of 
whom joined in the other’s opinion, provide the strongest protection for free 
speech; these justices maintained an absolutist interpretation of the First 
Amendment that would countenance no restraint on the press.15  While the 
government argued that restraints on speech were necessary to protect the nation’s 
security, Black and Douglas took the view that the way to truly protect a 
democracy was to allow for a full and robust debate of public issues.  Douglas’ 
opinion contended that “[s]ecrecy in government is fundamentally anti-
democractic,” and that the health of American democracy is better protected by 
open discussion of public issues.16  Black echoed this view, writing, “The 
guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed 
representative government provides no real security for our Republic.”17  Black 
and Douglas also warned that “security” was “a broad, vague generality” that 
should not be used to justify restrictions on First Amendment rights.18       
 The other four justices in the New York Times majority agreed that the 
government had failed to meet the heavy burden necessary to justify a prior 
restraint in this case, but they refused to rule out the possibility of a constitutional 
                                                 
15
 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).  In 
an opinion joined by Justice Black, Justice Douglas stated that the categorical command of the 
First Amendment “leaves . . . no room for governmental restraint on the press.”  Id. 
16
 Id. 
17
 Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring). 
18
 Id. at 717. 
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prior restraint under other circumstances.19  Moreover, three of the concurring 
justices—Stewart, White, and Marshall—suggested that the government would 
not violate the First Amendment if it chose to prosecute newspapers after 
publication under laws that punish dissemination of sensitive national security 
information.20  Thus, the newspapers’ First Amendment victory in New York 
Times may in fact be more limited than the result alone would suggest.  
Nonetheless, several of the concurring justices echoed Black and Douglas’ view 
that the free press played an important role in protecting the values of a 
democratic government.  Justices Stewart and White noted that this role may be 
particularly important in the realm of national security, where public opinion 
operates as a crucial check on broad executive power over defense and foreign 
affairs.21   
                                                 
19
 See id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[O]nly governmental allegation and proof that 
publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to 
imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim 
restraining order.”); id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring, joined by White, J.) (“I am convinced that 
the Executive is correct with respect to some of the documents involved. But I cannot say that 
disclosure of any of them will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our 
Nation or its people.”); id. at 741-42 (Marshall, J., concurring) (explaining that the Court cannot 
allow the executive to invoke the courts’ equity power to enjoin behavior that Congress had 
specifically declined to prohibit).  
20
 See id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“Undoubtedly Congress has power to enact specific and 
appropriate criminal laws to protect government property and preserve government secrets. 
Congress has passed such laws, and several of them are of very colorable relevance to the apparent 
circumstances of these cases.”); id. at 738 n.9 (White, J., concurring) (“[I]t seems undeniable that 
a newspaper, as well as others unconnected with the Government, are vulnerable to prosecution 
under [the Espionage Act] if they communicate or withhold the materials covered by that 
section.”); id. at 745 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting the potential relevance of the Espionage 
Act to the facts at issue). 
21
 Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring, joined by White, J.) (“In the absence of the governmental 
checks and balances present in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon 
national policy and power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an 
enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the 
values of democratic government.”). 
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A second area in which the federal courts of appeals have considered the 
balance of First Amendment rights and national security interests is in ruling on 
claims by the media and other organizations of a right of access to court hearings 
that have been closed or documents that have been sealed based on an alleged 
need to avoid disclosure of sensitive security information.  These cases follow a 
line of decisions that began with the Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in Richmond 
Newspapers v. Virginia, in which the Court recognized a broad First Amendment 
right of the press and public to attend criminal trials.22  According to the plurality 
opinion in that case, “[W]ithout the freedom to attend [criminal] trials, which 
people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and 
of the press could be eviscerated.”23  In its 1982 decision in Globe Newspaper Co. 
v. Superior Court, the Court made clear that criminal trials may only be closed if 
the closure was “necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and [was] 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”24  In a series of subsequent decisions, the 
Court expanded this right of access to criminal trials to include access to jury 
selection25 and to preliminary hearings.26  The Court has not, however, extended 
the right of access beyond the context of criminal trials and related proceedings.27   
                                                 
22
 Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
23
 Id. at 580. 
24
 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1992). 
25
 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) [hereinafter Press-
Enterprise I]. 
26
 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Press-
Enterprise II]. 
27
 In Richmond Newspapers, the Court explained, “Whether the public has a right to attend trials 
of civil cases is a question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and 
criminal trials have been presumptively open.”  448 U.S. at 580 n.17. 
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Generally, courts evaluate claims of a First Amendment right of access in 
two stages.  First, the party seeking access must demonstrate that the underlying 
proceeding is one for which there is a First Amendment right of access.  The 
existence of a right of access depends on whether the proceeding is of a type that 
has traditionally been open to the public and whether “public access plays a 
significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.”28  
If the court determines that the proceeding is subject to a First Amendment right 
of access, the court then moves to the second stage, in which it considers whether 
the party seeking closure can overcome that right by demonstrating that “closure 
is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that 
interest.”29  When the government has claimed national security interests to justify 
closure, the courts have recognized the high value of this purpose, but have also 
emphasized that the judiciary cannot abdicate its duty to protect constitutional 
rights by allowing the government to invoke broad or vague security interests. 
In In re Washington Post Co., decided in 1986, the Fourth Circuit 
highlighted the important role of open court proceedings in preventing 
government abuses.30  The circuit court vacated a district court order closing the 
courtroom for a Ghanaian national’s plea to espionage charges and sealing related 
documents.31  The government argued that disclosure of the plea proceedings, 
which were part of a larger prisoner exchange between the U.S. and Ghana, could 
                                                 
28
 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8-9. 
29
 Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510.  
30
 In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986). 
31
 Id. at 393. 
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jeopardize the prisoner exchange and risk the lives of Americans who were being 
held for spying in Ghana.32  Although the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the 
dangers of public disclosure of classified information, it held that in order to 
justify closure, the district court must comply with standard procedural 
requirements mandating advance notice and specific findings supporting closure, 
even when national security interests are involved.33  The Fourth Circuit 
explained that a trial court could follow standard procedures without divulging the 
substance of the information that the government sought to protect.34  
Furthermore, the court made clear that while it was “troubled . . . by the risk that 
disclosure of classified information could endanger the lives of both Americans 
and their foreign informants,” it was “equally troubled by the notion that the 
judiciary should abdicate its decisionmaking to the executive branch whenever 
national security concerns are present.”35  “Blind acceptance” of the government’s 
claimed need for secrecy, according to the court, would “open the door to possible 
abuse.”36 
In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, decided in 2002, the Sixth Circuit 
similarly rejected an attempt by the government to carve out less rigorous closure 
rules for judicial proceedings related to national security issues.  Pursuant to a 
challenge by the Detroit Free Press, the court affirmed a preliminary injunction 
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 Id. at 386. 
33
 Id. at 391. 
34
 Id.  
35
 Id. 
36
 Id. at 392. 
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against a post-September 11th executive branch policy that imposed blanket 
closures upon deportation hearings in “special interest” cases.  Under the policy, 
the executive branch had unilateral power to designate a case as “special interest” 
based on suspicion that the alien was connected to or had information about 
terrorism.37  While the court recognized the risk that dangerous information could 
be disclosed in certain deportation hearings, it concluded that “the ordinary 
process of determining whether closure is warranted on a case-by-case basis 
sufficiently addresses [these] concerns.”38  The court explained the importance of 
maintaining openness in judicial proceedings and the role the press can serve in 
protecting against abuses: 
The Executive Branch seeks to uproot people’s lives, outside the 
public eye, and behind a closed door.  Democracies die behind 
closed doors.  The First Amendment, through a free press, protects 
the people’s right to know that their government acts fairly, 
lawfully, and accurately in deportation proceedings. . . .  The 
Framers of the First Amendment “did not trust any government to 
separate the true from the false for us.”  They protected the people 
against secret government.39 
 
 In deciding the case, the Detroit Free Press court first addressed whether 
there was a First Amendment right of access to such hearings.  The court held that 
both prongs of the test for a First Amendment right of access had been satisfied, 
                                                 
37
 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).  The Third Circuit also considered 
a challenge to the “special interest” closure policy, but reached an opposite result.  See New Jersey 
Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003).  The 
court held 2-1 that the First Amendment did not confer a right of access to deportation hearings, 
finding that deportation proceedings lacked the tradition of openness necessary to create a First 
Amendment right of access and that access to such proceedings did not play a positive role. Id. at 
201.  The court concluded, “Since the primary national policy must be self-preservation, it seems 
elementary that, to the extent open deportation hearings might impair national security, that 
security is implicated in [the second prong of the test].” Id. at 202.  
38
 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 692-93. 
39
 Id. at 683 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 773 (1972)). 
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emphasizing in particular the “positive role” that access would play by ensuring 
that proceedings were conducted fairly and properly, particularly in an area—
immigration—in which the government has “nearly unlimited authority.”40  In 
considering whether the government could overcome this right, the court held that 
while the government had a compelling interest in protecting national security by 
safeguarding its ongoing terrorism investigations, the blanket closure of “special 
interest” hearings was not a narrowly tailored means of serving this interest.41  
The court concluded that the government had failed to show that its security 
concerns could not be “addressed on a case-by-case basis.”42  While the 
government argued that sensitive information would inevitably leak out if the 
judge had to conduct a hearing on the issue of closure and that these small pieces 
of isolated information could aid terrorists in “creating a bigger picture of the 
Government’s anti-terrorism investigation,” the court explained that such 
“speculation” should not “form the basis for such a drastic restriction of the 
public’s First Amendment rights.”43  Furthermore, the court warned that the 
government could ostensibly use this theory—known as “mosaic intelligence”—
to justify complete closure of any public hearing with even a remote connection to 
national security.44  The court explained:  “This, we simply may not countenance.  
                                                 
40
 Id. at 700, 703-04. 
41
 Id. at 705. 
42
 Id. at 707. 
43
 Id. at 708-09. 
44
 Id. at 709-10. 
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A government operating in the shadow of secrecy stands in complete opposition 
to the society envisioned by the Framers of our Constitution.”45   
 In another terrorism-related case, United States v. Aref, decided in 2008, 
the Second Circuit held that the government had satisfied the burden to sustain 
closure of court documents related to a defendant’s motion to discover any 
evidence against him resulting from a warrantless surveillance program that had 
been reported in The New York Times.46  Assuming, without deciding, that there 
was a public right of access to the government’s sealed response to the discovery 
motion and related court order, both of which contained classified information, 
the court held based on an independent review of the documents that the closure 
was narrowly tailored to protect a national security interest.47  While the court 
cautioned that district courts should be reluctant to seal documents in their 
entirety and that public scrutiny of judicial decisions should be limited “only in 
the rarest of circumstances,” the court also concluded that “transparency must at 
times yield to more compelling interests” and that no such interest was more 
compelling than national security.48 
 The cases discussed above demonstrate that while the Supreme Court and 
courts of appeals place a high value on national security interests, they are 
unwilling to defer to the government’s broad or vague claims of a national 
                                                 
45
 Id. at 710. 
46
 United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2008). The party challenging the closure order in 
this case was the New York Civil Liberties Union, rather than a media outlet, as in the other two 
cases. It is included in this discussion, however, because it raises the same issue of public access. 
47
 Id. at 82. 
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 Id. at 83. 
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security risk to justify a restriction on the media’s First Amendment rights.  The 
courts have also emphasized the value of upholding the media’s First Amendment 
right to gather news and report on issues involving national security as a means of 
providing a check on the executive branch’s broad power in this area. 
 
Part II: Balancing Other First Amendment Speech and Association Claims  
Against National Security Interests 
 
 In addition to evaluating the rights of media parties in the face of 
restrictions aimed at protecting national security, the federal courts also have 
weighed the First Amendment speech and association rights of non-media 
litigants in the face of a wide range of government actions justified as essential to 
security, such as laws aimed at restricting the spread of Communism, laws 
targeting those who assist terrorists, or regulations on protests in security sensitive 
areas.  These cases further demonstrate the tension between the courts’ desire to 
avoid interfering with legitimate government activities that ensure the nation’s 
safety and the courts’ need to avoid providing the executive with carte blanche to 
limit First Amendment rights in the name of “security.”  The outcomes in these 
cases seem to be a function of the nature of the restriction at issue and, to some 
extent, the surrounding historical circumstances, with the courts generally 
demonstrating a greater deference to the government during periods of national 
security peril.  
Several of the earliest federal cases addressing First Amendment 
challenges to restrictions based on national security concerns dealt with laws 
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aimed at limiting the spread of Communism.49  In these cases, the courts treated 
Communism as posing a unique threat that justified First Amendment restrictions 
that would not be upheld in other circumstances.50  For instance, in its 1947 
decision in United States v. Josephson, the Second Circuit credited government 
assertions that Communism was the most immediate threat to freedom of 
expression in rejecting a defendant’s First Amendment challenge to his conviction 
for refusing to answer questions about political beliefs or affiliations from the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities.51  The court doubted that the First 
Amendment could serve as a bar to Congress investigating Communist beliefs; if 
it could, the court said, “the Constitution itself provides immunity from discovery 
and lawful restraint for those who would destroy it.”52  More than a decade later, 
in 1958, in Barenblatt v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected a First 
Amendment challenge to the right of the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities to inquire into a witness’ past or present membership in the Communist 
Party.53  While the Court recognized that the First Amendment would in some 
circumstances protect an individual from compelled disclosure of his or her 
associational relationships, it concluded that this right is outweighed by Congress’ 
                                                 
49
 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1958); 
Wilkinson v. United States, 272 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1959); United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 
(2d Cir. 1947). 
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 See Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 128 (“[T]his Court in its constitutional adjudications has 
consistently refused to view the Communist Party as an ordinary political party, and has upheld 
federal legislation aimed at the Communist problem which in a different context would certainly 
have raised constitutional issues of the gravest character.”). 
51
 Josephson, 165 F.2d at 91. 
52
 Id. at 90. 
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 Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 109. 
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need to investigate the “advocacy of or preparation for” the overthrow of the 
government by violence.54  The following year, in Wilkinson v. United States, the 
Fifth Circuit similarly upheld the committee’s power to investigate political 
affiliations, noting that the First Amendment did not prevent Congress from 
“exercising measures of self-protection.”55     
By 1967, however, the courts were retreating from the broad deference 
given to the other branches in fighting the Communist threat.  In United States v. 
Robel, decided that year, the Supreme Court limited the government’s ability to 
interfere with First Amendment associational rights in fighting Communism by 
striking down a law that made it a criminal offense for members of certain 
Communist organizations to be employed at defense facilities.56  Although 
“association” is not among the freedoms identified by the First Amendment, the 
Supreme Court had previously held that “freedom to engage in association for the 
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect” of freedom of 
speech.57  In evaluating the restrictions on associational rights at issue in Robel, 
the Court held that the statute violated the First Amendment because it swept 
“indiscriminately across all types of association with Communist-action groups, 
                                                 
54
 Id. at 130, 134. 
55
 Wilkinson v. United States, 272 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1959). 
56
 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 261(1967). 
57
 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1154-55 (3d ed. 2006) 
(quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).  In Roberts v. U.S. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984), the Supreme Court explained that an individual’s ability to 
exercise his or her enumerated First Amendment rights “could not be vigorously protected from 
interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends 
were not also guaranteed.” 
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without regard to the quality and degree of membership.”58  According to the 
Court, the statute was not narrowly drawn to punish only those employees whose 
association with the Communist Party posed an actual threat, but instead punished 
any member of a Communist organization, regardless of whether he was inactive, 
unaware of the organization’s illegal aims, or disagreed with its unlawful goals.59  
While the government sought to defend the statute on the basis that it was passed 
under Congress’ war power and therefore entitled to broad deference, the Court 
warned that “the phrase ‘war power’ cannot be invoked as a talismanic 
incantation to support any exercise of congressional power which can be brought 
within its ambit”60 and that “national defense” could not be invoked to “justify[] 
any exercise of legislative power designed to promote such a goal.”61  According 
to the Court, defending the nation included defending the “values and ideals 
which set this Nation apart,” among the most cherished of which is the First 
Amendment.62  Contrary to the Second Circuit’s conclusion 20 years earlier that 
the Constitution could not protect those who would destroy it, the Robel Court 
concluded, “It would be indeed ironic if, in the name of national defense, we 
would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties—the freedom of 
association—which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.”63  
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 Robel, 389 U.S. at 262. 
59
 Id. at 266. 
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 Id. at 262-63. 
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 Id. at 264. 
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The Robel Court’s unwillingness to defer to broad claims of “national 
security” is echoed in the en banc D.C. Circuit’s plurality opinion in Zweibon v. 
Mitchell.64  The plurality rejected the executive branch’s attempt to justify 
warrantless surveillance of a domestic advocacy organization on the basis of the 
executive’s determination that such surveillance “was deemed essential to protect 
this nation and its citizens against hostile acts.”65  The opinion—issued in 1975, 
the year after President Richard Nixon’s resignation—highlighted growing unease 
with the increasing range of activities that the government was conducting for 
“national security” reasons.66  The court acknowledged the executive’s “vast and 
indispensable powers” in this realm, but warned that the judiciary must be 
particularly vigilant because the “existence of such tremendous power . . . renders 
it susceptible to abuse and endangers those fundamental personal liberties which 
the Government was instituted to secure for its citizens.”67  Although the court 
was primarily concerned with the Fourth Amendment violations entailed by 
warrantless surveillance, the opinion also emphasized that prior judicial review of 
surveillance was important “to protect free and robust exercise of the First 
Amendment rights of speech and association by those who might otherwise be 
chilled by the fear of unsupervised and unlimited Executive power to institute 
electronic surveillances.”68 
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 Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc). 
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 Id. at 607. 
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 Id. at 604. 
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While the Zweibon opinion demonstrated a consciousness of surrounding 
historical circumstances that suggested a need for greater suspicion of executive 
power, several opinions since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have 
suggested that the surrounding circumstances necessitate greater deference to the 
executive’s national security claims in the face of First Amendment challenges by 
non-media litigants.  In 2005, in United States v. Ickes, the Fourth Circuit rejected 
a claim that the border search doctrine69 was subject to a First Amendment 
exception, stating:  “Particularly in today’s world, national security interests may 
require uncovering terrorist communications, which are inherently expressive.”70  
Judge Kermit Lipez of the First Circuit candidly acknowledged that since the 
2001 attacks, the balancing of First Amendment rights and national security 
interests had become “even more difficult” because the “risks of violence and the 
dire consequences of that violence . . . may weigh more heavily than they once 
did.”71  In Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, decided in 2002, the Seventh 
Circuit similarly described the government’s “paramount” interest in preventing 
terrorism as having “been made all the more imperative by the events of 
September 11, 2001.”72  The court in that case concluded that a civil suit founded 
on conduct that would violate a federal criminal statute barring the provision of 
“‘material support,’” including money, to foreign terrorist groups did not violate 
                                                 
69
 The border search doctrine is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.  It 
dictates that, based on the Government’s strong interest in preventing the entry of unwanted 
persons or items, searches at the border “without probable cause and without a warrant are 
nonetheless ‘reasonable.’”  United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977). 
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 United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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 Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (Lipez, J., concurring). 
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the First Amendment.73  The court explained that the availability of the civil suit 
remedy was not aimed at suppressing speech and was “closely drawn to avoid 
unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms” by premising liability on the 
basis of funding rather than mere membership.74    
In 2010, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the criminal statute underlying the civil suit in 
Boim in an opinion emphasizing the importance of deferring to judgment of the 
political branches on issues of national security.75  The Court held that the 
statute—which barred the knowing provision of “‘material support or resources’” 
to groups designated as “foreign terrorist organizations”—did not violate the First 
Amendment rights of speech and association of individuals and groups who 
sought to assist in only the “lawful, nonviolent purposes of those groups.”76  The 
challenged statute defined “material support or resources” to include: “any 
property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary 
instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert 
advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, 
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, 
personnel . . . , and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.”77  The 
plaintiffs claimed that they wanted to support the humanitarian and political 
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 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339B).  
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 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, No. 08-1498, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5252 (June 21, 2010). 
76
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activities of two groups that had been designated as terrorist organizations by 
providing support in the form of money, legal training, and political advocacy—
such as training members of these groups how to use international law to 
peacefully resolve disputes and how to seek aid from international bodies—but 
that they could not do so for fear of prosecution.78  The plaintiffs claimed, inter 
alia, that the material-support statute unconstitutionally infringed on their First 
Amendment rights to free speech and association by criminalizing their provision 
of support to these organizations without requiring proof that the plaintiffs had 
specific intent to further the organization’s unlawful goals.79 
The Court, in a 6-3 decision, first found that the statute did not prevent the 
plaintiffs from engaging in independent advocacy, but instead was “carefully 
drawn to cover only a narrow category of speech to, under the direction of, or in 
coordination with foreign groups that the speaker knows to be terrorist 
organizations.”80  As to this category of speech, the Court noted that the 
“[g]overnment’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the 
highest order” and rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the application of the 
material support ban to activities aimed at serving a terrorist organization’s lawful 
                                                 
78
 Id. at *18, *26. 
79
 Id. at *19.  The plaintiffs also claimed that the statute was unconstitutionally vague under the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Id. 
80
 Id. at *45.  While the court concluded that the statute was thus a content-based regulation of 
speech and therefore subject to a “more demanding standard” of scrutiny than the intermediate 
scrutiny that applies to content-neutral regulations of conduct that incidentally burden expression, 
it did not make clear exactly what standard of scrutiny it was applying.  Id. at *48-*49. 
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goals was not necessary to serve that interest.81  The Court explained that 
“[w]hether foreign terrorist organizations meaningfully segregate support of their 
legitimate activities from support of terrorism is an empirical question” and that 
Congress, which had based its determination on specific findings, was justified in 
rejecting the view that “ostensibly peaceful aid would have no harmful effects.”82  
Material support, the Court explained, could further terrorism by “free[ing] up 
other resources within the organization that may be put to violent ends,” by 
helping to “lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups,” and by straining the 
United States’ relationship with allies who have been attacked by these groups.83  
The majority further explained that while “concerns of national security 
and foreign relations do not warrant abdication of the judicial role” or deference 
to the “Government’s reading of the First Amendment,” “when it comes to 
collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences” in the area of national 
security and foreign relations, “respect for the Government’s conclusions is 
appropriate.”84  The Court explained that national security concerns arise in a 
context of constantly evolving threats in which hard evidence can be difficult to 
obtain; in this context, the Court suggested, the government cannot reasonably be 
expected to make the same kind of specific showings that might be expected in 
other contexts.85  In taking preventive measures to prevent terrorist attacks—such 
                                                 
81
 Id. at *49-*50. 
82
 Id. at *50-*51. 
83
 Id. at *52-*56. 
84
 Id. at *59. 
85
 Id. at *59-*60. 
138 
 
as by criminalizing aid that makes such attacks “more likely to occur”—the 
government is therefore “not required to conclusively link all the pieces in the 
puzzle before we grant weight to its empirical conclusions.”86  According to the 
Court, “given the sensitive interests in national security and foreign affairs at 
stake, the political branches ha[d] adequately” justified their determination that 
prohibiting all support—even that “meant to promote only the groups’ nonviolent 
ends”—was necessary.87   
In addition to reflecting the influence of surrounding historical 
circumstances, the Supreme Court and courts of appeals’ balancing of First 
Amendment rights and national security interests also appears to be a function of 
the nature of the restriction at issue.  In two areas—restraints on the speech of 
government employees88 and time, place, and manner restrictions89—the federal 
courts have been more willing to tolerate restrictions based on national security 
concerns.  Cases in the first category have most often arisen in the context of 
restrictions on one particular group of government employees—CIA agents. 
The federal courts have on several occasions upheld limits on the writings 
of former CIA employees based on information gained during the course of their 
employment.  These cases make clear that while the former employees have a 
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First Amendment interest in publication, the government has considerable leeway 
in limiting this right through employment agreements or other means.  In a 1972 
case, United States v. Marchetti, the Fourth Circuit held that the First Amendment 
limited the extent to which the federal government could impose secrecy 
requirements upon former employees and enforce them through a system of 
prepublication review of their writings.90  At the same time, however, the court 
recognized that the government’s need to maintain the secrecy of highly sensitive 
national security information justified a system of prior restraints limiting 
disclosure of classified information by employees and former employees.91 
Eight years later, in Snepp v. United States, the Supreme Court approved 
additional limitations on disclosures by former CIA employees.  In that case, the 
Court considered a former agent’s challenge to an employment agreement that 
barred him from publishing any information related to the CIA without approval 
from the agency.92  The agent claimed that the agreement constituted an 
unconstitutional prior restraint,93 but the Court upheld the agreement, explaining 
                                                 
90
 Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1313.  The Fourth Circuit concluded that the First Amendment did not 
bar a secrecy agreement requiring employees not to divulge any classified information unless 
specifically authorized to do so.  Id. at 1317.  However, the court also concluded that limitations 
on a former employee’s ability to disclose unclassified information violated the First Amendment, 
even when such disclosures were barred by an employment agreement.  Id. (“We would decline 
enforcement of the secrecy oath signed when [Marchetti] left the employment of the CIA to the 
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that “a former intelligence agent’s publication of unreviewed material relating to 
intelligence activities can be detrimental to vital national interests even if the 
published information is unclassified.”94  The government had a compelling 
interest in protecting secrecy, and the agreement was a “reasonable means” of 
protecting this interest, even though it infringed on employee activities that might 
otherwise be protected by the First Amendment.95 
Three years after Snepp was decided, in McGhee v. Casey, the D.C. 
Circuit similarly rejected a former CIA agent’s challenge to the classification of 
certain material in his manuscript as “secret,” and therefore unpublishable, during 
a CIA review of his writing pursuant to an employment agreement that barred him 
from publishing classified information.96  The agent sought a declaratory 
judgment that the “CIA classification and censorship scheme violates the First 
Amendment,” or, in the alternative, a judgment that the CIA had improperly 
classified the information in his manuscript.97  The court upheld the classification 
scheme, finding that it served the government’s “substantial interest in assuring 
secrecy in the conduct of foreign intelligence operations.”98  Moreover, the court 
explained that when the government acts as an employer, it has an interest in 
regulating the speech of its employees and may do so as long as the restriction 
serves a substantial government interest not related to the suppression of free 
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speech and is narrowly drawn to restrict no more speech than necessary to protect 
that interest.99  On the issue of classification, however, while the court held the 
CIA’s classification of the information at issue was appropriate here, it 
emphasized that when reviewing such decisions in the context of secrecy 
agreements, the courts “should require that CIA explanations justify censorship 
with reasonable specificity.”100  The court noted that although the judiciary lacks 
the CIA’s expertise in matters of intelligence gathering, it must uphold its role in 
preserving individual rights.  The court further explained that because “the line 
between information threatening to foreign policy and matters of legitimate public 
concern is often very fine, courts must assure themselves that the reasons for 
classification are rational and plausible ones.”101  
First Amendment challenges to time, place, and manner restrictions on 
protests in security-sensitive areas represent another area of litigation in which the 
courts have generally deferred to the government’s judgment that a limitation on 
speech is necessary to protect security.  Under the Supreme Court’s case law, “the 
government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of 
speech,” if such restrictions are content-neutral, “‘narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels 
for communication of the information.”102  Courts have considered a claimed 
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interest in national security as a particularly strong means of satisfying the 
significant-government-interest prong of this test.  For instance, in evaluating 
restrictions on protests outside the site of a NATO conference, the Tenth Circuit, 
in its 2007 decision in Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs, 
emphasized that the government’s security interest was of the “highest order.”103  
The First Circuit, in its 2004 decision in Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston, 
likewise concluded that there could be “no doubting the substantial government 
interest in the maintenance of security at political conventions.”104  In a case 20 
years earlier, White House Vigil for ERA Committee v. Clark, the D.C. Circuit, 
considered restrictions on protests outside the White House and explained that the 
government’s interest in the president’s security implicated “the capacity of the 
United States to respond to threats and crises affecting the entire free world.”105   
 The weight accorded to national security in these cases may be relevant 
not only for determining whether the restriction served a “significant” government 
interest, but also in conducting the narrow-tailoring analysis.  In Citizens for 
Peace, the Tenth Circuit explained: “While an extremely important government 
interest does not dictate the result in time, place, and manner cases, the 
significance of the government interest bears an inverse relationship to the rigor 
of the narrowly tailored analysis.”106  The court further noted the historic 
deference that courts have given the other branches “in matters relating to foreign 
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affairs, international relations, and national security; even when constitutional 
rights are invoked by a plaintiff.”107  
 While in each of these cases the courts ultimately determined that the 
government had satisfied the requirements for imposing reasonable time, place, 
and manner restrictions, these courts also stressed that the government must 
demonstrate the existence of specific security risks.  For instance, in Citizens for 
Peace, the court explained that the claim of a broadly stated need for “security” 
would not suffice.108  In Bl(a)ck Tea Society, the First Circuit, assessing 
restrictions on protests outside the Democratic National Convention, warned that 
“[s]ecurity is not a talisman that the government may invoke to justify any burden 
on speech” and that the narrow-tailoring analysis must consider the specific 
security harms that a particular set of restrictions are designed to combat.109 
 In examining the Supreme Court and courts of appeals decisions identified 
in this study that weigh the First Amendment speech and association claims of 
non-media litigants against national security interests, two themes emerge.  The 
first is that the courts appear to be at least conscious of—and perhaps influenced 
by—the unique political or historical context in which their decisions are taking 
place.  Whether responding to dire fears about Communism, a recent record of 
abuses of executive power, or a massive attack on American soil, the courts 
appeared to take the broader surrounding circumstances into account in their 
balancing analysis.  A second theme from these cases is that in certain areas, the 
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courts are generally deferential to claims of national security interests.  In 
particular, the courts have usually deferred to the executive’s judgment regarding 
restrictions on the speech of employees or time, place, and manner restrictions on 
speech activities in security-sensitive areas.    
  
Conclusion 
 The Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals’ decisions discussed in 
this chapter demonstrate that the judiciary has typically given the other branches 
of government significant deference in evaluating national security-based 
restrictions on First Amendment speech, press, and associational rights.  This 
deference, however, has not been unlimited.  In particular, when the government 
has attempted to justify restrictions of First Amendment rights based on broad or 
vague claims of a need to protect “national security,” the courts have been less 
willing to defer to the judgment of the other branches.  The appeals court cases 
involving security-based closures of court proceedings provide a good example of 
this tendency; the courts in Detroit Free Press110 and In re Washington Post 
Co.111 rejected the government’s attempts to replace case-by-case consideration of 
closed proceedings with rules requiring security-based closures in broad 
categories of cases.  In addition, in claims involving restrictions on the First 
Amendment rights of the media, the courts have emphasized the important role 
that the media play in ensuring transparency in the conduct of national defense 
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activities and in providing a check on the government’s exercise of national 
security powers.  Finally, and of particular relevance to claims relating to the 
government’s expanded NSL authority under the Patriot Act amendments, the 
federal courts’ decisions balancing First Amendment rights and national security 
concerns analyzed for this study appear to be influenced at least in part by the 
broader circumstances surrounding the restrictions at issue.  In particularly 
perilous times, the cases suggest that courts are likely to be more receptive to First 
Amendment restrictions in the interest of national security. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
  
 The availability of NSLs to subpoena media records from third-party 
providers has important implications for both First Amendment rights and for 
national security interests.  On one hand, the use of NSLs to demand journalists’ 
records from third-party providers poses a threat to newsgathering rights by 
allowing the government to secretly collect information about the parties with 
whom a journalist has been communicating, including confidential sources.  As 
the media petitioners argued in Branzburg, this exposure of confidential sources 
threatens the “free flow of information protected by the First Amendment.”1  
Because gathering news often requires that reporters agree not to reveal the 
identity of certain sources of information, if the government is able to nonetheless 
identify confidential sources through the use of NSLs, sources identified this way 
and “other confidential sources of other reporters will be measurably deterred 
from furnishing publishable information.”2  On the other hand, the government 
interest in national security is “paramount” and has been made even stronger 
given the real threat of terrorist attacks since September 2001.3  The government 
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therefore has a strong interest in being able to use all investigative tools at its 
disposal to monitor terrorist activities and to track down and deter leaks of 
national security information. 
This chapter assesses whether the First Amendment protects journalists 
against the use of NSLs to subpoena their records.  Part I discusses whether and 
how each of the various NSL statutes could be used to collect records relating to 
newsgathering activities.  This analysis builds on the research discussed in 
Chapter 2, which addressed the first set of research questions identified in Chapter 
1.  Those questions asked how the NSL statutes may enable the government to 
collect records related to a journalist’s newsgathering activities and the extent to 
which the statutes, their legislative history, and the Department of Justice media 
subpoena guidelines inform the First Amendment issues involved when NSLs are 
directed at the press as a target.  Chapter 2 explained that the NSL statutes could 
be used to collect various records of journalists—including financial records, 
telephone toll records, and e-mail transactional records—based on only a showing 
of relevance to an investigation to protect against terrorism.  That chapter also 
concluded that neither the statutes themselves nor the Department of Justice 
guidelines governing media subpoenas provide an effective limit to the potential 
use of NSLs to target journalists’ records. 
Part II assesses whether journalists have a protectable First Amendment 
interest in shielding these records from discovery by the government via NSLs.  
This part builds on the discussion in Chapter 3, which addressed this study’s 
second set of research questions by examining the extent to which the federal 
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courts have recognized First Amendment-based protections against government 
intrusion into the newsgathering process.  It also considered what principles 
drawn from these cases may be relevant to the question of whether journalists can 
claim First Amendment protection against government intrusion into the 
newsgathering process through the use of NSLs.  Chapter 3 concluded that while 
the Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals have been adverse to granting 
journalists “special rights,” particularly when the restriction at issue only 
indirectly burdens newsgathering activities, they have also recognized the need to 
protect journalists’ First Amendment rights when otherwise neutral laws intrude 
on newsgathering activities.  In particular, several of the decisions discussed in 
Chapter 3 suggest that the courts view the availability of procedural protections as 
an important means of protecting these rights.  Part II of this chapter will 
explicitly apply these principles to the NSL context. 
Assuming that journalists do have a First Amendment right to protect their 
records from discovery via NSLs, Part III considers whether NSLs could 
nonetheless be justified as a means of serving the government’s interest in 
national security.  This part builds on Chapter 4, which addressed this study’s 
third set of research questions by examining how the Supreme Court and federal 
appeals courts’ have balanced First Amendment rights against countervailing 
national security interests and by considering what principles from these cases 
may be relevant to the NSL context.  Chapter 4 concluded that while the Supreme 
Court and federal appeals courts have recognized the media’s important role as a 
check on the government’s exercise of its national security powers, the courts 
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have also given the government significant deference in evaluating national-
security-based restrictions on First Amendment rights, particularly during periods 
of heightened national security concerns.  Part III of this chapter builds on that 
analysis to specifically apply the cases located in this study and discussed in 
Chapter 4 to the NSL context.  Together, Parts II and III address the first question 
in the fourth set of research questions for this study, whether the First Amendment 
bars the government from collecting the records of journalists through the use of 
NSLs. 
Finally, Part IV considers whether, in the absence of a strong 
constitutional claim for protection against NSLs, there are legislative reforms that 
could effectively limit the use of NSLs to target journalists’ records.  This part 
thus addresses the second question in this study’s fourth set of research questions.  
In particular, this part looks at legislation proposed in the 2009-10 Congressional 
session and considers how legislative reform could provide effective protection to 
reporters’ records. 
 
Part I:  The Potential Impact of NSLs on Newsgathering Activities 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, there are four separate statutes providing the 
government with the authority to issue NSLs, each allowing for the collection of a 
different type of information about the target from third-party providers.  Chapter 
2 concluded that journalists could be susceptible to the collection of their records 
through the use of NSLs.  However, one of the NSL statutes—the National 
Security Act—applies only to third-party records relating to a current or former 
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executive branch employee, and thus could not be used to obtain a reporter’s 
records.4  Of the three NSL statutes that could be used to collect reporters’ 
records, two of them—the Right to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”) and the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (“FRCA”)—are unlikely in most circumstances to allow 
collection of records that would constitute interference in the newsgathering 
process.  However, the issuance of NSLs pursuant to the remaining statute—the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”)—arguably poses a significant 
threat to reporters’ newsgathering activities because it can be used to collect 
phone records and e-mail transactional information that would reveal reporters’ 
sources.  Each of the three statutes that could be applied to reporters’ records is 
discussed further below.           
As explained in Chapter 2, under the NSL authority granted by the Right 
to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”),5 the FBI may collect various financial records 
from third-party providers, including information about checking and savings 
accounts and transactions with loan companies, travel agencies, or operators of 
credit card systems.6  While the use of an RFPA NSL to collect a journalist’s 
records might expose some information related to newsgathering activities—for 
example, a record of credit card purchases may reveal that a journalist had 
traveled to a particular city or country—it seems unlikely that in the typical case 
the government’s knowledge of such information would threaten confidential 
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 See 50 U.S.C. § 436(a).  
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newsgathering activities.  Financial records alone would not necessarily reveal the 
nature of a story a journalist was working on or expose the identity of confidential 
sources, although in a rare case a record of travel to an out-of-the-way location 
where the suspected source of a leak resides could provide confirmation for the 
government’s suspicions.  Similarly, the NSL authority granted under the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act, which allows the FBI to obtain information about an 
individual’s credit history and other consumer information maintained by credit 
reporting agencies,7 is unlikely to expose the type of information that may 
threaten a reporter’s newsgathering activities.    
 The type of NSL most likely to reveal information about a journalist’s 
newsgathering activities is an NSL issued under the authority of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”).8  These NSLs will accordingly be the 
focus of the remainder of this chapter.  Under the NSL authority provided by the 
amended ECPA, the FBI may collect historical (as opposed to real time) 
information on telephone calls dialed and received; local and long distance billing 
records; subscriber information; and e-mail “transactional records,”9 which 
include the routing and addressing information for e-mails.10  These NSLs may be 
used to collect transactional information only—indicating when a communication 
occurred and who was involved—and cannot be used to gather information about 
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the actual content of the communications.11  Nonetheless, the ability to collect 
transactional information alone arguably burdens newsgathering activities 
because such information is sufficient to reveal reporters’ confidential sources.  In 
a leak investigation, for example, information revealing whom the reporter spoke 
with by phone or communicated with by e-mail during a relevant time period can 
be used to identify the source of the leak.  In fact, as the Inspector General’s 2010 
report detailing NSL abuses revealed, the government has already used exigent 
letters to collect reporters’ telephone records in a leak investigation.12  Moreover, 
the collection of phone or e-mail records may expose sources other than those 
who are the subject of the leak investigation. For example, when the FBI 
requested the toll billing records for various reporters in connection with the leak 
investigation mentioned above, they received from one company records of more 
than 1,600 phone calls, only three of which fell within the period relevant to the 
investigation.13  
Such access to reporters’ phone records could have a major impact on 
reporters’ ability to do their job.  As the Second Circuit explained in New York 
Times Co. v. Gonzales, “the telephone is an essential tool of modern journalism 
and plays an integral role in the collection of information by reporters.”14  As 
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such, that court held that any First Amendment protection for reporters also 
extends to telephone records in the possession of third parties.15 
 
Part II: NSLs as an Intrusion on Protected Newsgathering Activities 
 Assessing the degree of First Amendment protection afforded to 
newsgathering activities in the face of an NSL seeking a journalist’s records 
involves applying two major themes of the Supreme Court and federal appeals 
courts decisions on newsgathering claims identified in Chapter 3.  Chapter 3 
addressed this study’s second set of research questions, which considered the 
extent to which the federal courts have recognized First Amendment protections 
for newsgathering activities and how these decisions may inform the question of 
whether journalists have First Amendment rights against government intrusion 
though the use of NSLs.  That chapter concluded that the courts have extended 
greater First Amendment protection against restrictions that directly limit 
newsgathering activities, while providing less protection against indirect 
restrictions on newsgathering activities.  It also concluded, however, that even in 
the case of indirect restrictions, the courts have recognized the importance of 
procedural protections to guard against First Amendment abuses. 
Applying these principles to the NSL context, on one hand, the link 
between the use of NSLs targeting journalists’ records and the alleged harm to 
newsgathering—that current or potential confidential sources would be deterred 
from providing information—is the type of attenuated link that has typically led 
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the federal courts to extend only minimal substantive protection to the 
newsgathering interests at stake.  In cases like Branzburg and Zurcher, for 
example, the Supreme Court was unwilling to create broad substantive rules to 
protect the underlying First Amendment newsgathering rights against intrusion by 
the government activities at issue.  On the other hand, part of the justification for 
refusing to extend broad substantive First Amendment protections in these cases 
was the fact that procedural protections—such as a motion to quash a bad faith 
subpoena or the requirement that a neutral magistrate approve a newsroom 
search—were available to guard against abuses of First Amendment rights.   
The NSL context is unique in this regard because the discretion to issue an 
NSL lies wholly within the executive branch and the target will rarely ever know 
of its existence,16 much less have an opportunity to challenge it.  This part of 
Chapter 5 will first assess the scope and degree of First Amendment protection 
that the case law suggests would be afforded to journalists’ interests in protecting 
their communications records from discovery by the government.  It will then 
consider whether the use of NSLs to request these records intrudes upon protected 
First Amendment activities, with a particular focus on how the lack of procedural 
protections to guard against bad faith NSLs affects this analysis. 
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 As discussed in Chapter 2, under the non-disclosure provisions of the NSL statutes the third-
party recipient of the NSL is forbidden from notifying the target of the request for his or her 
documents.  Under the law as amended in response to the Doe litigation, a recipient may contest 
the nondisclosure order in court.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3511.  Such challenges, however, will likely be 
rare, since providers will have few incentives to litigate these requests. 
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 Assessing Journalists’ First Amendment Rights to Protect their Communications 
Records from Discovery by NSLs 
 
The Supreme Court and courts of appeals cases identified and discussed in 
Chapter 3 make clear that newsgathering is entitled to at least some degree of 
constitutional protection.17  In particular, when the government has attempted to 
directly prevent reporters from engaging in specific newsgathering activities—for 
example, by barring them from contacting jurors after the conclusion of a high-
profile trial18 or restricting their ability to interview voters19—the courts have 
provided robust protection to First Amendment newsgathering rights.  At the 
same time, however, the federal courts have concluded that the First Amendment 
“does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from 
the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability.”20  In cases 
involving generally applicable laws aimed at serving important government 
interests, the burden on newsgathering is typically the incidental result of, rather 
than the intent of, the restriction at issue, and the link between the law and the 
harm to newsgathering is more “uncertain.”21  Therefore, in assessing journalists’ 
First Amendment claims against compelled testimony, searches and seizures, or 
subpoenas of their records from third-party providers, the courts have extended 
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 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (“[W]ithout some protection for 
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more limited protection to First Amendment rights.22  As the Branzburg Court 
explained, “otherwise valid laws serving substantial public interests may be 
enforced against the press as against others, despite the possible burden that may 
be imposed.”23   
 The NSL statutes fall within this category of neutral, generally applicable 
laws that may, when applied to reporters, have an incidental effect on 
newsgathering.  They are not aimed specifically at restricting newsgathering 
activities, but, like subpoenas or searches, the use of NSLs to obtain reporters’ 
records may burden newsgathering activities by exposing journalists’ confidential 
sources and discouraging future sources from coming forward.24  To the extent 
that the federal courts have recognized protection for newsgathering activities in 
challenges to such laws, they have not held that the First Amendment generally 
provides reporters with a right to be shielded from such intrusions into the 
newsgathering process.  Instead, the First Amendment protection offered by most 
of these decisions could perhaps best be described, in the words of the D.C. 
Circuit, as a requirement that these laws be applied to journalists with “special 
sensitivity” in light of “the vital function the press serves in a self-governing 
society.”25  At the least, this requirement has been viewed as providing journalists 
with First Amendment protection against abusive government practices in 
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applying these laws,26 although some courts have also construed this special 
sensitivity to impose extra protections, such as the exhaustion of alternative 
sources before the government issues a subpoena to a reporter.27   
A narrow interpretation of this special-sensitivity standard is evident in the 
majority opinion in Branzburg, which suggests that reporters would have First 
Amendment protection against grand jury investigations “conducted other than in 
good faith.”28  Justice Powell’s concurrence incorporates a more protective 
special-sensitivity standard, explaining that a reporter could move to quash a 
subpoena if the information sought had only a “remote and tenuous relationship to 
the subject of the investigation” or the testimony would implicate relationships 
with confidential sources without a legitimate need by law enforcement.29  
Similarly, the courts of appeals that have considered government subpoenas of 
reporters have imposed certain protections—such as the requirement that the 
reporter’s testimony have more than a remote relationship to the subject of the 
                                                 
26
 As explained in Chapter 1, the availability of a First Amendment claim would be particularly 
important to journalists attempting a challenge to NSLs demanding their communications records, 
since the third-party doctrine would prevent a Fourth Amendment claim. 
27
 See In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that a court could 
deny a special prosecutor’s request to compel a reporter’s testimony if the information was readily 
available from another source). 
28
 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707. 
29
 Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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investigation or that the information not be readily available from another 
source—to ensure that reporters are not subpoenaed in bad faith.30 
The federal court decisions studied in Chapter 3 involving journalists’ 
First Amendment claims against searches or seizures also reveal an emphasis on 
applying the relevant laws to journalists with special sensitivity.  In Zurcher, 
while the Supreme Court rejected a broad rule protecting journalists against 
searches pursuant to warrants, it explained that the warrant requirements should 
be applied with “particular exactitude” in the case of newsroom searches.31  
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in Smith v. Nixon held that a wiretap target’s 
employment as a journalist must be taken into account in assessing whether 
surveillance satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” requirement.32 
 While the notion of protection in the form of “special sensitivity” is less 
readily apparent in the D.C. Circuit and Second Circuit decisions on challenges to 
                                                 
30
 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 F. App’x 430, 432 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a 
“limited balancing” of  journalists’ First Amendment rights and the government’s law 
enforcement interests may be conducted where a grand jury investigation is not conducted in good 
faith or the journalist’s testimony is only remotely related to the investigation); In re Special 
Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that a reporter could not be compelled to 
testify pursuant to a special prosecutor’s subpoena unless such testimony is “directly relevant to a 
nonfrivolous claim or inquiry undertaken in good faith” and that “disclosure may be denied where 
the same information is readily available from a less sensitive source”); Storer Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1987) (explaining that judges 
evaluating a grand jury subpoena of a reporter must determine “whether the grand jury’s 
investigation is being conducted in good faith, whether the information sought bears more than a 
remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, and whether a legitimate law 
enforcement need will be served by forced disclosure of the confidential source relationship”). 
31
 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978). 
32
 Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183, 1889 (D.C. Cir. 1979).  But see Arkansas Chronicle v. Murphy, 
183 F. App’x 300, 305 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that the heightened Fourth Amendment standard 
for protecting First Amendment interests applied only when a seizure was aimed at “suppress[ing] 
the ideas contained in the documents,” not when it “was an attempt to shed evidentiary light” on a 
crime); Desyllas v. Bernstine, 351 F.3d 934, 941-42 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the First 
Amendment generally “imposes no requirements beyond those in the Fourth Amendment” when 
officers engage in otherwise lawful investigative activities). 
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subpoenas seeking journalists’ phone records from telephone companies, these 
courts both recognized that abusive subpoenas for reporters’ records would 
violate the First Amendment.  In Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press 
v. AT&T Co., the D.C. Circuit, citing Branzburg, held that reporters have no 
general right to protect their phone records from good-faith inspection by the 
government.33  According to the court, the “freedom to gather information” that is 
protected by the First Amendment is “[s]ubject to the general and incidental 
burdens that arise from good faith enforcement of otherwise valid criminal and 
civil laws that are not themselves solely directed at curtailing the free flow of 
information.”34  The Reporters Committee court acknowledged, however, that the 
use of subpoenas or other investigative tools to collect journalists’ records in bad 
faith could abridge First Amendment rights.35  According to the court, “while the 
First Amendment does not immunize the information-gathering activities of a 
journalist or any other citizen from good faith law enforcement investigation, it 
does protect such activities from official harassment.”36  In New York Times Co. v. 
Gonzales, the Second Circuit considered a newspaper’s challenge to the 
government’s planned grand jury subpoenas demanding that telephone companies 
turn over Times reporters’ phone records in connection with investigation of a 
major leak in a terrorism case.37  The court concluded that Branzburg squarely 
                                                 
33
 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 
1978). 
34
 Id. at 1051. 
35
 Id. at 1064. 
36
 Id.  
37
 New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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governed the First Amendment claim.38  While the opinion noted Branzburg’s 
suggestion, particularly in Justice Powell’s concurrence, that bad faith subpoenas 
could violate First Amendment rights, it did not engage this analysis or discuss 
any need for special sensitivity to First Amendment rights because there was “no 
suggestion of bad faith in the investigation.”39 
  Based on the Supreme Court and courts of appeals cases found in this 
study and discussed in Chapter 3, it seems unlikely that journalists would be able 
to claim a broad First Amendment right against the use of NSLs to request their 
communications records from third-party providers in good-faith investigations.  
Like subpoenas or searches, NSLs are an otherwise valid investigative tool that 
imposes merely an incidental burden on newsgathering activities.  Therefore, to 
the extent that journalists may claim a First Amendment right against the use of 
NSLs to collect their records, it is at least a right to be free from misuse of NSLs 
and may also encompass the right to have the NSL requirements applied with 
special sensitivity (for example, by ensuring requests are narrow and specific) 
when the target is a journalist.  Unlike these other investigative tools, however, 
NSLs do not provide the target with an opportunity to protect his or her First 
Amendment rights through ex ante judicial review.  The question then becomes 
whether the lack of such procedural protections undermines the constitutionality 
of the overall scheme.       
 
                                                 
38
 Id. at 172. 
39
 Id. at 174 & n.8. 
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Assessing NSLs as an Intrusion on Protected First Amendment Rights 
To the extent that the federal courts have recognized that otherwise valid 
criminal laws or investigatory tools may under some circumstances infringe First 
Amendment rights, they have often rejected broad substantive protections and 
instead relied on the availability of existing ex ante procedural protections to 
ensure that First Amendment rights are upheld.  Judge J. Skelly Wright argued in 
his dissent in Reporters Committee that the Branzburg and Zurcher decisions 
“turned explicitly on the determination that the prior judicial scrutiny on a case-
by-case basis which was afforded was sufficient to protect the First Amendment 
rights at stake.”40  In Branzburg, for example, the Supreme Court explained that 
subpoenas issued in bad faith or for purposes of harassment remained subject to 
judicial control and could be challenged via a motion to quash.41   
The courts of appeals decisions assessing reporter subpoenas found in this 
study, discussed in Chapter 3, likewise rely on the availability of a judge to 
determine whether the subpoenas satisfy the various requirements they have 
outlined for avoiding violations of reporters’ First Amendment rights.  In Zurcher, 
the Court rejected a claim that the First Amendment required a broad rule barring 
newsroom searches pursuant to a warrant, but explained that the First Amendment 
interests at stake could be adequately protected by a neutral magistrate applying 
the warrant requirements with “particular exactitude.”42  As the court explained, 
                                                 
40
 Reporters Comm., 593 F.2d at 1080 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
41
 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (1972) (“Grand juries are subject to judicial control and 
subpoenas to motions to quash. We do not expect courts will forget that grand juries must operate 
within the limits of the First Amendment as well as the Fifth.”). 
42
 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978). 
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“There is no reason to believe . . . that magistrates cannot guard against searches 
of the type, scope, and intrusiveness that would actually interfere with the timely 
publication of a newspaper.”43  Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in Smith v. Nixon relied 
on procedural protections in concluding that a magistrate’s consideration of a 
wiretap target’s employment as a journalist provided adequate protection for First 
Amendment rights threatened by wiretaps of journalists’ phone lines.44 
 The question of constitutionality of the NSL statutes thus becomes a 
question of whether the government may constitutionally use generally applicable 
criminal investigative tools to monitor journalists in the absence of ex ante 
procedural protections, such as those that would guard against bad faith 
subpoenas or unreasonable searches.  The D.C. Circuit considered this issue in 
Reporters Committee and concluded that the media plaintiffs had not established 
their entitlement to an equitable remedy requiring that they be notified of 
subpoenas for their telephone toll records issued to third parties and provided the 
opportunity for case-by-case judicial review of such subpoenas to ensure that they 
had not been issued in bad faith.45  While the court acknowledged that subpoenas 
issued in bad faith could violate reporters’ First Amendment rights, it concluded 
that the judiciary could not “assume superintendence of criminal investigations 
merely on the suspicion that Executive officers may act in bad faith in the 
future.”46  Such a remedy would only be available, according to the court, if a 
                                                 
43
 Id. at 566. 
44
 Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
45
 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. AT&T Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1070-71 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
46
 Id. at 1071. 
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plaintiff could establish a “clear and imminent threat of . . . future misconduct.”47  
Furthermore, the court noted that the plaintiffs were not without other remedies.  
The plaintiffs’ phone company had adopted a policy that would provide plaintiffs 
with after-the-fact notice that the government had issued a subpoena for their 
records.  This notice, according to the D.C. Circuit, would guarantee that the 
plaintiffs could bring post hoc lawsuits for damages if they believed that the 
government had issued a particular subpoena in bad faith.  The court concluded 
that the “inevitability” of such lawsuits “would pose a significant deterrent to 
future Government misconduct, making totally unnecessary any type of equitable 
relief.”48 
 Judge J. Skelly Wright argued in dissent that the Supreme Court decisions 
in Branzburg and Zurcher “turned explicitly” on the ground that the availability 
of prior case-by-case judicial scrutiny was sufficient to protect journalists’ First 
Amendment rights and that therefore “some opportunity for judicial scrutiny such 
as that afforded in Branzburg and Stanford Daily must be provided here as 
well.”49  In Wright’s view, the request for case-by-case review was not a demand 
for an equitable remedy, but a mandate of the First Amendment.  According to 
Wright, a system requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard before the 
government could subpoena reporters’ records would provide an opportunity for 
journalists to raise genuine First Amendment challenges while also minimizing 
                                                 
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. at 1069. 
49
 Id. at 1080 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
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the burdens imposed on the government by leaving it up to the reporters to invoke 
judicial process.50 
 In New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, the Second Circuit, over objection of 
the government, held that a newspaper that was notified of the government’s 
intent to subpoena its reporters’ phone records from the telephone company could 
bring an action for a declaratory judgment51 that the subpoena would violate the 
reporters’ common law and First Amendment privileges against compelled 
disclosure of sources.52  The court further held that because the services provided 
by telephone companies play an “integral role” in reporters’ work, telephone toll 
records, “when sought by the government [are] covered by the same privileges 
afforded to the reporters themselves and their personal records.”53  The court 
explained that because the facts before it involved a potential grand jury subpoena 
for reporters’ phone records, Branzburg determined the scope of the First 
Amendment protection that was available.54  The court did not assess what 
exactly these protections—procedural or otherwise—might be, however, because 
it determined that none of the interpretations of Branzburg’s holding would 
                                                 
50
 Id. at 1092. 
51
 Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), a district court has discretion to 
“declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, 
whether or not further relief is or could be sought,” when there is “a case of actual controversy 
within [the court’s] jurisdiction.” 
52
 New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2006). 
53
 Id. at 168. 
54
 Id. at 174. As to the claim of a common law privilege, the court held that such a privilege would 
be overcome on the facts of this case.  Id. at 169. 
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provide protection in the case before it, which involved serious law enforcement 
concerns and in which there was “no suggestion of bad faith.”55   
Judge Robert Sack, who dissented from the majority’s result but agreed 
with much of its opinion, took a larger view of the issues at stake.  Sack explained 
that the “question at the heart of this appeal is not so much whether there is 
protection for the identity of reporters’ sources, or even what that protection is, 
but which branch of government decides whether, when, and how such protection 
is overcome.”56  In Sack’s view, the majority opinion “reaffirme[ed] the role of 
the federal courts in mediating between the interest of law enforcement” and the 
press’s interest in maintaining the confidentiality of its sources.57 
 The secrecy surrounding NSLs makes them unique among these 
investigative tools.  Not only do the targets of NSLs lack notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before the requested documents are turned over, 
preventing ex ante enforcement of First Amendment rights, the nondisclosure 
provisions of the NSL statutes make it unlikely that the target will ever discover 
that his or her records were shared with the government, preventing post hoc 
enforcement as well.58  Although the FBI’s request for toll billing or e-mail 
transactional information may not be made “solely upon the basis of activities 
protected by the first amendment,” the FBI is otherwise free to request reporters’ 
                                                 
55
 Id. at 173-74. 
56
 Id. at 175 (Sack, J., dissenting). 
57
 Id.  
58
 Even in the unlikely event that a communications service provider successfully contested the 
nondisclosure provisions, nothing mandates that the provider share the fact of the NSL with the 
target.  Conceivably, a target could be alerted that his or her records were the subject of an NSL if 
the documents became evidence at a later criminal proceeding, but this also seems unlikely.   
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records without any special sensitivity to the potential burdens on First 
Amendment rights as long as the information is “relevant to an authorized 
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine activities.”59  
Moreover, judicial review to ensure that NSLs are not issued in bad faith is 
unavailable to the target.  While strict adherence to the voluntary DOJ guidelines 
governing subpoenas for reporters’ phone records may allow for some balancing 
of First Amendment interests in seeking phone records, even in the absence of 
judicial review, as discussed in Chapter 2, the IG’s reports suggest these 
guidelines have not been strictly followed and, in any case, discretion remains 
wholly with the executive branch.      
 Although the Supreme Court’s newsgathering case law has not 
specifically addressed whether the First Amendment requires the availability of ex 
ante procedural protections when valid criminal investigative tools are employed 
against journalists, language in the Branzburg and Zurcher decisions strongly 
suggest that this is the case.  In both decisions, the Court explicitly relied upon the 
availability of procedural protections to ensure that investigative tools are not 
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 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b). 
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used in bad faith to intrude upon protected newsgathering activities.60  However, 
based on the cases located in this study, the circuit courts that have considered 
subpoenas of journalists’ records from third-party providers—the closest analogy 
to the investigative use of an NSL—seem to be split on whether reporters have a 
right to challenge such subpoenas ex ante.61  But even the Reporters Committee 
decision, which rejected a requirement that subpoenas be reviewed ex ante for 
compliance with the First Amendment, seemed to require that at least some 
opportunity for judicial review be available.  The court specifically noted that 
potential First Amendment violations could be deterred, and any actual violations 
vindicated, by post hoc damages suits upon notice of the subpoenas from the 
phone companies.62  Because the NSL statutes fail to provide for either the ex 
ante procedural protections or opportunities for post hoc relief that could protect 
against First Amendment violations, it appears that under existing precedent, there 
is a strong argument that the use of these statutes to target reporters’ records 
constitutes a burden on protected First Amendment rights. 
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 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707-08 (1972) (“[N]ews gathering is not without its First 
Amendment protections, and grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in 
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 Compare New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006) with Reporters Comm. 
for Freedom of Press v. AT&T Co., 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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 See Reporters Comm., 593 F.2d at 1069. 
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Part III:  National Security Interests as a Justification for the Burdens to First 
Amendment Rights Imposed By NSLs  
 
The finding that the use of NSLs to collect reporters’ records is an 
intrusion on reporters’ First Amendment rights, however, is merely the first step 
in an analysis of the ultimately constitutionality of the use of NSLs targeting 
reporters’ records.  Assessing the availability of First Amendment protection also 
requires examining whether the law may nonetheless be upheld because it serves 
important government interests that outweigh the burden to First Amendment 
rights.  The use of NSLs to request reporters’ records brings into conflict two 
important values of the American democratic system—protection of First 
Amendment rights, including vigorous protection for the rights of the free press, 
and the state’s undeniable interest in national security and the safety of its 
citizens.  Chapter 4 considered this conflict in addressing the third set of research 
questions posed by this study, which asked how the federal courts have balanced 
the rights of free press, free speech, and freedom of association against 
countervailing national security interests and how the decisions identified in that 
chapter inform the question of whether journalists’ rights against government 
intrusion into the newsgathering process would be upheld against the 
government’s national security interest in the information sought.  Chapter 4 
concluded that when First Amendment and national security values conflict, the 
courts have provided the most robust protection to First Amendment rights in the 
face of a government attempt to impose a prior restraint.  On the other hand, the 
courts have generally been accommodating to the executive’s claims that neutral 
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restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech are necessary to protect 
national security interests.  In addition, the cases identified in Chapter 4 
demonstrated that while the courts have traditionally deferred to the other 
branches of government on issues of national security, particularly during periods 
of heightened national security concerns, they have also emphasized the need to 
protect the free press’ role as an important check on the exercise of executive 
authority in this realm. 
As discussed in Part II above, the application of NSLs to reporters’ 
records is not aimed at restricting the content of speech and imposes only 
incidental burdens on the exercise of newsgathering rights.  As such, it would 
likely be subject to intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment.63  Under 
this standard, a restriction on speech may be upheld if it “furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest . . . unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms 
is no greater than” necessary to further that interest.64  The regulation “need not 
be the least speech-restrictive means of advancing the Government’s interest,” 
rather the requirement is that the “means chosen do not burden substantially more 
speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.”65 
                                                 
63
 Under Supreme Court precedent, laws that “suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential 
burdens upon speech because of its content” and laws that “compel speakers to utter or distribute 
speech bearing a particular message” are subject to strict scrutiny.  On the other hand, laws that 
are “unrelated to the content to speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny . . . because 
in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the 
public dialogue.”  Turner Broad. Sys. v. FEC, 512 U.S. 622, 624 (1994). 
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 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
65
 Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 662 (quotation omitted). 
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The federal cases located in this study and discussed in Chapter 4 make 
clear that the government’s interest in national security is of the “highest order,”66 
suggesting that the NSL statutes would easily satisfy the “substantial government 
interest” prong of the intermediate scrutiny test.  However, based on a review of 
those cases, the courts have also made clear that broad or vague claims of a 
national security interest will not suffice to justify restrictions on speech and that 
a naked claim of “national security” cannot alone justify a restriction on speech.67  
Whether a court would find the necessary fit between the government’s claimed 
interest in national security and the contouring of the NSL provisions to serve this 
interest is a close call and could arguably come out either way.  Given the courts’ 
deference to the executive on national security claims, however, as well as the 
current climate of heightened concern for national security protections, it seems 
more likely that the balance would tip in favor of a finding of constitutionality. 
The best argument to be made that the EPCA NSL statute may burden 
substantially more speech than necessary to serve the government’s national 
security interests is that it allows the government to collect records of reporters’ 
newsgathering activities on the basis of mere relevance to a national security 
investigation.  There is no requirement that the information be necessary to the 
investigation, that the government first attempt to secure the information from 
alternate sources, or that the FBI take any other precautions to attempt to 
minimize intrusions on speech.  The statute allows for broad records requests that 
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 Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colo. Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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 See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967); In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 
383, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1986). 
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could (and do) result in the production of substantially more documents than 
necessary to discover the desired information, allowing for further potential 
invasions of newsgathering rights.  In a leak investigation, for example, the 
government may request a reporter’s phone records for the month leading up to 
the publication of a story containing classified information.  These records, 
however, could be used to identify not just the source of the leak at issue, but to 
identify any number of confidential sources with whom the reporter had spoken 
over the course of the month.   
On the other hand, however, the burdens on First Amendment rights 
imposed by NSLs could also be considered quite narrow.  The NSL statutes do 
not bar the publication of any information or otherwise act as a prior restraint.  
Nor do they directly restrict journalists from engaging in newsgathering activities, 
for example, by limiting access to records or restricting the ability to interview 
certain parties.  While the federal courts have recognized the particular value of 
reporting on national security issues, at most, the NSL statutes constitute an 
indirect interference with reporters’ newsgathering efforts by deterring 
confidential sources from providing information about counterterrorism efforts or 
national security policies.  The ultimate impact on speech may be negligible; as 
the Branzburg majority pointed out, “[f]rom the beginning of our country, the 
press has operated without constitutional protection for press informants, and the 
press has flourished.”68  For these reasons, it is likely that use of NSLs to collect 
reporters’ records would survive intermediate scrutiny. 
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Part IV: Potential Avenues for Reform and Recommendations 
 Because the First Amendment protection available to reporters subject to 
NSLs is doubtful, the most effective means of protecting journalists against the 
burdens to newsgathering imposed by NSLs is legislative reform.  Regardless of 
whether reporters have constitutional protection against the use of NSLs to collect 
their records, Congress could chose to protect reporters’ records by statute.  While 
Parts II and III of this chapter together addressed the first question of fourth set of 
research questions for this study—whether the First Amendment bars the 
government from collecting the records of journalists under the NSL statutes—
this part addresses the second question, which asks what statutory reforms might 
best limit the impact of NSLs on the newsgathering process.  One way to provide 
such protection would be to amend the NSL statutes themselves, for example by 
excluding reporters’ records from their reach or by requiring that requests for 
reporters’ records receive judicial pre-approval.  A second, and likely more 
difficult, means of protecting reporters’ records in the hands of third-party 
communications providers would be the passage of a federal shield law that 
would encompass NSL requests to third parties for information about media 
customers.   
This part reviews proposed legislation in the 111th Congress (2009-10) 
that could serve as a vehicle for providing journalists with protection against 
NSLs by either amending the NSL statutes or creating a media shield law.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, because of the large number of proposed bills in a given 
Congress, the bills discussed here are limited to those that have been successfully 
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voted out of committee, which indicates that the bill could at least be viable in one 
of the Houses of Congress.  This part discusses four such bills, describing the 
relevant provisions of each and discerning their potential effect on the use of 
NSLs to request journalists’ records.  It then recommends what type of legislative 
reform might best protect journalists’ newsgathering interests while also 
providing sufficient protection for genuine national security interests. 
Assessing Proposed Legislation 
 Prior to the renewal of expiring Patriot Act provisions in February 2010,69 
several legislators had proposed bills tying the renewal of these provisions to 
revisions of other portions of the Patriot Act, including the NSL amendments.  
Two such bills—one in the House and one in the Senate—were voted out of 
committee.  The Senate Bill, the USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 
2009,70 would have returned the NSL statutes to their pre-Patriot Act form by the 
end of 2013 by revising each of the statutes to read as it read on the day before the 
Patriot Act’s passage and repealing the second class of FCRA NSLs created by 
the Patriot Act. 71  The bill would, however, have maintained provisions for 
judicial review of nondisclosure requests.72  These revisions, while failing to 
provide a blanket exemption for NSLs seeking reporters’ records, would 
significantly reduce the threat that NSLs pose to newsgathering activities.  By 
returning the ECPA NSL statute to its pre-Patriot Act form, the bill would have 
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 H.R. 3961, 111th Cong. (2010). 
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 See Patriot Act Sunset Extension Act of 2009, S. 1692, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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 Id. at § 2(c)(1). 
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 Id. at § 5. 
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ensured that an NSL could only be issued for a reporter’s telephone toll records 
when the FBI had specific facts to conclude that the reporter himself was a 
terrorist or spy.73  The government would also be able to collect subscriber 
information (but not toll records) if there was specific evidence that 
“communication facilities registered in the name of a” reporter or newspaper had 
been used in communication with a terrorist or spy or with “an agent of a foreign 
power under circumstances giving reason to believe that the communication 
concerned international terrorism.”74  While this authority would seemingly allow 
discovery of the fact that a number belonging to a reporter had dialed or received 
calls from a number belonging to a spy or terrorist, such a revelation would be 
based on the examination of the terrorist’s telephone toll records, not the 
reporter’s.  It therefore seems that under either provision, the government would 
not be able to issue an NSL for a reporter’s records simply to track down leaks or 
otherwise monitor communications related to a terrorism investigation.   
The House Bill, the USA PATRIOT Amendments Act of 2009,75 would 
similarly have returned the NSL statutes to their pre-Patriot Act text by the end of 
201376 and maintained judicial review of nondisclosure orders.77  Unlike the 
Senate bill, however, the House bill proposed a new standard for issuance of an 
NSL, requiring: 
                                                 
73
 See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (b)(1) (2000). 
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specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the information sought: 1) pertains to a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; 2) is relevant to the 
activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power that is the subject 
of such authorized investigation; or 3) pertains to an individual in 
contact with, or personally known to, a suspected agent of a 
foreign power that is the subject of such authorized investigation.78        
 
This standard would likewise seem to eliminate the applicability of NSLs 
to leak investigations, except in the rare case in which a leaking 
government employee is deemed to be acting as an agent of a foreign 
power.  While this standard would not provide journalists with protections 
when their records are subject to NSLs, the House bill, like the Senate bill, 
would likely substantially reduce the number of situations in which an 
NSL could potentially be used to collect a reporter’s records.  
A second means of providing journalists with protection against NSLs’ 
threat to newsgathering activities would be the passage of a media shield law.  In 
the 111th Congress, one shield law bill passed the House,79 and another was 
reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee.80  Each of these two bills would 
provide limited protection against the use of NSLs when reporters are the targets, 
with the end result being the availability of procedural protections, similar to 
those available for media subpoenas or searches, to allow reporters to challenge 
NSLs for their records.    
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The House of Representatives passed a shield law bill in April 2009 that 
would provide journalists with a qualified privilege against compelled testimony 
and the production of certain materials.81  In all cases, the bill prevents a federal 
entity from compelling a “covered person” to provide testimony or produce 
documents related to information obtained while that person was engaging in 
journalism unless a judge finds by preponderance of the evidence, after providing 
the covered person with notice and the opportunity to be heard, that the 
government has  “exhausted all reasonable alternative sources” of the information 
at issue and that the public interest in compelling disclosure outweighs “the public 
interest in gathering or disseminating news or information.”82  In determining the 
balance of the public interest, the court would be specifically authorized to 
consider “the extent of any harm to national security.”83  In addition to these 
requirements, in a criminal investigation or prosecution the bill tracks the DOJ 
guidelines by requiring that the party seeking disclosure prove “there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has occurred” and that “the testimony 
or document sought is critical to the investigation or prosecution or to the defense 
against that prosecution.”   
Heightened protections apply under the bill if the testimony or document 
would reveal the identity of a source or could reasonably be expected to allow 
discovery of the identity of a source.  In these cases, the privilege is absolute 
                                                 
81
 H.R. 985.  The bill is identical to an amended version of an earlier effort, H.R. 2102, 110th 
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unless the party seeking disclosure can show that the need for disclosure fits one 
of the bill’s enumerated exceptions.  Three of these exceptions have relevance to 
national security issues, allowing a party to compel disclosure of a source when it 
is: 1) “necessary to prevent, or to identify any perpetrator of, an act of terrorism 
against the United States or its allies or other significant and specified harm to 
national security with the objective to prevent such harm”; 2) “necessary to 
prevent imminent death or significant bodily harm”; or 3) “essential” in a criminal 
investigation to identify “a person who without authorization disclosed properly 
classified information and who . . . . had authorized access to such information,” 
where such disclosure “has caused or will cause significant and articulable harm” 
to national security.84  Even if the demand fits within one of these exceptions, 
however, the exhaustion and public interest balancing requirements must be 
satisfied as well.85  
The same standards apply to requests for “compelled disclosure from 
communications service providers” for reporters’ records.86  In such cases, a court 
may compel disclosure of the document only after the party seeking the document 
provides the reporter whose records are being sought with notice of the request 
and an opportunity to challenge it in court, although notice may be delayed if the 
court determines “by clear and convincing evidence that such notice would pose a 
substantial threat to the integrity of a criminal investigation.”87   
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The House shield law bill would provide reporters with limited protection 
against the use of NSLs to demand their records from third-party communications 
providers.  While the bill’s requirements that the government must exhaust 
alternative sources of the information and that a judge evaluate the demand under 
a public interest balancing test in cases that do not involve information about the 
identity of a source would provide reporters with some protection against the use 
of NSLs, the bill’s special treatment of demands related to national security 
diminishes these protections.  In particular, the bill’s exception to the absolute 
privilege for confidential sources in cases of leaks of classified information 
reduces protection against the most likely use of NSLs for reporters’ records, 
although the requirement that the leak must “ha[ve] caused or will cause 
significant and articulable harm” to national security is a higher standard than the 
NSL statute’s requirement of mere relevance to a terrorism investigation.  
Moreover, the notice and hearing requirements of the House bill will provide 
journalists with procedural protections, ensuring that the decision to demand their 
records is not left wholly to the discretion of the executive branch.  Even when the 
government is able to invoke the exception to notice, thus depriving the target 
journalist of the chance to challenge the demand, the decision to apply this 
exception will rest with a court rather than the executive. 
  The Senate’s shield law bill—reported out of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in December 2009—provides a far more limited reporter’s privilege 
than its counterpart in the House.88  Perhaps most significantly, the Senate shield 
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law bill applies only to a narrow category of “protected information,”89 limited to 
information identifying confidential sources or materials that a reporter created or 
obtained upon a promise that the materials would remain confidential.90    
Like the House bill, the Senate bill provides that a party may compel 
disclosure of protected information only after exhausting “all reasonable 
alternative sources.”91  The Senate bill also requires that in criminal investigations 
there must be reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has occurred and that the 
information sought is essential.  In most other ways, however, the Senate’s 
version of the privilege is much more limited.  Importantly, the Senate bill 
replaces the House’s public interest balancing test with a standard allowing 
disclosure if the Attorney General has certified that the request is “consistent 
with” the DOJ guidelines governing media subpoenas92 and the covered person 
has failed to establish “by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure of the 
protected information would be contrary to the public interest.”  As with the 
House bill, the judge is to take into account “the extent of any harm to national 
security” in assessing the public interest.93 
 The Senate bill also makes it relatively easy to compel disclosure when 
certain safety or national security risks are present.  When protected information 
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is “reasonably necessary to stop, prevent, or mitigate a specific case of: 1) death; 
2) kidnapping; or 3) substantial bodily harm,” the privilege simply does not apply 
at all.94  The bill also creates an exception allowing compelled disclosure in a 
criminal matter or leak investigation if the court finds that the protected 
information would “materially assist” the government in “preventing, mitigating, 
or identifying the perpetrator of an act of terrorism or other acts that have caused 
or are reasonably likely to cause significant and articulable harm to national 
security.”95  Investigations or prosecutions of leaks of classified information that 
do not involve an attempt by the government to prevent or mitigate terrorism or 
significant harm to national security are treated under the bill’s provisions 
covering criminal investigations generally.96    
 The standards above also apply when the government attempts to compel 
a communications service provider to disclose information from a reporter’s 
account, except when the information is sought under 18 U.S.C. § 2709, the 
ECPA NSL statute.97  When an ECPA NSL is issued in connection with a 
criminal investigation or prosecution, all the provisions above apply except the 
requirements that government have reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has 
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occurred and that the Attorney General certify that the request is consistent with 
the media subpoena guidelines.98  The bill thus provides fewer procedural 
protections when the government invokes its NSL authority to demand records.  
Nonetheless, the bill would still require that reporters whose records are subject to 
NSLs or other subpoenas to third parties receive notice of the request and an 
opportunity to be heard, except that notice may be delayed if the court determines 
that it would “pose a substantial threat to the integrity of a criminal investigation, 
a national security investigation, or intelligence gathering, or that exigent 
circumstances exist.”99 
 While the Senate bill would not provide substantive protections as 
rigorous as those offered by the House bill, particularly given the broad 
exceptions for national security-related requests, it could still significantly limit 
the potential burdens to newsgathering imposed by NSLs.  In particular, the 
requirement that reporters be provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard 
when their records are requested via NSLs would provide the type of procedural 
protections that the federal courts have recognized as sufficient to protect 
reporters’ First Amendment rights in other contexts. 
Recommendations 
 
 In their current form, nothing in the NSL statutes provides journalists with 
any protection against the government’s ability to secretly collect their toll billing 
and e-mail transactional records to track down the confidential sources of leaks 
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upon a mere showing that “the information sought is relevant to an authorized 
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine activities.”100  
As discussed in Chapter 2, neither the statute’s provision that NSLs may not be 
issued “solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment,”101 
nor the DOJ’s voluntarily adopted and selectively enforced guidelines governing 
reporter subpoenas102 provide an effective check on the FBI’s NSL power.    
The most effective means of protecting journalists’ newsgathering 
activities against the threat of NSLs would be to return the ECPA NSL to its pre-
1993 scope.  Prior to the 1993 amendments, a mere showing of relevance to a 
terrorism investigation was not sufficient to justify the use of NSL authority.  
Instead, NSLs could be issued only in foreign counterintelligence investigations 
and only for the records of those individuals or entities who were believed to be 
“a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”103  Under this standard, the 
records of journalists would seemingly rarely—if ever—be subject to review.  
However, the 2010 failure of the House and Senate bills proposing to return the 
NSL statutes to their pre-Patriot Act scope suggests that proposals to scale back 
NSL authorities in general may not be politically viable. 
The best, politically viable approach to ensuring an adequate balance of 
First Amendment rights and national security interests when NSLs are issued for 
journalists’ records may be to bring the use of NSLs in line with the use of other 
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investigative tools—such as searches and subpoenas—as applied to journalists.  
Providing procedural protections such as those available in Branzburg and other 
media subpoena cases would ensure that national security interests could not be 
invoked broadly to justify intrusions on journalists’ First Amendment 
newsgathering activities.  Case-by-case scrutiny of NSL requests for reporters’ 
records by a neutral judge would ensure against abuses and would also provide an 
opportunity to account for the public interest in maintaining a free flow of 
information from confidential sources.  At the same time, such a scheme would 
not prevent the government from invoking its national security interest in a case 
in which an intrusion is truly justified based on a specific national security need.   
The essential ingredients to such a scheme would be notice to the media 
party of the intent to collect his or her records through the use of an NSL and the 
opportunity to contest the NSL before a court prior to its issuance.  In light of the 
valid concern that disclosure of an NSL request could, in certain cases, tip off the 
target of a terrorism investigation and thus compromise law enforcement efforts, 
such a scheme would likely need to afford the government with the opportunity to 
seek a non-disclosure order against the media party to the same extent it may 
currently seek a non-disclosure order against the third-party provider in 
possession of the records.  Such a compromise, while limiting the media’s First 
Amendment right to disclose information about the NSL request, may be 
necessary to ensure the greater First Amendment benefits that stem from an 
opportunity for judicial review of NSL requests for media records.  A limitation in 
this context, which might be considered analogous to a court order preventing a 
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party in litigation from disclosing the contents of confidential materials received 
through discovery, is also less troubling than the type of prior restraint at issue in 
the Pentagon Papers case.  Furthermore, the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the 
scope of the non-disclosure provisions in the Doe litigation suggests that the 
government would have to make a significant and specific showing of need before 
non-disclosure could be ordered.104    
The statute should also adopt safeguards similar to those proposed in the  
House shield law bill discussed above, which requires in all cases that the 
government has exhausted all alternative sources of the information and that the 
public interest in compelling disclosure outweighs the public interest in gathering 
and disseminating news.105 
 
 
Conclusion 
The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the war on terror have created “a 
greater sense of urgency to the issue of unauthorized disclosure of sensitive 
national security secrets.”106  Both the Obama and Bush administrations ramped 
up efforts to root out leakers in the face of media reports about sensitive national 
security issues.  Under the Bush administration, for example, leaks about secret 
CIA prisons and the NSA’s warrantless surveillance program led to the launch 
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several FBI probes, a polygraph investigation within the CIA, and a threat to 
prosecute reporters under federal espionage laws.107  President Obama’s Justice 
Department has similarly “taken a hard line against leakers.”108  In May 2010, an 
FBI linguist was sentenced to 20 months in prison after pleading guilty to 
providing classified information to a blogger in only the third known conviction 
of a U.S. government official or contractor for leaking information to the press.109  
The previous month, the Justice Department reissued a grand jury subpoena 
against a New York Times reporter demanding disclosure of his sources for book 
chapter describing a CIA operation to disrupt nuclear weapons research in Iran 
and indicted a former National Security Agency official in connection with leaks 
to the Baltimore Sun.110 
As the government increasingly cracks down on leaks of national security 
information to the press, NSLs may provide an attractive means of quietly 
obtaining reporters’ phone or e-mail records in order to ferret out the identities of 
leakers.  From a First Amendment perspective, such a development would be 
troubling, as the use of NSLs occurs without the procedural protections that guard 
against violations of newsgathering rights in other contexts.  While reporters 
would likely not have a viable First Amendment claim against the use of NSLs to 
obtain their records in good faith investigations under current precedent, they 
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likely do have a First Amendment right to protect their newsgathering activities 
against NSLs that are overly broad, only tangentially related to the investigation 
at issue, or otherwise abusive.  The lack of judicial oversight of NSLs, however, 
leaves journalists without the ex ante ability to challenge NSLs for their records.  
Moreover, the nondisclosure provisions of the NSL statutes mean that journalists 
will rarely, if ever, discover that their records were subject to NSL requests, 
essentially depriving them of the ability to sue for damages post hoc as well.  
However, even if a journalist was able to bring a claim against the use of NSLs to 
obtain his or her records, the government may be able to justify any First 
Amendment infringement based on the important national security interests 
served by the issuance of NSLs.   
Given the uncertain success of a constitutional challenge, it appears that 
the best option for those concerned about the newsgathering intrusions imposed 
by NSLs is to seek legislative reforms.  While a wholesale scaling back of the 
NSL provisions to their pre-Patriot Act scope would not provide journalists with 
specific protections against the use of NSLs to obtain their records, it would 
severely limit the applicability of NSLs to situations involving information 
available in reporters’ records.  Such revisions may also be more politically viable 
than providing protection through the passage of a shield law.  Although a shield 
law would provide journalists with procedural protections to limit the use of 
NSLs, the odds of its passage may be slim.  Legislators have long tried to pass a 
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successful shield law without success; for example, in just the first six years after 
the Branzburg decision, nearly 100 shield law bills failed.111 
No matter how they occur, NSL reforms may be necessary to ensure that 
the government does not obtain records of journalists’ communications 
unchecked and in secrecy.  Although the consequences of leaking can be 
particularly devastating during times of war or other national security threats, and 
the government’s heightened concern about leaks therefore appropriate, the 
federal courts have suggested that the need for a robust and free flow of 
information may also be at its greatest during such times.  As Justice Stewart 
explained in his concurrence in the Pentagon Papers case, “the only effective 
restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and 
international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry—in an informed and 
critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic 
government.”112   
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